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ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding their asymmetry in size and power, Singapore and the People’s Republic of China enjoy a “special relationship” based on cultural affinity and close economic interdependency. The city-state was also a model of development for its giant neighbor after the latter abandoned Maoist autarchy and embarked on the road of reform. But their ties are also awkward because Singapore is strategically close to the US superpower which views a rising and rivaling China with suspicion. Singapore’s relations with Beijing may become even more awkward during an uncertain power transition in East Asia amid the bitter Sino-US decoupling over trade, technology, finance and human talent.
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Notes
1 See, for example, Ortmann and Thompson, “China and the ‘Singapore Model’,” 39–48; Ortmann and Thompson, “Introduction: The ‘Singapore Model’ and China’s Neo-Authoritarian Dream,” 930–945.
2 For instances on the Sino-Singapore special relationship, see Zheng and Lim, “Lee Kuan Yew: The Special Relationship with China,” 31–48; Wong and Chong, “The Political Economy of Singapore’s Unique Relations with China,” 31–61; Wong and Song, “China’s Special Relationship with Singapore,” 245–250.
The Singapore-China special relationship was defined by a Singapore journalist in a Business Times (November 6 2015) article thus: “The special relationship that Singapore and China enjoy is the result of trust built over the years between leaders and citizens alike. Though vastly different in size and schema, Singapore and China have established a special friendship since the mid-1970s which has evolved over time, in line with changing needs and development priorities”.
3 Foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang had this to say on its stance toward Singapore’s military exercises in Taiwan: “The Chinese side is firmly opposed to any forms of official interaction between Taiwan and countries that have diplomatic relations with us, military exchanges and cooperation included. We require the Singaporean government to stick to the one China principle.” See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Slovenia, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s regular press conference on November 282,016”.
4 See, for example, Tan, “Faced with the Dragon,” 245–265.
5 Former Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo explains: “Singapore can never afford to have other countries in ASEAN see us as a Chinese state in Southeast Asia. Lee Kuan Yew made it a matter of principle that Singapore would establish diplomatic relations with China only after our neighbors had done so”. See George Yeo, “Reflections by George Yeo: Celebrating 30 years of diplomatic relations between Singapore and China”, Think China, October 282,020.
6 Yew, “The Evolution of Contemporary China Studies in Singapore,” 135–158.
7 Quoted in Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Belligerents: Meet the Hardliners Who Now Run China’s Foreign Policy.”
8 For a comprehensive study on Sino-Singapore economic relations, see Saw and Wong, eds., Advancing Singapore-China economic Relations.
9 Harper, “Singapore becomes hub for Chinese tech mid US tensions.”
10 See Suryadinata, The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas.
11 The Singapore media reported: “Following the back-and-forth between Singapore and Chinese state-owned newspaper Global Times over the South China Sea issue, some Singapore businessmen with interests in China are being questioned by their Chinese counterparts, on where they stand on the matter. Singapore companies … are concerned that this, along with the increasingly shrill comments by Chinese netizens in response to the newspaper’s provocative articles, would eventually affect their businesses. … Ho Meng Kit, chief executive officer of Singapore Business Federation, added: ‘If this drags on, and there’s widespread anger or hostility toward Singapore products, we’ll be concerned. The Chinese are very nationalistic’”. See Tan, “Singapore businesses quizzed by Chinese counterparts over their stand on South China Sea.”
12 Though Goh Chok Tong was Prime Minister of Singapore from November 1990 to August 2004, Singapore’s foreign policy toward China during that period was marked by continuity. One reason is because Lee Kuan Yew remained highly influential in the Cabinet and was the “grandmaster” in the city-state’s external relations.
13 Lam, “The Politics of Confucianism and Asian Values in Singapore.”
14 See, for example, Sin and Ng, “The Chinese Singaporean identity.” This article noted: “While China’s soft-power charm offensive has caused some Singaporeans to hope for closer bilateral ties between the two countries, others, amid a growing sense of national identity, feel that relations should be kept as those between friendly states but without the common ethnic element coming into the picture”.
15 See, for example, Koh, “China’s perception of Singapore: 4 areas of misunderstanding.”
16 See, for example, Yong, “Singaporeans should be aware of China’s ‘influence operations’ to manipulate them, says retired diplomat Bilahari”; Qin, “Worries Grow in Singapore Over China’s Calls to Help ‘Motherland’,”.
17 Mahbubani, “Qatar: Big lessons from a small country.”
18 Ibid.
19 Nur and Chew, “Minister Shanmugam, diplomats Bilahari and Ong Keng Yong say Prof Mahbubani’s view on Singapore’s foreign policy ‘flawed’.”
20 Ibid.
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LAM Peng Er
Lam Peng Er obtained his PhD from Columbia University. He is the editor of three academic journals:International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Oxford University Press), Asian Journal of Peacebuilding (Seoul University) and East Asian Policy: An International Quarterly (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore).