The Biden Nuclear Posture Review and Its Implications for US Asia-Pacific Allies

ABSTRACT

US President Joe Biden is expected to issue a new Nuclear Posture Review report soon. It may include as a policy goal a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US military strategy. In that context, the issue of the modernization of the US nuclear deterrent will be addressed. Even if the land-based leg of the triad were somehow curtailed, the United States would be able to keep its allies reassured as long as its overall nuclear deterrence capability was perceived to be maintained. A reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the overall US military doctrine should be welcomed. In that sense, adoption of a nuclear no-first-use or sole-purpose policy should also be welcomed even though some Japanese officials and experts may oppose it. Decreasing the role of nuclear weapons requires strengthening conventional deterrence unless the overall security situation is improved – a point that is not very well recognized in Japan. This shift will not be easy for Japan, where economic growth has been very low for decades and defense spending is virtually capped at around 1% of the gross national product. The US stance vis-à-vis the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will draw attention in Japan, where there is considerable support for the treaty.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear posture review
• nuclear deterrence
• US allies
• Asia-Pacific

Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons

The Biden administration, in its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021, said that it “will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [its] national security strategy, while ensuring [its] strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that [its] extended deterrence commitments to [its] allies remain strong and credible” (White House 2021). This is a welcome development for those in Japan who seek realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 2011 Japan joined a statement of the group of 10 foreign ministers that “welcome[d] and support[ed] the renewed call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons … and consequently [saw] the need to further reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons as well as their role in security strategies, concepts, doctrines and policies” (MOFA 2011). Of late, however, the call for a reduced role of nuclear weapons by the Japanese government seems to be muted. It is not found in the recent key speeches of the prime minister or foreign minister or in the text of the UN resolution on nuclear disarmament that Japan proposed¹

Reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy was one of the key themes of the President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report (DOD 2010). The 2018 NPR report, in contrast, almost abandoned the idea of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, citing the changed international security situation: “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction” (DOD 2018). It will be a major change of direction if the Biden administration follows through with its guidance of March 2021.

Reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security policy requires strengthening non-nuclear deterrence unless the general security situation significantly improves. The 2010 NPR report acknowledged this trade-off when it said that “any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities” (US Department of Defense 2010, xi). This consequential requirement of allies is not very much recognized in Japan; the part of the Japanese public that favors nuclear disarmament and a reduced role for nuclear weapons generally is not aware of it. This would put the Japanese government in a difficult position. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe succeeded in reversing the gradual decline in the percentage of Japanese gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defense, citing the increasing threats from North Korea and China. But the GDP ratio continues to hover around 1%. (In 2020 it went slightly over 1%, but that was largely because of the economic decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic.) Even though the figure of 1% of GDP was abolished as an official cap² on defense spending, it still carries considerable political and psychological weight. Significant increases in defense spending therefore would be difficult to achieve³ The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s policy platform announced on 12 October 2021, in anticipation of the general election to be held at the end of that month, stated that the party will strive to increase defense-related spending, keeping in mind the over-2-percent-of-GNP target of NATO member countries (Liberal Democratic Party 2021). Whether the ruling party can achieve this goal remains to be seen. Nevertheless, given the long-stagnant economy, the gap between Japanese and Chinese defense spending will only continue to grow. Chinese military spending surpassed that of Japan in 2001, and China now spends five times as much as Japan does (SIPRI 2021). Under the circumstances, one way Japan may meet the challenge is to focus on strengthening its military capability by taking advantage of advanced technologies in the fields of hypersonic, precision-guidance and cyber technologies.

Dependability of the US Nuclear Deterrent and the Nuclear Force Modernization Debate

The United States is engaged in the modernization of its triad of nuclear forces – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. There are voices among Congressional Democrats and arms-control advocates calling for elimination or phasing out of the ICBM leg of the US nuclear deterrent. From the allies’ point of view, for the US nuclear deterrent to be dependable, it has to be survivable against potential enemy attack, able to penetrate enemy defenses, and numerically superior to – or at least on par with – potential enemy nuclear forces. SLBMs look highly survivable and able to overcome missile defenses unless Russia or China deploys a highly dependable missile-defense system, which does not seem very likely in the near future. An emerging threat against nuclear submarines is the development of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) that can detect, trace, and attack submarines in the future. The US Navy is developing its own UUVs and is expected to develop countermeasures against enemy UUVs so that the US submarines can maintain a high rate of survival. The ICBMs in silos and bombers on airfields are more vulnerable to enemy preemptive attacks. Bombers have an additional issue of ability to penetrate enemy air defenses. For this reason, the United States is developing new air-launched cruise missiles. From the allies’ point of view, perhaps, SLBMs are the most dependable strategic nuclear forces, followed by strategic bombers and ICBMs. For Japan, for example, the retention of the ICBM is not an absolute requirement. If the United States decides to phase out or eliminate its ICBMs, Japan will be obliged to accept the decision as long as the other two legs are kept credible and the overall balance vis-à-vis other nuclear powers is maintained.

An additional concern for Japan may be the overall balance of US nuclear and conventional forces. If the spending for modernization of the US nuclear forces reduces the funding available for procurement and deployment of conventional weapon systems – that is, aircraft and warships – around Japan, it may be perceived as a weakening of US extended deterrence for Japan.

Japan has a history of insisting on the retention of the naval Tomahawk cruise missiles as proof that the United States maintains a nuclear deterrence capability suiting the Western Pacific theater. In the lead-up to the 2010 US decision to retire the aging Tomahawk missiles, emissaries of the Japanese government expressed their concern about the decision to the US Congressional Commission on US Strategic Posture in 2009 orally and with the so-called Akiba paper. It was later revealed by those who were present at the event that Takeo Akiba, political counselor of the Japanese embassy in Washington at the time, expressed such concern in his testimony during a closed session of a hearing held by the Commission in February 2009 (Kakujoho 2009), but, to this day, the Japanese government in Tokyo refuses to disclose the contents of the exchanges (Fujita 2018). Subsequently, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party lost power that summer and the foreign minister of the new government, Katsuya Okada, sent a letter to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on 24 December 2009, stating that “some media outlets have reported that in the process of the compilation of a report by the Congressional Commission ….Japan’s diplomatic authority had requested the United States to acquire low-yield nuclear earth penetrators and had opposed the retirement of the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk Land Attack Missile” but as far as he understood, “Japan’s diplomatic authority did not take such actions”. He further stated that he “thought highly of the deterrence provided under the nuclear umbrella” and that he supported “a world without nuclear weapons” and “intended to cooperate in that respect”. What was described in the press reports was entirely different from what he sought, “which (was) nuclear disarmament”. “Naturally”, he wrote, he “requested that an explanation be given on any impact that the retirement of the Tomahawk missile (would) have on expanded deterrence” and “requested a separate explanation on ways to supplement the retirement of the missile”. He also stated that he had a “strong interest in the proposals” in the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, including affirmation that the sole purpose of nuclear possession is to deter enemy nuclear attack and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) “while acknowledging that it may not be possible to carry the proposals out immediately”. It is noteworthy that Katsuya Okada, a strong dovish politician in Japan, ended up expressing a strong concern about the effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrent while denying the specific statements made by the Japanese officials (MOFA 2010). (In fact, a reporter from Kyodo News insisted during the question-and-answer period subsequent to the press conference by Okada on this issue on 22 January 2010, that the original report by Kyodo on the statements by Japanese officials was “a well-grounded report” written on the basis of “solid information obtained by interviews”. The reporter said he “was very disappointed to hear that there was no such request” to retain Tomahawk missiles.)

The commission report stated that “in Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some Los Angeles-class attack submarines – the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). This capability will be retired in 2013 unless steps are taken to maintain it”. The report added, “In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement” (USIP 2009). At the end of the report, four Japanese embassy officials, including Akiba, were cited as foreign officials who were consulted by the commission.

More recently, the US administration has been pursuing the development of low-yield nuclear warheads and sea-launched cruise missiles to carry them (US Department of Defense 2018). Apparently, this is intended to provide assurance to regional allies through a theater-specific nuclear capability, something that Japanese officials had suggested around 2009⁴

No First Use/sole Purpose

For the purpose of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security strategy and the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons or by miscalculation, the Biden administration may consider adopting a nuclear no-first-use policy or a sole-purpose policy⁵ As vice president and later as a presidential candidate, Biden has expressed on a number of occasions support for no first use⁶, and there is a considerable support for the policy in the Democratic Party, as seen in the bill proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Adam Smith to declare a nuclear no-first-use policy (US Senate 2021).

In practice, it may not be easy for Biden administration to single-handedly adopt a no-first-use policy. The Obama administration considered adopting a no-first-use policy but ended up short of adopting a sole-purpose policy. After a convoluted statement, the 2010 NPR report stated that “[t]he United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted” (US Department of Defense 2010). In the Northeast Asian context, this means a sole-purpose policy is not adopted vis-à-vis North Korea, China, or Russia.

The 2018 NPR report clearly stated that the Trump administration did not accept the concept of sole purpose: “The highest U.S. nuclear policy and strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale. However, deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons. Given the diverse threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat environment, U.S. nuclear forces play the following critical roles in U.S. national security strategy. They contribute to the:

• Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack;

• Assurance of allies and partners;

• Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and

• Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future” (US Department of Defense 2018).

While the 2010 NPR report tried to limit the cases beyond the sole purpose – deterring nuclear attacks from others – by saying that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or [chemical- or biological-weapon] attack” and expressed its intention to “work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted”, the 2018 NPR report cited deterrence of (unqualified) non-nuclear attack and explicitly added the cases of deterrence failure and hedging against future uncertainty.

At the time when the 2010 NPR was underway, it was reported that the Japanese government expressed its reservation about the adoption of a no-first-use/sole-purpose policy. The Japanese delegation, led by former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, was almost unanimous in opposing the proposal to adopt a no-first-use policy in the discussions leading up to the adoption of the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament in 2009⁷ The delegation members were concerned that if the United States declared a nuclear no-first-use policy, a potential adversary such as North Korea would feel free to launch a massive conventional attack or use chemical or biological weapons without fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons. Later, in 2016, when the Obama administration tried again to adopt a sole-purpose policy, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his reservations about the idea (Kawai 2016). Those who favor adoption of a no-first-use policy, such as former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, hope that the Japanese government does not oppose it this time (Shimbun 2020a), but there is no indication that the government is changing its position.⁸

Even if the Biden administration succeeds in introducing a sole-purpose policy in its NPR report, it may retain the kind of reservation expressed in the 2010 NPR report in view of the renewed concern about the future threat of biological weapons, spurred by the recent COVID-19 pandemic. While the search for and debate on the true source of COVID-19 continues, the huge impact of the pandemic stirred fears of a powerful virus created by a gain-of-function operation that may be used intentionally in the future by terrorists or a state. In the context of offering negative security assurances, the 2010 NPR report stated, “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat” (US Department of Defense 2010).

In fact, no-first-use policy is not uniform from one country to another. China says it offers its policy of no first use unconditionally, but India qualifies its no-first-use policy of “only (using nuclear weapons) in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere” by saying that “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons” (Ministry of External Affairs (India) 2003).

An enduring issue of nuclear no-first-use policy is its credibility. It is basically a declaratory policy of a nuclear-weapon-possessing state. A political leader may change his or her thinking in a matter of moments or he or she may be pressed by public opinion to use nuclear weapons. There is no legal guarantee or political assurance. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi of Japan recently stated in a committee hearing that Japan does not support a no-first-use policy unless all nuclear-armed states adopt such a policy through a commitment that is verifiable and legally binding⁹ In the same committee hearing, Katsuya Okada referred to the case of the Soviet no-first-use policy, which later proved to be false (Kakujoho 2021). Motegi also mentioned that Japan does not consider Chinese no-first-use policy to be credible¹⁰

The Taiwan Factor

In considering the issue of extended nuclear deterrence in the Northeast Asian context, the issue of Taiwan arises. Taiwan is not a treaty ally of the United States, but the authors of the 2010 NPR report likely were thinking of it as one of the “partners” when they wrote, “By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own” (US Department of Defense 2010). The 2018 NPR report said, “Assurance is a common goal based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat the threats we face” (US Department of Defense 2018). Even though there is no clear definition of which countries are included in “partners”, the 2018 review goes on to say, “In many cases, effectively assuring allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which enables most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to U.S. non-proliferation goals”. This is an important consideration, as Taiwan once actually tried to obtain nuclear weapons for itself in the 1970s, and it took considerable US efforts to dissuade it (NTI 2005). Taiwan later agreed to forgo enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel under a 2014 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States (TECRO (The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States) and AIT (The American Institute in Taiwan) 2013). With this new agreement of indefinite duration, the democratic government of Taiwan is highly unlikely to venture into another clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. Now, however, under strong military pressure from China, Taiwan is all the more likely to seek security assurances from the United States against Chinese threats that include the threat of nuclear use.

Alex Littlefield and Adam Lowther of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute see Taiwan as a latent nuclear power and say that the “move to nuclear weapons would not take long given its current materials and technical capacity”. They argue that while President Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party “represents the anti-nuclear movement within Taiwan”, “views change when survival is at stake. It is not a bridge too far to suggest that a reluctant Biden administration and an aggressive Xi [Jinping, the president of China,] might lead Taiwan to see the utility of a nuclear arsenal”. They observed that “[h]istory suggests that once Taiwan has nuclear weapons, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] will become much less aggressive towards it – making the development of nuclear weapons more attractive” (Littlefield and Lowther 2020).

While the concern and speculation that Taiwan might seek to obtain nuclear weapons are rising, Taiwan itself seems to be aware that China might take military action to forestall such an effort. In a report submitted to the Taiwanese legislature on 21 August 2021, the Taiwanese government identified seven circumstances in which China could justify launching a military offensive against it, including a formal declaration of independence and the acquisition of nuclear weapons, according to a media account (Feng 2021).

China has a long history of maintaining a nuclear no-first-use policy and offering negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states – both unconditionally (State Council Information Office of the PRC 2019). Can Taiwan take comfort from these policies? China regards Taiwan as a renegade province and therefore it is not clear if Taiwan qualifies for the negative security assurance that is offered to non-nuclear-weapon “states”. In fact, China is seen as likely to make an exception when its national interests are threatened, particularly over Taiwan: Baohui Zhang, an associate professor of political science at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, argues that “China’s vast conventional weakness compared to the United States”, in conjunction with its nuclear modernization efforts, makes it more likely that China will rely on nuclear first use in “a real crisis in the Taiwan Strait” that threatens military defeat by the United States, since the PRC will take any action necessary to prevent regime collapse or Taiwanese independence (Zhang 2008).

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 implies that the United States will resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security of Taiwan:

It is the policy of the United States ….to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States …. (and) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan” (Section 2b) (US Congress 1979).

Currently, the United States maintains a policy of ambiguity as to whether it will employ its military force to defend Taiwan. This is to deter China from using military force against Taiwan on one hand and, on the other, to deter Taiwan from provoking China by, for example, declaring independence. There are two opposing views in the United States today. One is that the United States should depart from the traditional policy of ambiguity to state its intention to use military force to defend Taiwan and thus clearly convey an unmistakable message to China (Johnston et al. 2021). The other view is that the United States should stay away from a conflict over Taiwan that may lead to a major war with China, as Taiwan ultimately is not essential to US security¹¹

The Japanese attitude on the Taiwan issue has shown signs of departing from the past, when Japan carefully stayed away from this delicate issue. The 2021 Defense White Paper issued on 13 July 2021, for the first time explicitly touched on the issue, stating that “(s)tabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before” (Ministry of Defense 2021). On 5 July 2021, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said his country “would have to defend Taiwan” with the United States if the Island were invaded by mainland China. If Taiwan were to experience such a big crisis, “it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation” for Japan, Aso, who also served as finance minister, said at a gathering of ruling Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers in Tokyo (Kyodo News 2021). The phrase “survival-threatening situation” is an important phrase that allows the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to exercise the right of collective self-defense (with the US forces) under a provision of a new defense law enacted in 2016¹²

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Japanese people have a strong antipathy to nuclear weapons, as may be reflected in the strong majority support for Japan joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). An opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in November 2020 showed 59% supporting the idea of Japan joining the TPNW while only 25% opposed it (Shimbun 2020b). Another poll conducted by the Chunichi Shimbun in August 2021 found 71% supporting Japan joining the TPNW with 62% of them saying that is because Japan is the only country where atomic bombs were used (Shimbun 2020). An opinion survey conducted by Jonathan Baron and his colleagues found “that baseline support for the Prime Minister signing and the Diet ratifying the TPNW stands at approximately 75% of the Japanese public. Only 17.7% of the population is opposed, and 7.3% is undecided. Moreover, this support is cross-cutting, with a wide majority of every demographic group in the country favoring nuclear disarmament. Most strikingly, an embedded survey experiment demonstrates that the Japanese government cannot shift public opinion to oppose the Ban through the use of policy arguments or social pressure. Such broad support for the TPNW indicates that the Japanese government will not be able to hide from the Treaty and must take action to restore its credibility as a leader on nuclear disarmament” (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog 2020).

When the UN General Assembly decided to convene a negotiating conference for a legally binding instrument on nuclear weapons on 23 December 2016, Fumio Kishida was the foreign minister of Japan. His constituency is the First District of Hiroshima, which encompasses the area around Hiroshima City. After the General Assembly’s First Committee adopted the resolution on 27 October 2016, he stated in a press conference that “after an extended, careful consideration, (Japan) cast a vote against it”, but “whether or not we will participate in the negotiations, it will be considered by the government as a whole”. He said he himself “would like to take part actively in the negotiations and firmly state what must be stated as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings and from our position of emphasizing cooperation between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states” (Kishida 2016). Five months later, however, he announced that Japan would not participate in the negotiations that started on 27 March 2017 (Kishida 2017). The Asahi Shimbun reported that the foreign minister abandoned his pursuit of bridging the gap between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states because he was unable to strike an acceptable balance between addressing the serious security situation around Japan and promoting nuclear disarmament as the only state to have suffered a nuclear attack. The report quoted government officials as saying the prime minister’s office did not want to upset President Trump who, in the joint statement issued the previous month, confirmed the US nuclear umbrella over Japan (Matsuo and Kanenari 2017).

A new NPR report may or may not take up the issue of the TPNW, but the attitude that the United States takes on this treaty will affect the international discussions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the coming NPT review conference scheduled to be held in January 2022 and in other forums.

So far, the United States has taken a leading role in opposing the TPNW, seeking to dissuade other countries from joining the deliberations on such a treaty and, once it was adopted in the UN General Assembly in 2017, not to sign and ratify the treaty. It has encouraged its allies to join its efforts, even making use of the levers of economic cooperation.

In the P5 Joint Statement on the NPT issued on 24 October 2018, the United States and the other P5 countries¹³ reiterated their opposition to the TPNW, saying they firmly believe that “the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a gradual process”. They went on to say the TPNW “contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT. […] It will not result in the elimination of a single weapon. […] It is creating divisions across the international non-proliferation and disarmament machinery” (P5 2018). It is to be noted that the US rejection of the TPNW started not under the Trump administration but dates back to the time of Obama administration (North Atlantic Council 2016).

If the United States shifted its stance to become more accommodating to the TPNW, that could improve the climate in the coming NPT review conference and simplify the Japanese government’s task of bridging the gap between the pro-TPNW and anti-TPNW camps. But because the United States has been taking such a firm stance against the TPNW, it may not be easy for the Biden administration to change its attitude. As of this writing, the next NPT review conference is scheduled to be held January 4–28, 2022, in New York, but the dates of this delayed conference, originally scheduled for 2020, could change again because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first meeting of the TPNW states parties had been planned for January 12–14, 2022, in Vienna, as the treaty requires the first meeting of the states parties to be held within one year from the date of its entry into force. But since this comes into conflict with the new dates for the NPT review conference, the TPNW conference has been rescheduled to be held in March 2022. With an eye on the March TPNW meeting, there will likely be intensive efforts at the NPT review conference in January by both sides to win more support for the pro-TPNW stance and the NPT-first stance.

One of the reasons why the United States opposes the TPNW is that the treaty does not allow its parties “to threaten the use of nuclear weapons”, (TPNW 2017) a provision that makes it impossible for the United States to offer extended nuclear deterrence to its allies. It also imposes many constraints if the United States tries to offer extended deterrence to its allies as it does not permit a country “to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or […] control over such weapons […] directly or indirectly”, to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited […] under the treaty”, or to “allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons […] in (allies’) territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control”. In a way, however, how strictly the terms “assistance, encouragement and inducement” are interpreted depends on the discussions in the first meeting of the states parties to the TPNW in 2022. As the meeting is scheduled to last for just three days, it is possible that the participants may not have enough time to discuss complicated issues in depth.

Another issue that may concern the United States is the extent to which “assistance” is prohibited. The global deployment of US nuclear forces relies on satellite reconnaissance, transmission, radar detection, and long-distance communications. The communication nodes are located on the territories of US allies around the world. Is the permission to allow the location of those facilities taken as “assistance”? The answer may depend on how strict the TPNW adherents want to be, or how much they may want to entice US allies to join the TPNW. Beatrice Fihn of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, for example, says she entertains strong hopes that Japan will move to join the TPNW (Parr 2020). There are voices in Australia, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain arguing that their states should join the TPNW while maintaining their alliance with the United States. The outcome may depend on how the TPNW adherents and the United States react.

There are also voices in Japan and the United States saying that even though their countries may not be able to join the TPNW right away, they can be helpful in the implementation of the article on victim assistance and environmental remediation. Japan has experience and expertise in the field of assisting the victims of nuclear detonation and nuclear testing including “medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provid[ing] for their social and economic inclusion”. The United States has been active in victim assistance and demining activities even though it has not joined the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention. So, why not do the same with regard to nuclear weapons and the treaty banning them? In fact, the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council expressed their intention to “seek Council action to provide […] the necessary assistance to the State victim of […] aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression” in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) (United Nations Security Council 1995).

One of the criticisms of the TPNW concerns the weakness of its verification provisions. Nuclear-weapon states can provide expertise gained from their implementation of nuclear-arms-control agreements and cooperate with the TPNW adherents to improve the provisions either by revising them or through additional documents.

All these efforts short of joining the TPNW can greatly improve the relationship between the TPNW and the NPT and enable the two treaties to be truly compatible with each other, as both sides claim.

There are voices in Japan calling on the government to participate in the meeting of the TPNW states parties even though it cannot sign the treaty right away. The Komeito Party, a minority partner in the governing coalition, has proposed considering observer participation¹⁴, but Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has not responded to the suggestion.

INF Treaty-class Missiles

It is likely that the new Nuclear Posture Review will take up the question of how to deal with the fast-growing Chinese nuclear and conventional military capability. Under the requirements of the INF Treaty, the United States and Russia had abstained from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 kilometers (km) to 5,500 km. As a result, for example, the United States possesses a much greater number of ground-launched ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5,500 km range than China does (400 ICBMs versus104 ICBMs), while China has a greater number of INF-class ballistic missiles (IISS 2021). China is estimated to possess 750–1,500 short-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km, which puts almost all of Japan within their range. It also has 150–450 medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km range; that means they can reach Guam (CSIS 2021). After the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, it started developing and testing intermediate- and shorter-range ground-launched missiles, or so-called INF-class missiles. In order to meet the increasing Chinese threat of short- and medium-range missiles, suggestions were made to place the US INF-class missiles in Japan and other locations close to China.¹⁵

Japan maintains a policy known as the Three Non-nuclear Principles – that is not possessing or producing nuclear weapons and not permitting the introduction of these weapons onto Japanese territory – which has garnered widespread support among the Japanese public. When the United States proposes to locate its INF-class missiles in Japan, the Japanese government is likely to ask the United States to make sure that they carry only conventional warheads. Otherwise, the government would have difficulty winning public support and could even provoke local opposition. So far, there is no clear indication whether the INF-class missiles the United States is developing are nuclear tipped, conventional, or dual purpose. It is to be noted that while the treaty is known as “Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty”, it actually prohibits the possession of all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles irrespective of whether the warheads they carry are nuclear or conventional. If the United States insists on maintaining the dual capability of the missiles, the Japanese government may have to settle for the age-old format of (Japan) not asking and (the United States) not telling whether they carry nuclear warheads or not. A better solution would be for the United States and China to work on a format to declare the nuclear or conventional nature of their respective short- and medium-range missiles, as there is concern among security experts that Chinese missiles’ ambiguity about the nuclear/conventional distinction raises the possibility of causing an unintended nuclear confrontation between the United States and China¹⁶ Increasing the transparency in such a matter can be an important confidence-building measure to be addressed when the US-China strategic stability dialogue materializes. The declaration may be made on the basis of models of missiles, the units they belong to, or their location.

Whether the missiles are nuclear- or conventional-tipped, local resistance to their deployment is not hard to anticipate. Governor Denny Tamaki of Okinawa Prefecture, where half of the American forces in Japan are located, already has expressed his firm opposition to the idea of basing such missiles in Okinawa. While the Japanese government maintains that it has not made a decision on the basing, Governor Tamaki said that “if there is such a plan, (he could) easily imagine fierce opposition from Okinawa residents” (Cloud 2020). Although the authority to allow basing of a specific US weapon system rests with the central government in Tokyo, strong opposition from a local government makes it very difficult for the central government to implement the decision. That has been the case with the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa, which has taken well over 20 years and still is not completed, and the cancellation of the planned stationing of the Japanese Aegis Ashore missile-defense system at two locations on the Japanese main Island.

While the United States officially maintains the policy of not revealing the location of its nuclear warheads, the open and democratic societies of the United States and its allies often make their locations known over the years, as in the case of the location of tactical nuclear warheads on the territory of NATO allies. China, on the other hand, intentionally maintains ambiguity about the warheads the missiles are carrying in an attempt to deter enemy attack on its missile bases; thus, according to the reasoning behind this policy, the enemy is obliged to refrain from attacking missile bases to avoid inadvertently starting a nuclear confrontation (Singer and Xiu 2020). The new DF-26 ballistic missile, which has a range of about 4,000 kilometers, is specifically called “dual purpose”, and some Chinese Rocket Forces brigades carry both the nuclear and the conventional versions of the DF-26. This, however, carries the risk of leading the United States or its allies to assume incoming Chinese missiles are nuclear-armed and therefore to retaliate against Chinese forces with nuclear weapons, thus inadvertently starting a nuclear war (Singer and Xiu 2020). For this reason, it would be desirable for the United States and China to achieve a certain mutual understanding to differentiate the kinds and the locations of either nuclear or conventional missiles so that the two countries can avert the risk of initiating unintended nuclear confrontation.

Conclusion

The new US Nuclear Posture Review will be a welcome one for Japan if it emphasizes reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy. But it will likely create difficult tasks for Japan – perhaps most notably, strengthening Japan’s conventional deterrence capability and accepting deployment of the US INF-class ground-based missiles to meet the rising Chinese threat. For these reasons, it would be desirable for the United States and Japan to engage China in a nuclear-arms-control process, or at least in a mutual efforts to reduce the risk of unintended nuclear escalation.

This can take a form of establishment of an emergency line of communication, mutual notification of military exercises and operations, and a dialogue on strategic stability where sides can discuss their nuclear doctrines and force postures, and then exploration of additional ways to avert unintended nuclear escalation.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nobuyasu Abe

Nobuyasu Abe is a former UN Under-Secretary-General for disarmament affairs (2003-06). He served as a commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (2014-17), director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2008-2014), Japanese ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (1999-2001), director-general for arms control and science affairs in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-99). He also served as a member of the advisory board to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (2008-09) and a senior fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center (2018-19). He currently is a senior adviser to the Council on Strategic Risks.

Notes

¹ The only nuclear-weapon issue raised in the major speeches by Motegi or Prime Minister Suga to the plenary session of the 2021 Diet (legislature) session came in references to North Korean nuclear weapons (Suga 2021; Motegi 2021)..

² The cap of 1% of GNP was adopted in 1976 by the Miki cabinet but abolished in 1986 by the Nakasone cabinet.

³ According to a government opinion poll conducted in January 2019, 29.1% responded that Japanese defense should be strengthened while 60.1% answered the current level is about right and 4.5% said it should be reduced (Ministry of Defense 2020a)..

⁴ Akiba’s note to the commission, which was obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, stated, “If the U.S. decides to remove TLAM-N, we (Japan) would like to (be) consulted well in advance on how the loss of this capability will be offset” (Kakujoho 2009)..

⁵ A no-first-use policy literally means that a nuclear power does not use its nuclear weapons first. It may be interpreted to mean that once the other side uses nuclear weapons first, the first nuclear power is free to use nuclear weapons in whatever way it likes. It suffers from the historical credibility question dating back to the time when the Soviet Union advocated such a policy. A sole-purpose policy means that nuclear weapons are used only to retaliate or deter the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary. By implication, the restraints would continue even after a nuclear exchange started. Although the two terms thus have slightly different meanings, they are often used interchangeably..

⁶ For example, then-candidate Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs, “As I said in 2017, I believe that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring – and, if necessary, retaliating against – a nuclear attack” (Biden 2020).

⁷ The author participated in the process as a member of the advisory board to the commission..

⁸ As shown in the statement by Foreign Minister Motegi quoted below..

⁹ On 21 April 2021, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi stated in a committee hearing that no-first-use policy would not work in practice until all the nuclear-weapon holders verifiably adopted it. (Kakujoho 2021)..

¹⁰ Russia officially renounced its nuclear no-first-use policy in 1993, but it declared mutual nuclear no first use and mutual nuclear detargeting with China in 1994 (Bo 2016)..

¹¹ Graham Allison of Harvard Kennedy School hinted that the United States eventually will have “to shed some allies [and] double down on others whose assets are as important for U.S. security” after calling attention to the US inability to militarily defend Taiwan against China (Allison 2020)..

¹² The 2020 Defense of Japan explained, “When an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival,” the use of force based on the right of collective self-defense is permitted under the Constitution (Ministry of Defense 2020b)..

¹³ The five countries that the NPT recognizes as nuclear-weapon states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – also are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or “P5.”

¹⁴ A representative of Komeito submitted a request to this effect to Foreign Minister Motegi on 5 August 2021 (TV Asahi News 2021).

¹⁵ After the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty on 2 August 2019, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the next day that “he was in favor of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in the (Asian) region soon, possibly within months” (Martina 2019). For the general situation surrounding possible placement of the US INF-class missile in Japan, see Sonoda and Sato (2021)..

¹⁶ Ankit Panda, for example, has argued that, given the question as to whether the DF-17 is conventional, is nuclear, or has dual role, “it may be useful for the United States and China to seek out a broader conversation on strategic stability and for Beijing to generally practice greater transparency on matters related to its nuclear weapons programs” (Panda 2020)..