Asian views of China in the age of China’s rise: interpreting the results of pew survey and Asian student survey in chronological and comparative perspectives, 2002-2019

ABSTRACT

In order to see how Asian countries in this special volume (Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia) are looking at China in chronological and comparative perspectives, using Global Attitudes Survey data conducted by Pew Research Center would be the best way because they cover the data from 2002 to 2019 as of now.

We can get a lot of insights on different views of the rise of China in Asia through the analysis of Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey data, but there are some inconveniences. Some data in Asian countries are lacking, and the timing of survey is different from one country to another, which makes it difficult to compare the results across the countries.

In order to overcome such limitations, this paper uses the second wave and third wave data of Asian Student Survey. Main findings of the analysis are as follows.

1. As of 2018, Singapore and Indonesia were comparatively positively viewing the influence of China, while Vietnam was viewing it negatively, and Japan and South Korea were in-between. The changes in these five years, however, were different from country to country.

2. Changing views of Chinese toward Asian countries were basically symmetrical to those of Asian countries toward China.

3. In these surveyed countries, “peaceful rise frame” was the most powerful determinant of the views of China, which explains why views of China were worsening in these countries. But the concrete determinants of the views were different from one country to another.

KEYWORDS:

• Views of China
• East Asia
• chronological and comparative analysis
• frame
• Asian student survey

1 Introduction

Recently, the rise of China has been receiving special attention. In fact, there are some public opinion poll projects of perception of China in Asia. In Japan, for example, the Cabinet Office and the Genron NPO have been investigating the public’s evaluation of Japan-China relations since 1978 and 2005, respectively. In South Korea, the Asan Institute of Policy Studies has taken up comparatively short-term issues, taking up current events to collect time-series data on the perception of China. Asian Barometer and AsiaBarometer cover many Asian nations to compare their views of some countries including China. Some researchers have started to investigate global views of China by using available secondhand data for comparative purposes¹

However, because concrete questions have been tailored to local circumstances, it is not easy to compare perceptions toward China in multiple countries/regions, and it is difficult to identify which factors affect the overall evaluation toward China across countries/regions because different surveys in different countries are using different parameters.

In order to see how Asian neighboring countries in this special issue (namely, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia) are looking at China extensively in comparative perspectives, which is one of the missions of this paper, using Global Attitudes Survey data conducted by Pew Research Center would be the best way because they cover the data from 2005 to 2019, which are already disclosed as of December 2, 2020²

2 Changing views of China: analysis of the global attitudes survey, 2002-2019

Data of Global Attitudes Survey have comparative advantages in the following three points. Firstly, sample size is large enough and covers a wide range of people in terms of their residence, generation, and other socio-economic status. Secondly, some socio-economic variables which might have something to do with people’s perception are available in the Global Attitudes Survey. Thirdly and most importantly, chronological data are available, which makes it possible to see the trends of perception toward China over time.

Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey contains three different types of frequently asked questions on China³ one is whether the informant evaluates China (as well as US) favorably or not, another is whether the informant sees economic growth of China positively or not, and the other is whether the informant sees military development of China positively or not⁴

2.1 Declining favorable views of China

Figure 1 shows the chronological change of the percentage of people with favorable views of China from 2002 to 2019⁵

Figure 1. Favorable Views of China: 2002–2019 (%).

Note: Number shows percentage of those who answered that their view of China is“favorable” (“very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” combined)

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

When the survey started in 2002, discrepancies among four countries toward the views of China were not so large; there is only 11-points difference between South Korea (66%) and Japan (55%) in the percentage of favorable views. Soon after, however, the discrepancy enlarges due to a drastic drop of Japan’s score, though we can see the same declining pattern across countries until 2008. The gap among countries had widened across the time since then, and it is in 2013 when the gap became largest between Indonesia (70%) and Japan (5%), where public opinions toward China were so tight and negative because of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands issues. Interestingly, however, the gap started to become narrower since then due to the gradual decline of favorable views in Indonesia as well as the gradual rise of favorable views in Japan, which continues until 2019.

The concrete timings of change of views are different across countries as well, reflecting different bilateral relations with China in Asia, which creates different changing patterns in surveyed countries. In the case of Japan, for example, favorable views declined until 2008 when Sichuan Earthquake happened and China-Japan joint rescue activities were conducted in an emergency, which gave Japanese informants opportunities to have a look at positive aspects of China. Japanese views of China faced a turning point in 2012 when the Minshutô (Democratic Party of Japan) administration purchased the Senkaku Islands from a private landlord, which triggered an intense confrontation between Japan and China. After this event, Japanese views of China hit rock bottom, and then became better steadily but very slowly. Accepting the deployment of US THAAD missiles was the critical turning point from positive to negative views of China in South Korea from 2015 to 2016⁶

Despite these fluctuations in Asian nations’ views of China, we can find some stable patterns over time as well. In other words, Figure 1 tells us that we can categorize Asian countries into three groups in terms of their views of China after the year of 2005; first is a negative group composed of China’s neighboring countries that have serious territorial (sovereignty) issues; second is a positive group to which most of the Southeast Asian countries belong; and third is a neutral group which is in-between the above two groups. Japan and Vietnam belong to the first group, Indonesia belongs to the second group, and South Korea belongs to the third group, even though there are some fluctuations of views depending on the nature of political /economic /socio-cultural /international events taking place in their bilateral/multilateral relations with China.

In terms of the degree of consensus among informants about the views of China, however, we will get a different picture. Figure 2 shows the chronological changes of standard deviation in four countries’ views of China from 2005 to 2019⁷

Figure 2. Standard Deviation in Views of China: 2005–2017.

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Figure 3. Correlation between Views of US and China: 2005–2017.

Note: Figure shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient between evaluation of influence from US and evaluation of influence from China

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

As can be seen in this figure, Japan and South Korea show relative stable score of standard deviation, while Indonesia’s standard deviation is continuously on the rise. As views of China have been worsening, consensus building on China is becoming difficult in Indonesia.

2.2 China vs. US: A rivalry or not?

Under the current situation where China’s rise is cautiously observed by the US, both countries are apt to be treated as competitor in global politics and economy. Some strategists in Asia are pointing out that some ASEAN countries are taking a “hedging strategy” for this challenging situation⁸, but how are the ordinary citizens looking at the US and China? Are they looking at the US and China in a zero-sum situation or a positive-sum situation?

Figure 3 shows the correlation coefficient between the views of US and China in four Asian countries over time. All in all, views of US and China are positively correlated in all the countries, but the coefficient is low and has been fluctuating over time. Coefficients in Indonesia have been highest among the four countries except in 2007, and this finding partially provides an empirical support for Fitriani’s⁹ argument that Indonesia has been trying to take an equal distance and establish good relationship toward the US and China¹⁰

Interestingly, South Korea shows constant decline of correlation from 2007 to 2017. The score of correlation was 0.37 in 2007, but the score was lowered as much as 0.02 in 2017, meaning views of the US and China are basically independent from each other. The same pattern can be witnessed in the case of Vietnam as well. Such a change might reflect changing geopolitical circumstances in South Korea and Vietnam.

2.3 Different evaluation of China’s economic and military development

Sino-Japanese relations after normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972 was stable and positively evaluated before the Tiananmen Incident happened in 1989, which triggered Japanese people’s concerns about the Chinese authoritarian regime, due to positive-sum relations; the Japanese side wanted to assist China’s economic development partly because such an assistance will create much better conditions for FDI and promising situation for Japanese companies, while the Chinese side needed Japan’s economic as well as technological assistance for the project of Four Modernizations.

Paradoxically, both parties needed economic collaboration despite their different political regimes. When China started to show her aggressiveness over territorial issues in the 2010s, however, Japanese people started to have a strong concern over the military development of China, which eventually resulted in a negative evaluation of China’s rise in Japan. Then, what about other Asian countries? Do they evaluate China’s economic and military development in a positive way or a negative way? Are their evaluations changing over time?

Table 1 and Table 2 show four countries’ evaluations of China’s economic as well as military development over time, respectively. All in all, Asian nations’ evaluations of China’s economic development are more positive than that of its military development.

Table 1. Evaluation toward China’s Growing Economy

“Overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?”
		Good thing	Bad thing	Don’t know	Refused
Japan	2006	67.7%	28.3%	4.0%
	2010	62.7%	28.1%	8.7%	0.4%
	2011	60.0%	33.0%	7.0%
	2013	48.3%	38.7%	13.0%
	2017	54.0%	34.2%	11.8%
South Korea	2010	45.2%	49.0%	5.8%
	2014	57.7%	36.0%	5.7%	0.6%
	2017	45.9%	48.1%	5.2%	0.7%
Vietnam	2014	21.5%	71.7%	6.4%	0.4%
	2017	27.9%	64.0%	7.9%	0.2%
Indonesia	2005	69.5%	23.4%	6.7%	0.5%
	2010	60.8%	27.6%	11.6%
	2011	62.5%	25.0%	12.5%
	2013	53.5%	33.4%	13.0%	0.1%
	2014	56.3%	27.3%	15.9%	0.5%
	2017	52.1%	33.7%	14.0%	0.2%

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Table 2. Evaluation toward China’s Growing Military Power

“Overall do you think that China’s growing military power is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?”
		Good thing	Bad thing	Don’t know	Refused
Japan	2006	3.2%	93.4%	3.4%
	2010	4.1%	88.7%	6.6%	0.6%
	2011	6.6%	88.0%	5.4%
	2013	2.1%	95.7%	2.1%
	2017	3.5%	91.2%	5.3%	0.1%
South Korea	2010	7.6%	86.3%	5.9%	0.1%
	2017	4.2%	92.9%	2.3%	0.7%
Vietnam	2017	4.3%	90.7%	5.0%
Indonesia	2005	60.1%	27.8%	11.8%	0.3%
	2010	40.9%	39.4%	19.7%
	2011	47.4%	31.5%	20.6%	0.5%
	2013	35.8%	38.3%	25.0%	0.9%
	2017	32.7%	47.7%	19.6%

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Though the percentage of those who evaluated the Chinese growing economy as a “good thing” declined in Japan since 2006, those who are positively looking at the phenomenon is more than those who are negatively looking at it, even when only 5% of the informants viewed China favorably in 2013. People in Vietnam tend to negatively evaluate China in many aspects, but those who positively evaluate the economic development in China outnumbered those who positively evaluate its military development by 23% as of 2017.

Conversely, a vast majority of the respondents in Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam have negative views of the Chinese military development. Most drastic changes can be seen in Indonesia; positive views of Chinese military development declined from 60.1% in 2005 to 32.7% in 2017. Thus, increasing economic presence of China is generally welcomed, while increasing military presence of China has been negatively received in Asian countries.

3 Competing frames on the rise of China: analysis of the Asian student survey, 2008-2019

Though Global Attitudes Survey provides us with a lot of information as we could see in the previous section, it is not free from limitations. Firstly, timing of research is not the same across Asian countries, and the Singaporean data is missing. Secondly, some competing frames of the rise of China which might determine people’s views of China are simply missing in the questionnaire. And thirdly, data is not appropriate to check the mutual perception between China and the rest of Asian countries because almost all the data are focused on the perception toward China.

In order to compensate for these limitations, it is better to further explore the Asian Student Survey¹¹ data which covers all the targeted countries in this project (See Table 3). Though the data was collected in three periods (2008, 2013–4, and 2018–9) with limited number of samples focused on the students who are studying at flagship universities in their undergraduate programs¹², Asian Student Survey contains questions on mutual perception among Asian countries including China and competing frames to understand the rise of China in the second and third wave, which makes this survey quite unique from other large-scale datasets including Global Attitudes Survey and Asian Barometer.

Table 3. Asian Student Survey: Second to Third Wave

Country	University	Date of Research		Sample Size
		Second Wave	Third Wave	Second Wave	Third Wave
Japan	Univ. of Tokyo	2013.10.1–11.15	2019.4.26–7.12	230	211
	Waseda Univ.			234	235
South Korea	Seoul National Univ.	2013.9.30–10.4	2018.10.2–2019.1.31	345	203
	Korea Univ.			395	262
China	Peking Univ.	2013.10.1–10.8	2018.9.15–12.12	200	207
	Tsinghua Univ.			200	203
	Fudan Univ.	2013.9.15–10.25	2018.9.18–10.1	200	216
	Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.			200	245
Vietnam	Vitnam National Univ. Hanoi	2013.9.17–9.25	2018.10.3–11.22	270	230
	Vitnam National Univ. HCMC			261	230
Singapore	National Univ. of Singapore	2013.10.1–11.30	2018.10.1–11.30	321	200
	Nanyang Technological Univ.	– –		– –	200
Indonesia	Univ. of Indonesia	2014.11.30–2015.3.17	2018.9.14–9.24	200	206
	Gadjah Mada Univ.			200	201

Source: Sonoda, Ajia no kokumin kanjo [National Sentiments in Asia], 254–255.

Before looking into the Asian Student Survey data, we will first investigate chronological changes of views of China in the surveyed four countries in the Global Attitudes Survey, and in Singapore.

Before starting the exploration of causality, we will check (1) how respondents in surveyed countries have been evaluating China’s influence on their countries, (2) whether their views of China are corresponding to the Chinese views of them, and (3) how competing frames for understanding the rise of China have been accepted by the respondents in surveyed countries.

3.1 Asian view of China’s influence

Asian student’s evaluations of China’s influence are diverse and fluctuating over time (see Table 4). As of 2018, compared to other countries, Singapore and Indonesia were positively viewing the influence of China, while Vietnam was viewing it negatively, and Japan and South Korea were in-between them. Changes within these years were also different from country to country. South Korea showed a decline of positive evaluation, while Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia showed an increase of positive evaluation from the second wave to the third wave. To our surprise, Japanese students’ evaluation became drastically better between 2013 and 2019¹³

Table 4. Asian Views of China’s Influence: 2013–2019

		Good	Rather Good	Hard to Say	Rather Bad	Bad	Don’t Know
Japan	2013	2.8%	17.4%	18.3%	38.3%	17.4%	5.9%
	2019	7.1%	40.1%	26.8%	20.7%	2.7%	2.7%
South Korea	2013	3.3%	36.6%	18.0%	32.3%	5.6%	4.2%
	2018	1.1%	28.8%	13.4%	39.0%	14.5%	3.2%
Vietnam	2013	1.9%	11.0%	16.7%	32.6%	31.1%	6.6%
	2018	2.9%	17.4%	28.4%	32.3%	15.6%	3.5%
Singapore	2013	5.9%	40.9%	23.1%	23.1%	3.8%	3.1%
	2018	12.8%	49.6%	19.9%	12.3%	1.5%	3.8%
Indonesia	2014	23.5%	41.5%	18.8%	11.8%	3.0%	1.5%
	2018	27.8%	44.4%	5.3%	16.4%	4.0%	2.0%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

3.2 Chinese view of other Asian nations’ influence

Changing views of Chinese toward Asian countries are basically symmetrical to those of Asian countries toward China (see Table 5). China-Singapore relations are most positively evaluated, while China-Vietnam relations are most negatively evaluated mutually.

Table 5. Chinese View of Asia’s Influence: 2013–2018

		Good	Rather Good	Hard to Say	Rather Bad	Bad	Don’t Know
Japan	2013	2.1%	13.2%	21.5%	38.0%	19.1%	6.1%
	2018	7.2%	39.6%	25.4%	22.0%	2.5%	3.4%
South Korea	2013	3.3%	27.6%	44.0%	16.4%	2.0%	6.8%
	2018	2.6%	24.1%	40.9%	22.0%	2.3%	8.1%
Vietnam	2013	0.6%	6.6%	41.9%	27.4%	6.1%	17.3%
	2018	1.5%	8.9%	48.4%	18.9%	2.3%	19.9%
Singapore	2013	9.3%	51.5%	27.3%	2.8%	0.6%	8.5%
	2018	8.7%	48.3%	30.7%	3.4%	0.8%	8.1%
Indonesia	2013	1.1%	12.2%	41.3%	23.5%	4.0%	17.9%
	2018	1.6%	13.8%	49.0%	11.4%	1.5%	22.7%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

However, two points should be noted here. Firstly, Chinese evaluations are more negative compared to Asian neighboring countries’ counterparts except Singapore. And secondly, DK answers are more commonly observed in the case of evaluation by Chinese students, especially toward Vietnam and Indonesia, which suggests some asymmetrical interests held by the Chinese students and other Asian students in terms of evaluation of the influence.

3.3 Competing frames to understand China

When it comes to competing frames to understand the rise of China¹⁴, Asian Student Survey prepared four frames which are frequently discussed either in academic community or in daily life conversation¹⁵

3.3.1 Political instability frame

The first one is the “political instability frame.” Observers outside China who believe in freedom and democracy might look at China not as their “ally” because of its authoritarian, repressive regime, which might result in forming a negative image of China. Some experts claim that China is facing the dilemma that the more successful China’s economic growth will be, the stronger its political leaders will feel insecure and threatened¹⁶ According to Takahara,

“It is easy to foresee that China will try to maintain a cooperative attitude in its diplomacy by emphasizing peaceful development to contain the China threat theory. However, at the same time, it will try to expand its military capacity and will never soften its tough stance over specific disputes with other countries. The more unstable its domestic situation is, the tougher its attitude will become in international relations. China’s domestic politics and diplomacy are closely linked.”¹⁷

As is shown in Table 6, students in Northeast Asia tend to accept this frame much more than their Southeast Asian counterparts. Clearly percentage of DK is larger in Southeast Asia than Northeast Asia, which suggests different political gaze toward China between East Asia and Southeast Asia.

Table 6. Political Instability Frame: 2013–2019. “In spite of rapid economic growth, China is politically unstable.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	35.3%	50.0%	5.0%	1.1%	8.7%
	2019	18.1%	56.4%	17.4%	0.9%	7.2%
South Korea	2013	24.6%	50.5%	13.0%	0.5%	11.3%
	2018	31.2%	47.1%	12.7%	1.1%	8.0%
Vietnam	2013	12.8%	41.3%	23.2%	2.8%	19.8%
	2018	22.0%	45.5%	12.3%	2.6%	17.6%
Singapore	2013	9.7%	48.4%	25.6%	1.3%	15.0%
	2018	7.3%	36.9%	34.3%	3.0%	18.4%
Indonesia	2014	11.5%	49.3%	20.0%	0.5%	18.8%
	2018	8.5%	38.7%	22.7%	1.7%	28.4%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

3.3.2 Increasing opportunity frame

The second one is the “increasing opportunity frame.” As is well known, CCP’s legitimacy has been maintained by its provision of (mostly economic) opportunities to the people¹⁸

According to the Pew Research Center’s data analysis of the case of the Philippines in 2017¹⁹, “(T)wo-thirds say having a strong economic relationship with China is more important for ties between the two nations, while 28% say being tough with China on territorial disputes is more vital. This represents a dramatic shift since this question was last asked in 2015; at that time, Filipinos were almost evenly divided between forging a strong economic relationship with China (43%) and being tough on territorial disputes (41%).” If this is the case, “increasing opportunity frame” probably must be a popular frame among Asian nations.

The popularity of the “increasing opportunity frame,” however, is different among the countries. While this frame is well received in Singapore and Indonesia, evaluations are divided in Japan and Vietnam (see Table 7).

Table 7. Increasing Opportunity Frame: 2013–2019. “The rise of China offers us a lot of opportunities.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	5.0%	35.1%	37.3%	8.2%	14.3%
	2019	8.4%	40.2%	33.3%	3.9%	14.2%
South Korea	2013	10.7%	54.0%	20.8%	2.1%	12.5%
	2018	9.5%	52.1%	22.5%	5.0%	11.0%
Vietnam	2013	3.8%	31.8%	37.7%	12.3%	14.4%
	2018	5.5%	35.8%	33.4%	8.4%	16.8%
Singapore	2013	16.3%	66.1%	8.5%	0.9%	8.2%
	2018	27.5%	60.1%	8.1%		4.3%
Indonesia	2014	14.3%	61.5%	19.8%	1.5%	3.0%
	2018	17.1%	55.3%	19.8%	1.5%	6.3%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

3.3.3 Global threat frame and peaceful rise frame

The third and fourth ones are somehow related to international relations.

“Global threat frame” frequently appears in the Western media, which sees China as a challenger to the global order. Though there are a lot of arguments on whether China’ commitment to the establishment of the Asia International Investment Bank (AIIB) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a threat to the existing global order, this frame assumes that China is threating the global order regardless of her intention. It is reported that news narratives in English language publications are sparking anxiety about China and its global ambitions²⁰

“Peaceful rise frame,” on the other hand, is the official claim of the Chinese government. It is a well-known fact that Zheng Bijian, adviser to Hu Jintao, proposed a new concept of heping jueqi (meaning “peaceful rise” in Chinese) at the Boao Forum in 2003²¹ The word heping jueqi will soon disappear in the official documents in China which has come to use heping fazhan (meaning “peaceful development” in Chinese) to avoid the connotation that they will challenge the global order. It is also the case that the Chinese government has kept on explaining that the rise of China is peaceful by nature. This frame presumes that China, which denies all kinds of China threat theories, will not destroy the existing peaceful environment which is needed for its further economic development. Chinese scholars prefer this frame²²

As to the “global threat frame,” Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam have more yes answers while Singapore and Indonesia, which are relatively free from territorial, sovereignty, and security issues than the other three countries, have less yes answers (see Table 8). As to the “peaceful rise frame,” targeted countries are divided into two groups; one is Vietnam where the majority of the respondents accept this frame and the other is Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia which have roughly equal number of those who agree and disagree (see Table 9).

Table 8. Global Threat Frame: 2013–2019. “The rise of China has been threatening the global order.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	9.3%	44.4%	34.4%	2.2%	9.7%
	2019	8.6%	39.5%	44.0%	2.3%	5.6%
South Korea	2013	9.4%	40.9%	37.0%	3.5%	9.1%
	2018	7.5%	49.1%	26.7%	5.4%	11.2%
Vietnam	2013	14.2%	41.3%	30.6%	3.2%	10.8%
	2018	16.5%	48.8%	19.1%	3.3%	12.3%
Singapore	2013	6.5%	39.9%	43.9%	1.9%	7.8%
	2018	9.3%	36.0%	42.3%	3.5%	8.8%
Indonesia	2014	9.3%	32.3%	50.3%	3.8%	4.5%
	2018	7.3%	35.8%	44.1%	2.5%	10.3%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 9. Peaceful Rise Frame: 2013–2019. “China will maintain her peaceful relations with Asian countries in spite of her rise.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	2.4%	11.5%	50.2%	16.7%	19.3%
	2019	1.8%	19.5%	54.1%	8.6%	16.1%
South Korea	2013	1.5%	17.1%	43.6%	8.7%	29.1%
	2018	1.5%	16.8%	41.7%	13.1%	26.9%
Vietnam	2013	2.8%	9.4%	41.7%	35.3%	10.8%
	2018	5.3%	20.7%	45.6%	14.1%	14.3%
Singapore	2013	5.3%	44.5%	19.6%	2.8%	27.7%
	2018	7.3%	39.8%	26.3%	3.3%	23.3%
Indonesia	2014	13.8%	58.5%	11.5%	1.0%	15.3%
	2018	8.0%	53.2%	16.9%	3.2%	18.7%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

3.3.4 Identifying determinants of evaluation of China’s influence

Takahara’s (2020) “four factor model” of China-Japan relations originally focused on the interaction (or one-way determination) between four factors; they are (1) (domestic) political factor, (2) economic factor, (3) international or security factor, and (4) socio-cultural factor (sentiments and emotions that people have toward the other country) and Takahara tries to identify which factor(s) affect the bilateral relations between Japan and China. This paper is interested in applying this model to explain the bilateral relations between five countries and China, but one of the difficulties of testifying this model derives from the difficult operationalization of “bilateral relations.” If “bilateral relations” mean a bundle of four factors, explanation will be tautological. In fact, it is extremely difficult to substantiate and evaluate “bilateral relations” by using or combining different types of macro data, including total amount of trade or FDI, number of inbound/outbound visitors or politicians, number of signed political agreements, and so on.

In order to overcome such difficulties, this paper operationalizes these four factors as explaining variables and bilateral relations as explained variable in the following ways²³

Firstly, we will use the evaluation of China’s influence (five-point scale)²⁴ in each country as explained variable. It is true that this parameter is subjective data rather than objective data, but this modification assumes that overall positive evaluation will reflect “objective good relations.” In fact, we already confirmed a symmetrical nature of mutual perception of bilateral relations with China in this paper.

Secondly, we will use the “political instability frame” (four-point scale)²⁵ as a political factor, the “increasing opportunity frame” (four-point scale) as an economic factor, and the “global threat frame” (four-point scale) and “peaceful rise frame” (four-point scale) as international or security factor. Again, it should be noted that these parameters are subjective by nature.

Thirdly and finally, we will use “personal connection with Chinese” (three-point scale)²⁶ and “Chinese proficiency” (four-point scale)²⁷ as socio-cultural factors. It is quite possible that those who acquired Mandarin (official language of China) will be more positive about China’s influence on their society. Also, if contact theory can be applied to bilateral relations with China, we can speculate that close social distance and linguistic knowledge of Chinese will contribute to the creation of more favorable views of China in Asia.

To sum up, the equation of the model can be expressed in the following way.

Y (Evaluation of China’s influence) = Constant + X₁ (Political instability frame) + X₂ (Increasing opportunity frame) + X₃₁ (Global threat frame) + X₃₂ (Peaceful rise frame) + X₄₁ (Personal connection with Chinese) + X₄₂ (Chinese proficiency)

It is expected that political instability frame as well as global threat frame might produce negative evaluation of China’s influence especially in democratic countries, while increasing opportunity frame and peaceful rise frame might lead to positive evaluation of China’s influence in Asian countries, but what were the results?

3.3.5 Results of the analysis

The results of analysis in the second and the third waves are presented in Tables 10 and 11, and we get the following findings.

Table 10. Determinants of Evaluation of China’s Influence: Second Wave

	Japan	South Korea	Vietnam	Singapore	Indonesia
(Constant)	2.68	2.79	3.91	5.87	3.53
X1 Political instability frame	−1.46	−1.60	−0.13	−3.25	−0.15
X2 Increasing opportunity frame	1.99	6.52	2.38	2.59	2.72
X31 Global threat frame	−1.77	−1.61	−2.28	−2.18	0.41
X32 Peaceful rise frame	3.83	2.46	−0.19	3.48	4.06
X41 Personal connection with Chinese	2.30	0.64	0.48	−0.26	2.01
X42 Chinese proficiency	2.26	1.65	−0.89	−2.06	−0.15

Note: Bold shows values of statistical significance.

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 11. Determinants of Evaluation of China’s Influence: Third Wave

	Japan	South Korea	Vietnam	Singapore	Indonesia
(Constant)	4.06	3.59	2.02	4.65	2.22
X1 Political instability frame	−2.87	−2.50	−1.84	−2.57	−1.48
X2 Increasing opportunity frame	3.54	4.38	1.35	3.36	1.06
X31 Global threat frame	−0.48	−3.13	0.08	−0.21	−0.60
X32 Peaceful rise frame	3.68	4.30	2.52	3.45	3.23
X41 Personal connection with Chinese	0.90	2.64	1.10	0.55	2.09
X42 Chinese proficiency	−0.11	1.34	0.10	−0.25	−1.77

Note: Bold shows values of statistical significance.

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Firstly, the parameter that has the strongest power of explanation of (perceived) influence of China is the “peaceful rise frame.” Though Vietnamese data in 2013 doesn’t show statistical significance, other countries’ data both in the second and the third waves show positive impact on the influence of China. In other words, worsening image of China’s influence in Asian countries can be attributed to increasing skeptical gaze on China’s official statement of their peaceful rise.

Secondly, the “increasing opportunity frame” has also a positive impact on the influence of China in South Korea and Singapore both in the second and the third waves. On the other hand, this frame doesn’t have a statistically significant impact on the influence of China in Vietnam. Thus, impact of the “increasing opportunity frame” is different from country to country.

Of course, the “peaceful rise frame” and the “increasing opportunity frame” show different aspects of China’s rise. As China develops economically, neighboring countries might get economic benefits, while its military development might bring them a sense of fear and threat. In the third wave survey, both frames had positive influence on the views of China in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, which suggests that these Asian countries are sandwiched by the two competing frames.

Thirdly, the “global threat frame” is not a good predictor of views on China²⁸ Though a lot of experts on China affairs refer to the global threat China poses, Asian students’ views of China are not influenced by their arguments.

Fourthly and finally, socio-cultural factors are not good predictors of the influence of China, either (except in South Korea in 2018). Despite their continuous efforts, China’s cultural diplomacy seems to be not successful in improving Asian students’ views of China through their personal contact with Chinese and Chinese language acquisition.

4 Summary and discussion

In the first half of this paper, we looked at the results of analyzing Pew’s Global Attitudes Survey data. From 2002 onward Japanese and Vietnamese views have been most negative while Indonesian view has been the most positive, and the Korean view is somewhere in-between. However, the timing of ups-and-downs of the views is different from one country to another and the variation among views as well as correlation between views of China and US shows different patterns across surveyed countries. All in all, economic development in China is positively evaluated (except in Vietnam) while her military development has been viewed with caution (except in Indonesia) in surveyed countries.

In the second half of this paper, we analyzed the second wave data (2013–4) and the third wave data (2018–9) of the Asian Student Survey and got the following findings.

1. As of 2018, Singapore and Indonesia were positively viewing the influence of China compared to other countries, while Vietnam was viewing it negatively, and Japan and South Korea were in-between. The changes in these five years, however, were different from country to country.

2. Changing views of the Chinese toward Asian countries were basically symmetrical to those of Asian nations’ changing views toward China, though Chinese responses contained more DK answers.

3. In these surveyed countries, the “peaceful rise frame” was the most powerful determinant of the views of China, which partially explains why views of China were worsening in these countries. But the concrete determinants of the views are different from one country to another.

The biggest contribution of this paper is to identify the dominant frame to understand the rise of China in five Asian countries. It is paradoxical that the “peaceful rise frame,” which is an official claim of the Chinese government, is the main cause of the worsening views of China, because this frame is becoming less popular in Asian countries (except in Vietnam) between 2013–14 and 2018–19.

This paper basically supports the observation of Chung who claimed that security concerns were stronger than economic interest in determining views of China in five Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea) in 2013²⁹, but our results reveal much more complicated reality. For sample, no statistically significant factor could be identified in Vietnam in 2013. “Increasing opportunity frame” was a better predictor in South Korea than “peaceful rise frame” both in 2013 and 2018. Considering a lot of exceptions for general observation, it is desirable for us to pay more close attention to concrete bilateral relations with China in each country by making best us of local knowledge, rather than just applying some theoretical models or frameworks³⁰

Our survey results also show how differently China and other Asian countries are looking at the rise of China. Chinese are most positively and optimistically looking at the rise of China while some countries’ views of China, especially those of Vietnam, are most negative and pessimistic. Such discrepancy might create some overt rather than covert conflicts between China and her neighboring countries in some way or another.

Though this paper tentatively used a modified version of Takahara’s four factor model and Asian Student Survey data to identify the dominant frame in understanding China’s rise in five Asian countries, there is a huge room for improvement in the future research.

First of all, it is more desirable if we could use the data of national scale which contains more diverse social groups³¹

Secondly, other wordings should be attempted to identify which is the most appropriate expression of the competing frames. For instance, this paper used people’s responses to the statement “In spite of rapid economic growth, China is politically unstable” as “political instability frame,” but there might be a better wording than this.

Thirdly and most importantly, the variables we used in this paper are subjective evaluation of four (political, economic, international, and socio-cultural) factors of bilateral relations with China, which is more or less “biased” by preoccupation, insufficient knowledge, or even prejudice of the respondents, rather than objective measurement of four factors³² We can sometimes observe that there are some gaps between people’s subjective understanding and objective characteristics of bilateral relationship between two countries. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is desirable to check what sort of gaps are there between subjective understanding and objective measurement of bilateral relations with China in the future research.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by JSPS’s Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) “Perception toward the Rise of China in Comparative Perspectives: Focusing on the Post-Cold War Generation in Asia-Pacific Region” (Project number: 19H04347). The author is grateful to the Pew Research Center for allowing me access to their original data from 2005 to 2019 as well as to two peer reviewers whose insightful comments were of great help.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [19H04347].

Notes on contributors

Shigeto Sonoda

Shigeto Sonoda is Professor of Comparative Sociology and Asian Studies at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), the University of Tokyo. He is now serving as deputy director of IASA as well as co-director of Beijing Center for Japanese Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University in China. His major publications includeNational Sentiments in Asia (2020, Chuo Koron), Social Inequality in Contemporary China (2008, Chuo Koron), and edited volumes of A History of Japan-China Relations, 1972-2012 III and IV (2012 and 2014, University of Tokyo Press).

Notes

¹ Nelson and Carlson, “Charmed by China?”; Linley, “Who’s afraid of the dragon?”; Herrick, China’s Peaceful Rise: Perceptions; Yu, Quanqiu Minyi Diaochazhong de Zhongguo Xingxiang [China Image in the Global Opinion Polls]; and Kolodko, China and the Future of Globalization.

² Asian Barometer Survey can be another candidate (Chu, Liu, and Huang, “How East Asians View the Rise of China”; Chu and Chang, “Xi’s Foreign-Policy Turn”) for internal comparison in Asia, but Global Attitudes Survey is more desirable in terms of the length of survey as well as its questions on the rise of China added on to the question on the influence of China.

³ More questions are there in the questionnaire in Global Attitudes Survey concerning evaluations toward China, but many of them were asked only once or twice, or asked only in a small number of countries, which makes it difficult to see changes over time extensively in Asia. These questions include, for example, those of threat perception (whether China is a major threat to the informant’s country or not) and confidence the informant has on Xi Jinping, asked in the 2017 survey.

⁴ For example, Chung argues whether people’s views of China’s economic and military development have any impact on the favorable / unfavorable views of China by using 2013 Global Attitudes Survey data. See Chung, “Economic interest or security concerns?”.

⁵ The question asks “please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China.” Though the Global Attitudes Survey covers many countries other than Asia, all the results in this paper will be confined to the countries (Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia) targeted in our international joint project.

⁶ Hwang, “The Continuous but Rocky Developments of Korea-China Relations”.

⁷ As the raw data of 2002 is not disclosed, we cannot get the standard deviation in 2002. The same can be said to the correlation shown in Figure 3.

⁸ Cheung, “China’s Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia”; Goh, “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers.”

⁹ Fitriani, “Indonesia: Tayosei ga umidasu taichu seisaku” [Indonesia: Diversified Understandings of China], 180. All in all, ASEAN countries are looking at US-China trade war as a threat rather than an opportunity. See Seah, et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021, 29.

¹⁰ As Kausikan suggests, “To promiscuously and simultaneously balance, hedge, and bandwagon is embedded in our (Southeast Asian) foreign policy DNA,” which is the cause of their equal stance to US and China. See Kausikan, Dealing with an Ambiguous World, 79.

¹¹ Asian Student Survey was initiated by the research group in Global COE Program “Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration” at Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, in 2008 (first wave) to get basic information of people’s mutual perception among Asia by focusing on the university students in top-tier universities to foresee what will happen about the future regional integration in Asia. Five years later until today, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo has succeeded this survey to see chronological changes of mutual perception among Asia. The second wave was conducted in 2013–14, and the third wave was conducted in 2018–19 respectively. In each country/region, two universities were surveyed and at least 200 samples were collected in each university. For more detailed explanation about the survey project, see Sonoda, Ajia no kokumin kanjo, 253–256.

¹² Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore also conducted large-scale survey of the students in ASEAN to see how they perceive ASEAN and its member countries in 2008 and 2017. These surveys, however, didn’t include China as a target of their perception. See Thompson and Thianthai, Attitudes and Awareness Toward ASEAN; Thompson, Thainthai, and Thuzar, Do Young People Know About ASEAN?

¹³ This finding is different from that of the Japanese Cabinet Office’s surveys as well as Genron NPO’s opinion polls. According to our interview results, one possibility is that Japanese students, especially those who major in engineering, have come to appreciate China’s IT development and evaluate its impact on Japan more positively than ordinary citizens in Japan. See Sonoda, “Chugoku seifu ga Ittaiichiro ni sennen dekiru noha nazeka” [Why can Chinese government promote Belt and Road Initiative without being bothered by the objections from the citizens].

¹⁴ Questions about the frames for understanding China were included the questionnaire from the second wave, so we have data only from two waves.

¹⁵ Sonoda, “Chugoku taito no kokusai shinri” [The rise of Chins in the eyes of Asians in comparative perspectives]. As to the four frames to understand the rise of China, there is a huge difference between Chinese students and other Asian students. Chinese students prefer more positive views, while other Asian students prefer more negative views. See Zhai’s analysis which used Asian Student Survey second wave’s data. Zhai, “The Gap in Viewing China’s Rise”.

¹⁶ Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower; Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup”.

¹⁷ Takahara, “The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood Diplomacy,” 65.

¹⁸ Tang, Populist Authoritarianism; Sonoda, “Chugoku seifu ga Ittaiichiro ni sennen dekiru noha nazeka” [Why can Chinese government promote Belt and Road Initiative without being bothered by the objections from the citizens].

¹⁹ Poushter and Bishop, “People in the Philippines Still Favor U.S. Over China.”

²⁰ Okuda, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Peaceful Development’”.

²¹ Zheng, Zhongguo Fazhan Dazhanlv.

²² Xin, “Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation Catalyst?”; Jin, Rising China in a Changing World.

²³ As this paper is using survey data, explained variable as well as explaining variables is influenced by each respondent’s perception. Thus, Takahara’s four factor model is modified in this paper.

²⁴ Those who answered “Good” are coded 5 and those who answered “Bad” are coded 1. Therefore, the larger the number is, the more positively respondents evaluate China’s influence on their society. DK answers are excluded from the analysis.

²⁵ In all four frames, those who answered “Strongly agree” were coded 4, and those who answered “Strongly disagree” were coded 1. DK answers are excluded from the analysis.

²⁶ Those who answered that they have Chinese friend(s) are coded 3, those who answered that they have Chinese acquaintance(s) are coded 2, and those who answered that they have no Chinese friend are coded 1. DK answers are excluded from the analysis.

²⁷ Those who answered “fluent” in Mandarin are coded 4, those who answered “daily conversation level” are coded 3, those who answered “very little” are coded 2, and those who answered “not at all” are coded 1. DK answers are excluded from the analysis.

²⁸ According to our interview with The University of Tokyo students in 2018, the concept of “global order” was difficult and too abstract for them to interpret, and it was differently interpreted by different respondents, which might be one of the reasons why this frame’s explanation power is relatively weak. See Sonoda, “Chugoku taito no kokusai shinri” [The rise of China in the eyes of Asians in comparative perspectives], 273–274.

²⁹ Chung, “Economic interest or security concerns?.”

³⁰ The meaning of “Chinese”, for example, might mean different across countries, which makes it difficult to generalize some findings of impact of socio-cultural factors onto the views of China.

³¹ The author conducted national-scale survey in 2020 in Japan (sample size is 3,000) by using the same questions of views of China. The results we could get were similar to those of this paper as far as Japan’s portion is concerned.

³² In order to include some objective measurement of the bilateral relations with China, it is necessary to increase the number of countries as target of analysis. The number of five countries in this paper is too small to draw some meaningful finding.