Ethnic minorities in China under Japanese occupation: the Muslim campaign and education during the Second Sino-Japanese War

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I explain the nature of the education and engagement of young Chinese minorities in north China under Japanese occupation during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Second, I examine what influence the occupation policy of Japanese puppet government had on forming Hui identity. During the Republic of China, the minority Hui were facing social inequality. Japan focused on the affairs of the Hui people and implemented a policy that gave them preferential treatment to advance the division and control of China. In 1938 the General Federation of Islam in China was founded under the Provincial Government of the Republic of China to advance the “Muslim campaign” of the Japanese Army. Its objectives were to support the regime, oppose communism, and the Young Muslim Association of China was established, training of young Muslims for military service. But young Hui trained in such association often rebelled against the Japanese occupation, and the Hui people who received modern education used education as a tool to fulfill their own goals instead. Therefore, the Hui established a dual identity of being Muslim and Chinese, and they chose to side with China rather than Japan. This study explores the complex process by which the minority Hui formed their double identity. This study is based primarily on literature review.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• second Sino-Japanese War
• hui
• double identity
• Japanese occupation
• Muslim campaign

1 Introduction

1.1 Background: ethnic minorities in China under Japanese occupation

In 1931, after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese military fomented the establishment of the Manchurian government, which divided northern China and further continued Japan’s encroachment into China. In addition, the Japanese military also supported the Mongol Military Government (MMG) in Inner Mongolia, in a vain attempt to control Xinjiang. Northwestern China has connections with Central Asia, where a high proportion of the population is Muslim. The Uighurs, who live in Xinjiang, and the Hui, who live in Gansu and Ningxia (the Hui also known as Sino-Muslims,Chinese is their mother tongue but they are ethnically descended from Persian and Turkish Muslims), held some power in the region. Conflict between Muslims and Han Chinese was continual because of differences of religious belief and lifestyle. The Japanese military took advantage of this sentiment to further its goal of disrupting Han Chinese control of China.

After the Lugou Bridge Incident, the Japanese military obtained occupation rights of Beiping (now Beijing), and in December 1937, established a puppet state, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (PGRC). The Japanese military expected the Muslim to play an important role in the process of establishing the regime, and in February 1938, the Islamic organization, the General Federation on Islam in China (GFIC, also known as the All China Muslim League) was founded to advance the “Muslim campaign” of the Japanese Army. The federation’s objective was to support the regime, oppose communism, and train young Muslims as part of the Young Muslim Association in China (YMAC, also known as Chinese Muslim Youth League).

1.2 Purpose of research

The aim of this study is to explore whether the Muslim campaign of the Japanese Army affected the formation of the double identity of the Hui and the national unification of China. I focus on the education and mobilization of Hui, a Chinese ethnic minority, under Japanese occupation. I am most concerned with three interrelated issues. The first issue is the education and wartime mobilization of Chinese ethnic minorities under Japanese occupation. According to Komagome¹ ,under colonial occupation, “the army played the role of hardware and school played the role of software.” I researched what functions schools and youth organizations served under colonial rule. Specifically, I focused on the YMAC, which was established in Beijing and employed Japanese-style social education. I examine both educational content and the conditions of wartime mobilization.

The second issue is how people confronted and survived the policies of Japanese occupation. Japan’s aggression was a crucial turning point for modern China. The Sino-Japanese War and subsequent civil war between the Communist and Nationalist parties was extremely chaotic, forcing people to make difficult choices. As society changed, ethnic minorities and women, who were previously sequestered to the periphery of society, came to the forefront. While accepting some measures of the Japanese occupation, many were ignored and rejected by Hui. In this study, I examine quiet resistance and explore which measures Hui rejected.

The third issue is how the antagonistic relationship with the Japanese occupation facilitated the formation of Hui identity and changed Chinese society. Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925), the founding father of the Republic of China, referred to the Chinese as “a sheet of loose sand.”² The Sino-Japanese War played an extremely important role in forming a national identity. What effect did the Japanese Muslim campaign have on Hui? In this paper, I elucidate how the double identity of the Hui developed and how this led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

1.3 Previous studies

Lipman’s comprehensive history of Islam in China from its arrival in the seventh century until 1930 focuses on the Hui³ Lipman explores how the Hui came into being and analyzes the group historically. Gladney conducted a survey of the Hui in the 1990s⁴ He introduces to the West the problems of ethnic diversity in China, where, within one nationality, there is a wide diversity of ethnic identities.

In addition, Matsumoto reported on the Hui during the Republican period and researched Japanese Muslims who engaged in the Muslim campaign in China⁵ Dryburgh conducted a study on the problem of identity and the Japanese engagement in North China⁶ Shimbo describes how young northern Chinese minorities were educated under the Japanese occupation during the Second Sino-Japanese War⁷ The target minority of the study were the Hui in Beijing.

There are several researches on the Hui under Japanese occupation⁸, but there are little researches on education especially from the view point of forming ethnic identity. There is no research on how the spread of modern education under the Japanese occupation paradoxically affected the formation of the minority identity, and how this led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Japan provided modern education to the Hui to use them as a tool for the occupation. However, the Hui developed a double identity of being Muslim and Chinese, and it formed the consciousness of the People’s Republic of China as a nation. In this paper, focusing on the Hui during the Sino-Japanese War, I use interviews with youth at that time and archives elucidate how the Hui formed double identity as Muslim and Chinese. The significance of this paper is acknowledged by the empirical evidence that the formation of double identity led to the victory of the Sino-Japanese war and was one of the major driving forces for the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

Lewin raises the concept of the marginal man⁹ Hui was a marginal man and a peripheral entity. However, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese army paid attention to the Hui who were the “marginal men” of the society. I analyze how the Hui stayed on the peripheral presence and how they play an important role as key persons in the confrontation between Japan and China.

1.4 Method

This study is based primarily on literature review. Most of the historical material that is analyzed was found in the following archives:

1. Diplomatic archives for foreign affairs (stored in the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan)

2. Archives of northern China from 1937 to 1945 under Japanese occupation (The Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing and the Beijing Archives)

3. Documents and photos of the Japanese Army’s Muslim campaign (Japanese Muslim Association Islamic Collection at Waseda University, Japan)

2 A Chinese journal of the GFIC (Beijing university)

In addition, the study is based on fieldwork conducted by the author, including interviews with former students of the Northwestern High School in Beijing under Japanese occupation¹⁰

3 Muslims in China

The introduction of Islam into China can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty. As the Yuan Dynasty expanded its territory into Central Asia, many Muslims traveled from western Asia to China. After the unification of China by the Qing Dynasty, a number of diverse ethnicities came under the rule of the Manchus. Because of the many differences in lifestyle between Muslims, the Manchus and Han Chinese (for example, the Muslim taboo against pork), disagreements between the ethnicities began to develop. The Hui began to resist the central government, leading to armed rebellions in Gansu, Ningxia, and Yunnan. In response, the Qing government continued to pursue a heavy-handed policy¹¹

In 1912 the Han Chinese regime of the Republic of China was established, and in 1927 the Nanjing government, headed by Chiang Kai-Shek, was born. The Kuomintang’s policy toward Islam was basically one of assimilation. It did not recognize Islam as a legitimate culture or ethnic minority and strongly advocated Han chauvinism¹² There were frequent incidents in which the Hui were insulted by the Han people, such as pouring pig oil into the wells used by the Hui. Under the Han Chinese, Muslims were often persecuted, arrested, and imprisoned based on groundless accusations¹³

However, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Chiang realized the importance and urgency of the problem of the ethnic minorities in northwestern China. He was particularly concerned with Islam and began to actively address the situation in northwestern China. In June 1938, in response to the GFIC, which formed in areas occupied by Japan, the Nanjing government established the Chinese Muslim Salvation Association as a unified front of all Muslims in the country. Through their participation on the front lines of resistance against Japan, a variety of ethnic groups began to realize their equality. The Japanese invasion compelled the Kuomintang (KMT) to reform its policy regarding Islam.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also addressed the issue of ethnic minorities as centers of resistance and liberation. In Shanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia, far from the front lines, the CCP recognized the autonomy of these regions¹⁴

4 The PGRC and the GFIC

4.1 The PGRC and the founding of the GFIC

After the Lugou Bridge Incident, Japan occupied Beijing, and in 1937, established the puppet state of the PGRC. This new government actually comprised the resurgence of feudal forces such as the Manchurian bureaucracy and the Beiyang Clique. Its political foundation was unstable, and so, the problem of ethnicity assumed particular importance. The Japanese military attempted to use the conflicts between Hui and Han Chinese in northern China to serve its aims. The Japanese military implemented the ethnic division policy using Chinese minorities as a “tool to be wielded in such conflicts between Hui and Han Chinese.”¹⁵

In February 1938, the GFIC held a large ceremony to celebrate its founding. Major Shigekawa Hidekazu of the Beijing intelligence agency considered the GFIC the greatest achievement at managing Islam in northern China. The GFIC’s constitution included the following goals: to coordinate relations between Japan, China, and Manchuria; oppose communism; support the PGRC; protect religions of the ethnic minority groups such as the Hui; and disseminate the above slogans. GFIC members showed a clear anti-communist stance and widely disseminated such slogans as “In the Russian Revolution, many mosques have been destroyed and akhoonds have been killed” and “Communism is the natural enemy of us Hui.”¹⁶ In addition, propaganda claiming that Japan was a friend and supported Islam was also spread. Anti-communist sentiment could only have been achieved with the aid of Muslims and the Japanese.

Through the “internal guidance” of Japanese advisors, the Japanese occupation completed the mission of fostering the Provisional Government as dictated by military intelligence policy¹⁷ The GFIC was also controlled from the inside by a few Japanese advisors.

4.2 The activities of the GFIC

The activities begun by the GFIC were foremost in the revitalization of Islam. Specifically, the GFIC set up a training center for akhoonds, where, among other activities, children’s textbooks were edited, religious education for elementary schools was offered, Islamic libraries were opened, and anti-communist beliefs were spread. Educational and cultural activities of the organization also included the training of master akhoonds, opening Japanese elementary and high schools, creating youth organizations, sending students to Japan, holding various seminars, and publishing magazines. Moreover, the federation had some economic concerns and conducted research on Islamic history and the living conditions of Muslims¹⁸ However, the capacity of the GFIC to infiltrate northern China was lacking. As an organization, its independence was restricted by multiple factors. It was reliant on the Provisional Government, which were unstable and could neither effectively organize the Muslims nor ensure the people’s support.

Muslims in China at that time were generally quite poor. In Beijing, there were approximately 50,000 Muslims, most of them Hui. Few reached the median standard of living; 20% had insufficient food and were below the poverty line. This goes a long way toward explaining the level of friction between Hui and Han Chinese. The GFIC attempted to address the living conditions. The belief was that to earn the support of Muslims and defame the Han Chinese, it was essential to find solutions to the problems experienced by Muslims. The GFIC petitioned the government to grant an exemption on rent for mosques, and they assisted students at the National Normal Institute in negotiating with authorities to construct a Muslim kitchen for Hui¹⁹

Though the GFIC was diligent in its efforts to improve the lives of Muslims under Japanese rule, heavy-handed occupation policy inflicted new disasters on Muslims. In fact, Muslims’ circumstances did not improve, but reached new and dire depths. For example, many Muslims made their living independently slaughtering and butchering cows. However, in February 1937, after the Lugou Bridge Incident, the government prohibited the unpermitted slaughtering and selling of beef in the name of public health in order to prevent a drop in the price of beef²⁰ Even economically powerful private organizations could slaughter only a certain number of cows. Thus, individual operators were completely incapable of survival. The livelihood of Muslims’ was under threat and their social status low.

4.3 Training activities of the young Muslim association of China

The educational activities of the GFIC were embodied in the YMAC organization. The association was established in 1938, and its aim was to nurture young Muslim cadres from 20 to 30 years-old, who would in turn train young teenage Muslims, nurturing the core of soldiers serving the military occupation. To join the YMAC, one had to graduate from high school (or possess an equivalent qualification) and pass an examination. To sit for the exam, examinees had to be between the ages of 20 and 30. Examinations covered geography, history, and other subjects. The training period was 2 months (later extended to 4 months), with all expenses paid by the GFIC²¹ Half the curriculum consisted of military training; the other half consisted of cultural instruction like “anti-communist studies,” “internal regulations of the military,” and Japanese²² The ultimate goal was to elicit Muslim support for the invasion of China, opposition to communism, and the establishment of a militaristic organization in service to the Japanese military.

The association arranged nine training terms, during which approximately 200 young people received training. At the end of training, the trainees were recommended for employment in such positions as Japanese gendarmes, foreign affairs intelligence officers for the North Branch of Manchuria Railways, or as staff at the regional offices of the YMAC or GFIC. They served, essentially, as minions of the Japanese invaders²³ The YMAC recruited beyond Beijing, in places like Henan, but faced difficulties there. For example, 20 recruits were expected for the first term of training, but only 9 joined. For the second term they expected 50 and ended up with only 41. Not only did few want to join, but the members often rebelled against Japanese teachers and disobeyed their orders.

The members of the YMAC did not follow Japanese leadership and they caused a lot of trouble. For example, a few Japanese staff of GFIC monitored the young Hui, and they were dissatisfied with being monitored. On one occasion, members of the association happened upon a road construction site and observed a Japanese supervisor beating Chinese workers. The members physically attacked the supervisor, and when their Japanese instructors scolded them, the young Hui insisted that they did not know that the supervisor was Japanese²⁴ Another incident occurred in 1939, when some YMAC members went to the theater near GFIC and quarreled with a theater manager, resulting in six of the members suffering serious injuries²⁵ Many small shops near the theater were owned and operated by Hui, and the shop owners came to the aid of the young Hui. The theater manager incited further participation and the quarrel became a fierce brawl. One Han Chinese made a derogatory remark about Islam and enraged the Hui. A YMAC member rushed to the offices of GFIC, to sue for injustice; however, the Japanese staff, afraid of the group approaching, fled through the back gate of the offices, which pleased the Hui enough for them to relent. YMAC members often caused problems of this kind. At first, many articles about the YMAC were published in Huijiao Yuekan and Huijiao Zhoubao, the magazine of the GFIC, but the number decreased gradually²⁶ These facts, which illustrate that YMAC members did not obey the Japanese, demonstrate that the YMAC did not produce the desired result. In 1942 the 10th-term trainees worked at a coal mine in Manchuria for 2 months. Mining was the lowest tier of labor and was frustrating for the young people.²⁷ As the number of applicants decreased sharply, the YMAC stopped recruiting thereafter.

Let’s look at the case of YMAC member Weng Shao-Rong, who came from a Hui village in northern China and joined the YMAC to job hunt²⁸ Many at the time believed that participation in the YMAC was a means of securing employment. Weng’s hometown had been attacked by the Japanese, forcing him to leave. After completing training, Weng joined the staff of the GFIC and was dispatched to Japan for 1 year. In 1943, there were 11 Japanese and more than 110 Muslim staff at the GFIC. As financial resources dwindled, the staff deteriorated into chaos, and Weng resigned. Around the same time, local organizations established by the GFIC had also been eroded through the efforts of the CCP. Weng contacted the communists, which should have been pro-Japanese. He was trained as a member of the YMAC and employed by the Japanese as a staff member. Furthermore, he was chosen from among the Chinese staff and studied abroad in Japan. Although Weng seems to be pro-Japanese, it is noteworthy that he regarded himself as Chinese and cooperated with the CCP. He was trying to establish an identity as a Chinese citizen.

In addition to the YMAC, there were also cases where they did not comply with Japanese intentions. According to Liu who studied at the Northwestern High School under Japanese occupation, the school was under Japanese rule and Japanese officials were sent to monitor. However, the teachers were Chinese. Therefore, in class the teacher did not follow the Japanese obediently, such as expressing the condolences for “Japan’s victory/China’s defeat in North China in 1941” and letting the students express their condolences²⁹

4.4 Quiet resistance of a hui leader

The movement toward Islamization began in the 1940s. An elementary school intended to train pious Muslims was built near Beijing³⁰ In an attempt to counter the CCP, the Japanese Army had to accept its construction. In order to protect their community, the Muslims living under Japanese military occupation sought to solidify their identity as Muslims living in China and to counter Japan’s Muslim campaign. The creation of this school also indicates that the attitude of Hui toward the cultural oversight of the Japanese Army was one of resistance. Because of such refractory maneuvers, the relationship between Japanese and Hui at that time cannot be described as one of mere dominance and dependence.

The leaders of the GFIC also initiated actions of resistance. For example, Deputy Chairman Zhao Guo-Zheng (born around 1880) was uncompromising on religious issues, even though he was said to be pro-Japanese and frequently made statements that emphasized the partnership between Japan and Muslims. For example, Zhao refused to attend the 1943 funeral of Shinminkai Vice-Chairman Ying Tong (1889–1942), because reading regret and burning incense were strictly prohibited in Islam. At that time, the GFIC received funds from the Shinminkai. Regardless of GFIC staff’s attempts to persuade him to attend, Zhao refused³¹ Furthermore, he did not salute lecturers at meetings of the GFIC. During the ceremony, the flags of Japan, the PGRC, and the GFIC were raised, but Zhao saluted none of them³² The Japanese attempted to persuade the people to worship in the direction of the Imperial Palace, but they also refused because besides the worship of Allah, “all worship is prohibited in Islam.”

The refusal to salute the Japanese flag or to worship in the direction of the Imperial Palace were decidedly taboo. The leaders of the GFIC were more likely to break such taboos than the leaders of other colonies or occupied territories such as Korea. Given the circumstances, punishment could not be administered. By stubbornly resisting the cultural oversight undertaken by the Japanese Army, the GFIC maintained its Muslim roots, which again indicates that the relationship between the Japanese and the Hui was not simply one of control and repression during the Japanese occupation.

Those who cooperated with the Japanese Army were considered collaborators. However, an examination of historical material, including detailed interviews with Hui who lived through the experience, shows that those who cooperated with Japan are regarded as having done so out of concern for the security of their people and the protection of their interests, even if they were considered collaborators³³ Even under Japanese military control, in many cases the collaborators, who were criticized as cooperators with Japan, attempted to maintain their pride as Muslims and as Chinese citizens, to the end.

5 The foundation of a double identity

As demonstrated above, the Muslim campaign, which centered on the GFIC, did not proceed as smoothly as the Japanese Army had expected, and the Hui demonstrated their independence and were able to take their own initiatives. What factors caused the failure of the Muslim campaign? Firstly, the structure of the Hui’s sense of belonging was complex. Hall described cultural identity as hybrid and not fixed, what is labeled “identity” is itself only “temporary positionality.”³⁴ Identity is unstable, metamorphic, and even contradictory, which signifies that identity is marked by multiple points of similarities and differences. The sense of belonging in the Hui is complex, consisting of multiple layers. These layers include: (1) Kinship, or groups the culture of which centers on language; (2) territorial groups or a group of people who call the same locality home; (3) religions, religious denominations, or similar groupings; (4) political units, (5) and psychological cohabitation³⁵ The Hui exhibit “multiple personalities” because of the inherent multiplicity in the structure of their sense of belonging. Such a complex structure of attribution is described as an “identity complex.”³⁶ Therefore, while the Hui were obedient to the Japanese, they were in fact adhering to their own convictions. Even Hui leaders of the GFIC, despite their pro-Japanese remarks, refused to worship the emperor, did not salute the Japanese flag, and did not allow others to do so. In one sense, the Japanese seemed to control them, but the Muslim community was actually maintaining a semblance of control and resistance.

Secondly, in northern China, the Japanese Army had to counter the influence of the KMT and the CCP. For example, one Hui leader living in Beijing visited a KMT leader in Shanghai to ask for exchanging information and discussing what they can do as the same ethnic minority group against Japan. Other Hui left Beijing and moved to areas controlled by the KMT, such as Chengdu. During the Sino-Japanese War period, Hui were active, traveling from Beijing to Mecca to meet and engage with other Hui dispatched by the KMT³⁷ So, even when considering the movement of Hui under Japanese occupation, the relationship between Mecca, China, and Japan is necessary. Both the KMT and the CCP dispatched agents to Beijing, and among the leaders of Beijing’s Hui groups, some were involved with either the KMT or the CCP³⁸ The CCP, in particular, recognized Hui as an ethnic minority and actively promoted policy allowing them greater autonomy. The success of such policy attracted the notice of the Muslims, who welcomed them. This influence was a threat to the Japanese Army.

One other important factor was the 1941 appointment of Mita Ryoichi as president of the GFIC. A devout Muslim himself, he advocated for Muslims in Japan after the war. After the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941, Mita voiced no strong opinions regarding Muslims, owing to the deterioration of the war effort at this point in the Second Sino-Japanese war.

6 Conclusions

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I explain the nature of the education and engagement of young Hui minorities under Japanese occupation during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, I examine what influence occupation policy had on forming the identity of Hui. This study explores the complex process by which the minority Hui formed their double identity. The conclusion is as follows. First, after its founding, the Republic of China adopted a policy of assimilation regarding Muslims, did not respect their indigenous culture, and ignored their poor living conditions. The GFIC was formed in response, to improve the living conditions of Muslims. However, what the GFIC actually accomplished was to chant slogans about respect for ethnic minorities and to make a great effort at creating ethnic conflicts. I examined the GFIC in northern China, which focused on YMAC, emphasizing military training, and employment in service to the Japanese Army. I also discussed the suspension of the YMAC and how military training was an important component of the YMAC. In general, members of the association were from rich Hui families, but they were dispatched in the name of working in service to Manchuria, with some even forced to work in coal mines. Even young Muslims had positive expectations for the GFIC and YMAC; the reality was a total betrayal. As a result, recruiting became increasingly more difficult, pushing YMAC to the brink of dissolution.

Second, the significant point was that Japan’s occupation policy promoted the formation of Hui double identity as Muslim and Chinese. I examined a young Hui man, Weng Shao-Rong, who belonged to the YMAC, worked at the GFIC, and studied in Japan. I examined his motivations for joining the YMAC, leaving the GFIC, and deciding to join the CCP. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT, the CCP, and the Japanese Army were actively struggling for control over Muslim communities in China. This is because the region where Muslims lived was critical for victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The forced organization of Muslims by the Japanese military played the paradoxical role of increasing their Chinese nationalism and solidifying their support for the Islamic religion and culture. Japan’s military aggression and the Muslim campaign played a notable role in changing the Hui people who have two identities, both Muslim and Chinese. The Hui did not side with the Japanese and chose to live as Chinese citizens. These minority ethnic groups contributed to the success of the war against Japan. As a result, the Hui was recognized for his achievements in the victory of the Sino-Japanese War and then in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Based on Japanese propaganda, the Hui thought that Muslims were oppressed in Russia and had defected, leaving Russia to escape the communist regime. Nevertheless, the Hui stood by the CCP rather than the KMT, because the CCP had policies of respecting the rights of ethnic minories. The support of the Hui was one of the factors that led to the CCP’s victory in the “nationalist split” between these parties. The Hui gained status as ethnic minority in the People’s Republic of China and were given preferential treatment as a minority.

Third, after Japan’s defeat in 1945, the collaborators with Japan experienced extremely harsh treatment. The puppet regime, like Wang Jing-Wei, which included China’s high-ranking officials, were subjected to the Hanjian Trials, where many were executed. Many of the local people who advanced the Muslim campaign were also heavily criticized and called collaborators. Japanese policy regarding ethnic minorities resulted in a considerable number of victims. Previous literature concerning the minority peoples under Japanese occupation claim that members of these minority groups served as staff in the Japanese government and acted as collaborators. However, the Hui who could not but be concerned with Muslim campaign often revolted against the Japanese Army and the military governments.

In the political movement after founding of the People’s Republic of China, especially during the Cultural Revolution, ethnic minorities were exposed to attack. Those considered to be “Muslim collaborators” suffered not only because they were collaborators with Japan but because they also believed in Islam. This study illuminates the complex circumstances of Hui people at that time, and it explains how Hui developed a double identity as both Muslim and Chinese, an identity born during the Second Sino-Japanese War. According to Lewin, a Hui is a “marginal man” that did not assimilate into Han society and were a peripheral presence³⁹ They played a key role in the Sino-Japanese War, and the Hui had a key presence during the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

From the perspective of providing modern education to minorities and equal educational opportunities, the following can be said as a result of this research ⁠ – during the founding of the Republic of China, ethnic minorities, such as the Hui people, were facing social inequality. There was prejudice and discrimination against the Hui people, and they were not provided with educational opportunities. However, during the occupation of North China by the Japanese army, Japan focused on the affairs of the Hui people and implemented a policy that gave them preferential treatment to advance the division and control of China. The Japanese army offered the opportunity of modern education and tried to use the Hui as a means for war mobilization. However, the Hui people who received modern education used education as a tool to fulfill their own goals instead. The Hui people understood that the Japanese Army’s claim to improve the status of the Hui people was not meant for the realization of social equality, but rather to use the Hui people to carry out war. Therefore, the Hui established a dual identity of being Muslim and Chinese, and they chose to side with China rather than Japan. The Hui also contributed to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

I would like to continue to examine the provision of modern education to ethnic minorities, and the realization of educational equality under the Japanese occupation and post-colonial situations in China beyond the twentieth century.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Atsuko Shimbo

Atsuko Shimbo is Professor of School of Education, Waseda University. She finished the PhD program at University of Tokyo Graduate School of Education. She received her PhD degree in2002 from Waseda Univesity. Before joining Waseda University, she was an assistant professor at Kyoto University (1987–1990). She is a visiting professor at Beijing Normal University (2013–2018) and a visiting scholar at School of African and Asian Studies, London University (2017).Her recent publications are (in Japanese) Muslims in China under Japanese occupation: The ethnic minority policy and women’s education in the North China and Mongol Military Governments (Waseda University Press, 2018) (in Chinese) My Road to Be a Teacher, with Manhua Wei and Xinrong Zheng (Educational Science Publishing House, 2014); (in Japanese) Fading Identities: Changing Patterns of Cultural Transmission within Ethnic Minority Families in China (Kokusai Shoin, 2014); and “Islamic Education in China: Triple Discrimination and the Challenge of Hui Women’s Madrasas,” with Masumi Matsumoto, in The Moral Economy of the Madrasa, edited by Keiko Sakurai and Fariba Adelkhah (Routledge, 2010).

Notes

¹ Komagome, “Iminzoku shihai no kyougi,” 138.

² Sun, San min chu i, 12.

³ Lipman, Familiar strangers,266..

⁴ Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism,65–116; Gladney, Ethnic Identity in China,195..

⁵ Matsumoto, Chugoku minzoku seisaku, 359; Matsumoto, “Sino-Muslims’ identity,” 39–54..

⁶ Dryburgh, “Problem of Identity,” 199–219..

⁷ Shimbo, Nihon senryou ka, 371..

⁸ Sawai, “Japanese army and Muslim,” 111–132; Ando, “Nihon senryou ka no kahoku,” 21–81.

⁹ Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, 230..

¹⁰ Fieldwork at Beijing in 1998 and 2015: Fieldwork at Guangzhou in 1998..

¹¹ Kataoka,” Kousho 21–22 neni,”53–77..

¹² Kaikyouken Koukyuujo,” Gendai ni okeru, ” 274–304..

¹³ “Kankai tairitsu mondai to sono kaiketu ni tuite,” Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs(Japan) Kikan kaikyou jijou,vol.2no.1,(Jan1939),11..

¹⁴ Yoshida,” Chugoku kyousan tou no,” 44–62..

¹⁵ General Federation on Islam in China, Kaikyou kousaku kara mita, 9.

¹⁶ “Zhongguo Huijiao lianhehui xuanyan,” Huijiao yuekan,vol.1no.1 (April 1938):5

¹⁷ Beijing tebie shi,“Huijiao lianhehui zuzhi ”;Yasui,“Nihon teikoku shugi,”161–187.

¹⁸ Mita, Shina ni okeru waga kaikyou,18..

¹⁹ Kaikyou ken koukyu jo.“Chugoku kaikyou sou renngoukai,”17..

²⁰ Yang, “Dan caozong xia de,” 14–15..

²¹ “Kaikyouken jouhou,” Gekkan kaikyo ken, vol.1 no.3 (September 1938): 38..

²² “Qingniantuan baogao,” Huijiao yuekan, vol.1no.3 (July 1938): 70..

²³ “Qingniantuan tegao,” Huijiao yuekan, vol.1no.4 (July 1938): 56..

²⁴ Liu and Liu, Beijing niujie, 104..

²⁵ Liu, Beijing Huimin jiaoyu shilue, 53..

²⁶ Huijiao Yuekan, Beijing,GFIC vo.1, no.1 (April 1938)-vol.2, no.4 (March 1940); Huijiao Zhoubao, GFIC, Beijing, no.1 (August 1940)-no.194 (March 1945)..

²⁷ Huijiao Zhoubao, no.97 (July 17 1942); no.98 (July 24 1942); no.99 (July 31 1942).

²⁸ Beijing Archive, J2-2-406-1 c663, July1, 1945..

²⁹ Liu, Dongsheng, personal communications, May 21 1998. Beijing..

³⁰ Jin, “Muguan xuexiao de huiyi.”.

³¹ Kurihara, Chuugoku kaikyou monndai, 17..

³² See note 28 above..

³³ Liu, Dongsheng, personal communications, May 21 1998. Beijing; RSE,BY (Names are coded to protect privacy) personal communications, Jun 9,1998.Guangzhou..

³⁴ Hall, “Who needs ‘identity’?,” 1–17.

³⁵ Kato, Isuramu sekai no kiki, 16–17..

³⁶ Suzuki, Nihonjin ni totte Isuramu, 39.

³⁷ Mu, “Cong Beijing huijiao hui,” 107–121..

³⁸ Peng, Nian. personal communications, April 28 1998. Beijing..

³⁹ Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts,230..