Arms Control Dialogue is Japan’s Interest: An Agenda for a New Nuclear Posture Review

ABSTRACT

In debates on the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the issue that has attracted the most attention in Japan is whether or not the declaratory policy of “no first use” or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons will be adopted. There is a strong argument in favor of declaratory policies as a method to promote nuclear disarmament. However, it is unlikely that the adoption of a declaratory policy at this time will lead to progress in nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia. This is because the security environment in the region is undergoing major changes. Force asymmetries, such as the medium-range missile gap between the United States and China, and the pursuit of a deterrent architecture based on entanglement between nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space domains, as well as the rise of emerging technologies that influence the modality of strategic stability, will have a significant impact on deterrence and arms control. Japan is moving toward ensuring the credibility of deterrence within the Japan-US alliance. Under such a circumstance, instead of focusing on declaratory policies to reduce nuclear risks and threats, it is important to establish communication mechanisms among stakeholders in the regional security for crisis management and a multi-layered mechanism to discuss issues of common interest, such as the impact of emerging technologies. Confidence building through these mechanisms for risk management and strategic dialogue provides a foundation for declaratory policies functioning for enhancing nuclear disarmament.

KEYWORDS:

• Arms control
• deterrence
• declaratory policy
• no first use
• strategic dialogue
• US-Japan alliance

Introduction

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report being prepared by the Biden administration will have an enormous impact on Japan’s national security. Therefore, the possible contents of the review have been a source of considerable discussion in Japan (Tokyo Shimbun 2021). In particular, as Joe Biden himself stated in a speech at the end of his term as vice president in the Obama administration (Biden 2017), there is a great interest in whether or not a policy of “no first use” (NFU) or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons will be adopted.¹

Regarding the pros and cons of adopting these declaratory policies, views in Japan are divided. There are those, mainly in the disarmament community, who support them and argue that the Japanese government should not prevent the United States from adopting an NFU policy (Kawasaki 2020), and those, mainly in the security policy community, who oppose their adoption.

Opinions are also divided in the United States. On 9 August 2021, former US government officials and scientists sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and the leaders of major political parties in Japan urging them not to oppose the US government’s adoption of an NFU policy. The letter, signed by 20 people, including former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, and six organizations, pointed out that the declaration would not affect the security arrangements with US allies, including extended nuclear deterrence against nuclear attack. As the letter also reads, “It would be tragic if Japan, the only country to suffer nuclear attacks, and a staunch advocate of the abolition of nuclear weapons, blocked this small but important step toward the abolition of nuclear weapons” (Nofirstuse Global 2021). Members of Congress also urged President Biden and his administration to adopt the NFU (Warren et al. 2021).

On the other hand, there are strong arguments that an NFU policy should not be adopted; doing so would weaken Washington’s ability to maintain deterrence credibility in a deteriorating global strategic environment. The Department of Defense explains, “Retaining a degree of ambiguity and refraining from a no first use policy creates uncertainty in the mind of potential adversaries and reinforces deterrence of aggression by making adversaries unable to predict what specific actions will lead to a U.S. nuclear response” (US Department of Defense 2019).

With a view to the question of what should be done to reduce the nuclear threat and the role of nuclear weapons in the deteriorating and increasingly unstable security environment in East Asia, where there seems to be no ground for arms control and disarmament, this article discusses measures to start nuclear threat reduction and disarmament in the region while assessing the effectiveness and limitations of the NFU policy in this regard. Rather than a binary choice between enhanced deterrence and disarmament, it would be useful to consider the role of arms control as a policy measure that bridges the gap between the two and lays the groundwork for reducing nuclear risk and the role of nuclear weapons in the region. The article also will discuss the need for Japan’s proactive involvement in such arms-control dialogue and efforts, as well as some specific measures that Japan should seek in cooperation with the United States and regional players to reduce risks²

Deteriorating Strategic Environment: Toward an Era of Disarmament Impossibility?

In examining the current environment for nuclear disarmament, it is perhaps useful to contrast it with the assessment of the strategic environment in the 2010 NPR report, when the United States took a proactive stance on nuclear disarmament under the Obama administration (US Department of Defense 2010). There are broadly two trends in the changing strategic environment. First, strategic competition among major powers has become more intense, as nuclear postures have become increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. Second, the escalation of conflicts at the sub-strategic level has become more complex. The growing entanglement between the nuclear and nonnuclear domains is increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation, and further, the United States and its allies are concerned about its gap vis-à-vis China in the medium-range strike capability at the regional level, which might pose the risk of the stability-instability paradox situation to US allies, including Japan.

Evolving Nuclear Posture of Russia and China under the Competitive Environment

The 2010 NPR report was based on a more optimistic outlook for great-power relations. The Obama administration emphasized strategic stability rather than deterrence in building its nuclear posture, judging that relations with Russia and China were not fundamentally adversarial. Rather, the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and terrorists, as well as insecure nuclear materials leading to such acquisition and use, were recognized as more serious threats to the United States. In addition, recognizing the unrivaled US superiority in conventional forces, the NPR was oriented toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance recognizes the changed security environment as it stated that “we cannot just return to the way things were before” (US National Security Council 2021). It is undeniable that the US relationships with Russia and China are increasingly antagonistic. China has been steadily modernizing its nuclear forces, with a view to increasing them numerically in the future. Both Russia and China are developing approaches to regional conflicts around their countries that include nuclear elements as part of their strategies to counter US actions and intervention. In East Asia, the United States and its allies are increasingly finding it difficult to maintain their superiority in conventional forces against China (Ministry of Defense of Japan 2021).

Russia’s operational policy for nuclear weapons appears to be reverting to reliance on limited nuclear first strikes in more diverse scenarios including ones with conventional attacks. In its military doctrine, which was approved by the President on 25 December 2014, Russia claims the right “to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 2015). In 2014, President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had placed its nuclear forces on alert during the Crimea crisis (Smith-Spark, Eshchenko, and Burrows 2015). President Putin’s signaling of the possibility of limited nuclear use was meant to prevent other states from intervening even in situations that do not threaten its own survival. In addition, the 2017 naval strategy states that if Russia is ready and willing to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the escalation of conflict, it can successfully deter its adversaries (Oliker 2018).

President Putin’s statement on Crimea suggests that the concept of “escalate to de-escalate”,³ in which Russia demonstrates its determination to use nuclear weapons and to prevent the escalation of a conflict or the intervention of other countries by sharply increasing the intensity of the conflict, has been incorporated into Russia’s nuclear policy by the concept of limited use of nuclear weapons. Whether this concept has been adopted as a formal strategy is a matter of controversy (Tertrais 2018; Oliker 2018). However, even if it has not been formally incorporated into the nuclear operational policy, words matter. In the 2018 NPR report, the United States explicitly cited this Russian approach as the basis for certain elements of the US posture (US Department of Defense 2018, 30).

With regard to China, the policy of unconditional NFU is generally considered to guide its nuclear strategy and operational planning. China has taken measures to make its pledge credible, such as demating nuclear warheads from delivery systems (Kulacki 2020). However, some documents are seen as mentioning the use of nuclear weapons for escalation control in conventional warfare (Yeaw, Erickson, and Chase 2012), and allowing for a “limited combat strategy” with nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Johnson 2019). They suggest that China could be shifting its nuclear posture toward incorporating the use of nuclear weapons into its approach to escalation control in wartime.

Recently, satellite-imagery analyses revealed that China is constructing a large number of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (Warrick 2021, Korda and Kristensen 2021). They added further concerns and uncertainties about China’s intention and nuclear posture. It is widely believed that China’s hundreds of silos will not all be filled with missiles (Acton 2021), or that they may be used as for playing a “shell game” with the United States. But they would certainly increase the chance of surviving its second-strike capability, and thus increase the credibility of deterrence. They also could be a bargaining chip in arms-control negotiations – if such negotiations ever happen – by increasing ambiguity and making adversaries’ calculation more complicated.

On the other hand, there are persistent views that the number of China’s nuclear weapons has been increasing. The Department of Defense’s report on China’s military and security development in 2021 states that China is accelerating its expansion of its nuclear arsenal to have up to 700 deliverable warheads and intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030 (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2021). When combined with the deployment of road-mobile missile launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the development and deployment of new strategic bombers, the prediction of the increase in the number of Chinese nuclear warheads reinforces the view that China is moving away from minimum deterrence toward limited deterrence, as well as maintaining a strong second-strike capability (Heinrichs 2019). Regardless of a policy China actually adopts, from the perspective of the United States and its regional allies, they will make it more difficult to envision the design of escalation control and will increase incentives to invest in avoiding deterrence failure. China’s strategy of imposing costs on the United States seems to be at work, and it would disincentivize the US strategic community from taking measures to reduce tensions by changing its force posture including nuclear posture.

Complicating the Regional Security Environment: Gray Zone, Strike Gap, and Emerging Technologies

The main threats to Japan and the United States in East Asia are North Korea and China. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and various means of delivering them are factors that could exacerbate the deterioration of strategic environment in the region. The discussion in this section, however, will focus primarily on the Chinese threat as it would be more structurally critical for the stability of the region.

For Japan and the United States, the deteriorating and increasingly complex regional security environment at the sub-strategic level is an important factor in defining the role of nuclear weapons in their deterrence architecture. Their perceptions of the regional security environment are shaped by China’s assertive attempts to change the status quo symbolized by the actions of the “gray zone” under the long nuclear shadow, the strike-capability gap and loss of conventional force advantage symbolized by the disparity in intermediate-range missile capabilities, and the entanglement of nuclear and other domains brought about by emerging technologies. The structure of deterrence envisaged by the United States and Japan needs to take these factors into account.

First, China’s expanding assertive behavior is a persistent challenge to a stable and open international system, an attempt to change the status quo (US National Security Council 2021). In such attempts to expand its sphere of influence, which in turn would impose constraints on the behavior of Japan and the United States in the region, China does not use military force from the outset. It gradually erodes the interests of the other parties through low-level provocations, such as reclamation of reefs and construction of de facto military bases, constant intrusion into territorial waters and harassment of other countries’ ships in disputed waters by Chinese official ships. These are viewed as incremental expansionary actions to change the status quo by building up faits accomplis. “Gray zone” is a concept to characterize such a new security situation. It is defined as “the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare” and also refers to “hybrid threats, sharp power, political warfare, malign influence, irregular warfare, and modern deterrence” (Schaus, Federici, and Sheppard n.d.). These actions are backed militarily by naval, air, and missile forces, as well as cyber and paramilitary capabilities, and politico-psychologically by the long nuclear shadow cast by modernized nuclear forces (Ministry of Defense of Japan 2021, especially Chapter 2).

To cope with such attempts to change the status quo, nuclear deterrence at the strategic level would not be sufficient, as the threat of nuclear retaliation against gray-zone activities would not been seen as credible. This leads to the argument that Japan and the United States should pursue a strategy to curb China’s assertive behavior, preventing it from achieving its strategic goal of expanding its sphere of influence and securing wider maneuverability, and to restore the status quo ante through a more integrated deterrence posture, rather than relying on nuclear deterrence at the strategic level. It would require the US-Japan alliance to have a tool kit with a wide variety of options to control escalation and to tame China’s assertive behavior.

Second, against this backdrop, the strategic community in Japan and the United States is increasingly concerned about the gap between the United States and China in medium-range strike capabilities including ground-launched intermediate-range missile capability, which was the subject of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Currently, China is said to possess more than 1,250 medium-range missiles (with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers), including both ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (US Department of Defense 2020). China’s medium-range missile capability is effective against Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, US bases in Japan, and US forward-deployed forces, thus increasing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities (Simon 2017). It would push US forces to retreat out of range of medium-range missiles to avoid damage in the event of an armed conflict in East Asia, and could temporarily reduce the operational capability of these forces.

There is a growing perception of the need to fill this strike gap at the regional level, which includes the need for a deterrence architecture that envisages an effective means to prevent nuclear escalation and missile exchange at the nonstrategic level. It forces Japan and the United States to plan to invest heavily in missile-defense systems, early-warning capabilities, and counterstrike capabilities. On this point, Campbell and Sullivan (2019) have argued for investment in long-range, unmanned, carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater vehicles, guided-missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons. In addition, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which outlined the request for budgetary expenditures for military operations and capability development in the Asia-Pacific region in the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, lists intermediate-range missiles with conventional warheads as one of its priorities (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 2021).

In Japan, too, there is a growing concern about the Chinese and North Korean buildups of medium-range missiles, which can reach all of Japan. Another issue is China’s development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which will reduce the effectiveness of early-warning systems and missile defense for their maneuverability at the terminal phase, thereby upsetting the balance between defense and offense and forcing Japan to bear excessive costs in the pursuit of “deterrence by denial”. These concerns have led to the argument that Japan should also have hangekiryoku (counterattack capability) (Kitaoka and Mori 2021). Such a capability would be expected to involve intermediate-range missiles with conventional warheads. It is expected to limit the actions of the Chinese navy with its anti-ship strike capability, thereby stopping an invasion of Japan’s territories, or to reduce air power and missile second-strike capabilities, thereby improving “deterrence by denial”.

This orientation arose out of a concern that China’s medium-range strike capabilities would deprive the United States and Japan of the initiative in escalation control and that the initiative therefore would be shifted to the Chinese side. Japan’s strategic community expects that US strategic documents, including the NPR report, will provide guiding principles for building an effective defense and deterrence architecture by indicating a “theory of victory”, a logic to discourage China from attempting to change the status quo and to recognize that it would be impossible to achieve its strategic goals (Roberts 2020). At the same time, the Japanese strategic community argues that Japan should proactively have close consultations with the United States and make proposals on how to deter China, rather than waiting for the US government to formulate its own guidelines (Takahashi 2021). When considering security needs, it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between the roles of Japan and the United States as in the past, with Japan focusing on its own defense and playing the role of “deterrence by denial” and leaving offensive and “deterrence by punishment” capabilities to the United States.

However, there will be strong resistance in Japanese society to the idea of possessing medium-range strike capabilities, as they could be perceived as beyond the traditional “exclusively defense-oriented posture, or senshu boei. Even though there is a growing awareness of the growing threat from China, one can expect vigorous political debate on possessing a robust strike capability.

From China’s point of view, if Japan and the United States establish a theory of victory, China will not be able to achieve its own strategic objectives in the Western Pacific region. It is unclear or even highly questionable whether China would be willing to accept a situation in which its influence inside the first Island chain, in particular over Taiwan and Japan, is diminished and deterred by Japan and the United States. In addition, although the Japanese and US missile-defense systems do not exert significant influence on China’s deterrence calculations at this stage, the Chinese side has strong concerns that its deterrent may be neutralized if more robust missile-defense systems are built in the future (Zhao 2020a).

China also is a node of interregional strategic linkage between East and South Asia. China’s medium-range missiles do not only play a role in the security dynamics of the Western Pacific or Northeast Asia, but also have the implication on the South Asian security dynamics. It suggests that China needs to take into account strategic implications of its own medium-range missile capability in South Asian security dynamics. Furthermore, in South Asia, India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed states that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), are at odds with each other. Both countries are modernizing their nuclear forces and enhancing their medium-range ballistic-missile capabilities. China is cooperating with Pakistan’s nuclear program and tries to cultivate Pakistan as a strategic partner in South Asia. Thus, China is not an outsider to the confrontation between the nuclear powers in South Asia.

Third, the rise of emerging technologies and their application to weapon systems is another critical factor that would affect the reconfiguration of the international security order. Emerging technologies such as drones, precision-guided weapons, HGVs, improved ballistic-missile defenses, lethal autonomous weapon systems, and artificial intelligence (AI) would make complicated and more ambiguous the calculations of “seamless” escalation scenarios from the “gray zone” through conventional warfare and finally to the punitive use of nuclear weapons.

For example, HGV and precision-guidance technology would enhance the interchangeability or substitutability with nuclear and weapons in certain missions such as decapitation operations. Nuclear-armed HGVs would have a better capability of penetrating an adversary’s missile-defense systems, which would increase the survivability of retaliatory capabilities. These features of HGV technology would add further concerns to the existing problem of the so-called “co-location” of nuclear and conventional weapons, or the deployment of nuclear and conventional warheads to the same missile units. If missile attacks are launched from the units of co-location, it is impossible to determine whether they are nuclear or conventional attacks. Likewise, it is impossible to distinguish whether an attack on a missile site that co-locate nuclear and conventional warheads, is an attack against nuclear forces or an attack against conventional forces. This creates a major problem for signaling in escalation control.

Advances in the use of remote sensing technology and AI for analysis of satellite imagery will make it easier to swiftly and accurately locate targets and track the movement of nuclear forces, increasing their vulnerability. Such heightened vulnerability may rekindle the temptation for preemptive strikes to disarm and incentivize arms buildup to avoid disarmament by preemptive strikes (Boulanin et al. 2020).

The vulnerability of nuclear command, control and communication (NC3) to cyberattacks and the dependence on space assets undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence as attacks on NC3 and space assets would cripple nuclear-weapon systems and pose great risks of sudden and unintended escalation (Lieber and Press 2017). In addition to cyberattacks, disruptions caused by deception and other forms of information manipulation and misinformation transmission in cyberspace will amplify uncertainty and fear in conflicts, which might cause unintended and unnecessary use of nuclear weapons.

It is not certain yet whether emerging technologies will fundamentally overturn the rules of the game of nuclear deterrence. It is also important to note that the scale and symptoms of the impact are asymmetrical between states, which would add complexity to the discussion and the attainment of a common understanding. At present, emerging technologies are still in the process of being adopted into weapon systems and the assessment of their functionality and effectiveness is incomplete. This, in turn, increases the uncertainty in escalation calculations and threat assessments, particularly of adversary’s ability to conduct operations.

As discussed above, the escalation brought about by the gray-zone activities under the long nuclear shadow, China’s superiority in medium-range strike capabilities, the erosion of US superiority in conventional forces, and the introduction of emerging technologies could increase the complexity and uncertainty in regional security environment in East Asia. They have a potentially significant impact on the design of deterrence structures.

As in the case of Crimea, states attempting to change the status quo may adopt a strategy of making threats and coercion by flirting with their own nuclear weapons to the extent that they do not compel the United States to use its nuclear weapons, and establishing a fait accompli before the United States commits to intervene. In such a situation, the US declaration of NFU or sole purpose of nuclear weapons could mislead them into believing that their threats would effective, letting them misestimate the risks of conflict (or US intervention). While these risks and uncertainties cannot be resolved by nuclear deterrence, declaring NFU, which would mean to draw a clear red line on the use of nuclear weapons does not appear to improve the current security environment, nor do concerns about the stability-instability paradox (or the fear of abandonment) remain at a negligible level for Japan. Japan would rather increase the level of concern over assertive actions by China in the region.

Debate on Declaratory Policies

Because of President Biden’s personal preference for NFU or sole purpose, these declaratory policies have taken center stage in the public debate over the nuclear-risk-reduction measures that should be included in the forthcoming NPR report. President Biden said that his administration would “work to put this belief [in sole purpose] into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and U.S. allies” (Biden, 2020, 75). The Interim National Security Strategy Guidance in March 2021 clearly states that the United States “will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy”. There is also a pressure from Capitol Hill. Congressman Adam Smith and Senator Elizabeth Warren also point out that the adoption of an NFU policy can demonstrate US moral and diplomatic leadership (Sonne 2019). Meanwhile, the guidance document also clarifies that the United States will make sure that its “strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that [its] extended deterrence commitments to [its] allies remain strong and credible” (US National Security Council 2021).

In examining the effectiveness and significance of declaratory policies, two issues will need to be considered: First, how can the diminishing role of nuclear weapons and the credibility of nuclear deterrence and extended-deterrence commitments to allies be reconciled under the emerging strategic environment described earlier? Second, what are the conditions under which declaratory policies can effectively bring about tension reduction, threat reduction, and ultimately disarmament?

Declaratory policies are generally regarded as contributing to the promotion of nuclear disarmament. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which was co-sponsored by Japan and Australia, suggests that a declaration to the effect that “the sole purpose of the possession of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of such weapons against one’s own state and that of one’s allies” should be considered (ICNND 2009).

Citing various papers, Tannenwald summarizes arguments that support NFU with four reasons: a policy of calculated ambiguity is unnecessary; threats of first use are dangerous; evidence for calculated ambiguity maximizing deterrence is hardly definitive; and even a minimal use of nuclear weapons would open Pandora’s box, and escalation would become uncontrollable (Tannenwald 2019).

Fetter and Wolfsthal (2018) claim that there is no reason for an ally, Japan, to oppose the adoption of an NFU policy, arguing that Japan’s opposition to NFU constitutes opposition to nuclear disarmament itself:

If Japan believes that the United States must be willing to threaten the first-use of nuclear weapons, it is saying that nuclear weapons are needed to deter more than nuclear attack. In opposing no first use, Japan is opposing the principle of nuclear disarmament.

China has not sought the parity of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. It has viewed the declaration of NFU as an effective way to signal that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive in nature and that China does not have the intention to catch up with the United States and Russia and hence to engage in arms race (Pan 2018).

On the other hand, Roberts said that the NFU’s “actual impact on non-proliferation and disarmament would be at best modest and short-lived”. And leadership in the global nuclear order cannot be achieved by “palliatives” such as the NFU. He believes that the NFU is too idealistic and lacks pragmatism (Roberts 2019).

But Mount (2021) argues that by limiting the role of nuclear weapons to the sole purpose, certain benefits can be expected. Such a policy would allow the state to effectively manage the risk of nuclear escalation in a limited conflict, increase stability against risks from nonnuclear weapons, and reduce the risks of unintended, and hence unnecessary, escalation.

Even the 2018 NPR report, which has been criticized for suggesting the expansion of the role of nuclear weapons, states that the United States would “only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners” (US Department of Defense 2018, VIII). Though it leaves some ambiguity, as the definitions of “vital interests” and “extreme circumstances” are arguable, it is an expression that is well-aware of limiting the role of nuclear weapons. Of course, it could be argued that this minor margin of ambiguity matters and that it makes strategic calculation more complicated.

One of the reasons why NFU or sole purpose is unpopular in the US and Japanese strategic communities is that it would undermine the role of nuclear weapons as ultimate guarantors to prevent the escalation of regional conflict under adversaries’ control, allowing adversaries to initiate non-nuclear first strikes, including those by chemical and biological weapons, and further escalate conflicts, without proper measures (or weapon systems) to mitigate risks from the existing inferiority of medium-range missile capabilities at the sub-strategic level in the region. As quoted in Sonne, Lubold, and Lee (2016), opponents of NFU claimed that it would eventually weaken US commitment to alliances (Sonne, Lubold, and Lee 2016).

In a scenario in which China and Japan would engage in a conflict, it is unlikely that China would use nuclear weapons in the early stages of the conflict. Also, China as well as the United States, which is expected to exercise the right of collective self-defense in support of Japan, should prefer to avoid a situation that escalates into an all-out nuclear war with catastrophic consequences. Based on these considerations, the idea that it would be sufficient for both countries to possess a limited strategic nuclear capability as minimum deterrence could be sustained⁴

In order to prevent escalation or bring de-escalation in the complex security environment of today as described above, however, the potential response must be credible in terms of both proportionality and timeliness. How to build a credible deterrence architecture to prevent China’s various assertive attempts to expand its sphere of influence under its long “nuclear shadow” cast in the Indo-Pacific is a major challenge for Japan as well as the US-led alliances in this regard.

From Japan’s perspective, there is another reason to be cautious about the US adoption of an NFU policy: The credibility of China’s declaratory policy is becoming more questionable as China continues its efforts to rapidly modernize its nuclear arsenal and conventional forces including medium-range ballistic missiles and HGVs, which could potentially be nuclear-capable⁵ China is believed to have maintained minimum deterrence. Negative security assurances are another element of China’s declaratory policy that potentially have a significant impact on the security of Japan as an NPT non-nuclear weapon state. Nevertheless, the recent expansion of Chinese nuclear and conventional arsenals along with construction of missile silos and deployment of strategic nuclear submarines, while not completely confirmed, compels the United States and Japan to strongly suspect the divergence from China’s conventional nuclear posture with minimum deterrence and declaratory policies such as NFU. A former Chinese diplomat also indicated China would consider the departure from traditional NFU posture as a response to the growing regional US military presence (Zhou 2021). Such a view from China, though it is not official, probably reaffirms US and Japanese skepticism on declaratory policies, undermining the credibility of China’s declaratory policies.

Even if the United States tries to exert its leadership in nuclear disarmament through “leading by example” to restore the spirit of international cooperation, it is not clear that other nuclear-armed states would follow the US example. In a strategic competition where confidence is missing between the parties, states would not formulate their security strategy based on adversary’s declaratory policies, which are unverifiable and easily reversible if not accompanied by force posture transformation. In other words, it is uncertain if the unilateral US adoption of declaratory NFU policy, even with good intentions, would lead to threat-reduction measures by others. Ironically, it is demonstrated by the fact that China’s NFU declaration has not led to US and Japanese détente vis-à-vis China. Similarly, China, which has already declared its policy of NFU, might think that the United States should its NFU example. A kind of disarmament cascade, where one declaratory policy changes the others’ declaratory policies, is not happening here.

It is hard to predict how the current strategic environment will evolve. In this context, a kind of signaling game is being played out between China on one side and the United States and its allies on the other: China is demonstrating its resolve to the United States and its allies through the testing of new weapons and the application of emerging technologies, testing the United States’ will to commit to regional security. The United States and its allies have made it clear that they will not tolerate any attempt by China to change the status quo and that they intend to improve the effectiveness of deterrence.

Under such a strategic environment, it is questionable whether unilaterally adopting a declaratory policy such as NFU is a choice that will bring the world closer to the goal of reducing the nuclear threat while meeting the national-security challenges that countries face. In this regard, rather than setting the nuclear-disarmament agenda as if the adoption of an NFU policy is the only criterion for the advancement of nuclear risk reduction and subsequent nuclear disarmament, Japan and the United States should work to create an environment in which the adoption of NFU can maximize its effectiveness and contribute to the acceleration of disarmament.

The Japanese strategic community argues that instead of relying on declaratory policies, in order to establish credible deterrence vis-à-vis China, it is necessary to do two things: first, conduct a comprehensive analytical assessment that examines not only the quantitative aspects of China’s nuclear weapons but also their consistency with the operational doctrine and force posture; and, second, conceive of a deterrence strategy that integrates conventional and nuclear forces, as well as cyber and space domains, taking into account everything from deterrence in the gray zone to management of nuclear escalation (Murano 2021).

Arms Control as a Stepping-Stone to Disarmament

Deterrence is the act of discouraging an opponent from taking a certain action by making the opponent believe that the costs of that action will outweigh the benefits. However, reducing threats and risks cannot be achieved only by imposing constraints on the actions of adversaries or by having the ability to respond to escalations into armed conflict or provocations in gray zone. Stabilizing relations and reducing tensions by avoiding unnecessary or unintended escalation is essential. For this purpose, strategic communication of all forms is necessary. And strategic communication should include not only signaling through deterrence posture and deterrence architecture but also diplomatic communications, including arms-control dialogue.

Hedley Bull (1961) defined arms control “in its broadest sense” as “all those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the pursuit of conflicting ones”. Given the current international security environment in flux, what are the “common purposes” that the United States and China as well as Russia, can agree on and jointly pursue? What are the items that can serve as catalysts for such joint actions?

To consider “common purposes” and set objectives, arms control efforts should be considered in three timeframes. From a short-term perspective, crisis management to avoid unintended escalation and reduce the risk of nuclear-weapons use (crisis stability); from a medium-term perspective, the shaping of stable strategic relationships and avoiding an arms race (arms race stability); and from a longer-term, or normative, perspective, measures to lead to the reduction of nuclear weapons (disarmament).

The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance suggests that the Biden administration would increase the importance of arms control and nonproliferation by elevating “diplomacy as our tool of first resort”. It would “head off costly arms races and re-establish our credibility as a leader in arms control”. With Russia and China, “where possible”, the administration would “pursue new arms control arrangements”. It also expressed the willingness to engage in “meaningful” dialogue with the two countries “on a range of emerging military technological developments that implicate strategic stability”, along with maintaining strong and credible deterrence for the United States and its allies and partners (US National Security Council 2021).

Zhao correctly points out that “much of the tension between China and the United States is driven by their intense conventional military competition” (Zhao 2020b). If both countries want to avoid strategic competition becoming punitively costly with the increased likelihood of catastrophic consequences by escalating it into nuclear exchange, it seems reasonable for them to reduce nuclear risks through strategic nuclear arms-control. However, for the stability of East Asia, preventing the use of nuclear weapons and establishing stability at the strategic level between the United States and China are necessary but not sufficient conditions.

The countries in the region, especially Japan and Taiwan, need the stability of the strategic relationship between the United States and China in such a way that alliance decoupling does not occur. In particular, as China is rapidly overcoming its inferiority in conventional forces, Japan and the United States should not be left without options in case of a change in the status quo of the international order, such as inferiority in medium-range ballistic-missile capabilities and gray-zone crises. If the United States places importance on alliances in its strategy and cares allies’ security concerns, an arms-control approach that focuses only on the balance of power and strategic stability among major powers will not necessarily contribute to regional stability in the current East Asian security environment.

As suggested by the arms-control regime in the transatlantic theater constructed during the Cold War, an arms control architecture needs to be designed to meet the security needs of the region. The arms-control architecture in the Western Hemisphere has been multilayered, with treaties to deal with each layer: anti-ballistic missiles, strategic arms, intermediate-range missiles, conventional forces in Europe. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has played a role as a confidence-building mechanism, though its role was limited. (At the same time, however, the European arms control regime was not stable in the long term.)

China has adopted a rather different nuclear doctrine, which would result in an asymmetric nuclear strategic relationship between China and the United States. China, which is inferior to the United States in terms of the number of nuclear weapons, has maintained minimum deterrence for a long time without trying to catch up with the United States in this regard. It suggests that China has believed that the disparity in capability does not preclude the establishment of mutual deterrence relationship as long as it can maintain a credible retaliatory capability, as well as strategic ambiguity that complicates the US calculation.

As China continues to maintain a smaller nuclear force and adopt an asymmetric nuclear strategy with the United States, the increase in transparency regarding the size, deployment, and posture of its nuclear forces will increase its own vulnerability. If such an orientation is to continue, it means that there is little appetite for arms-control negotiations (Li 2018). China has been claiming that it would participate in an arms-control dialogue when the United States and Russia achieved deep cuts. Thus, there would be no incentive on China’s side for increased transparency, which would be necessary to establish an arms-control baseline. Meanwhile, as discussed above, there are some signs that indicate the possible departure from the current nuclear posture and force structure.

The arms-control mechanism between the United States and the Soviet Union has focused on issues such as the total number of delivery systems, the number and deployment of nuclear warheads, and whether the treaty should incorporate verification measures. If China and the United States decided to pursue an arms-control agreement, it is possible that a totally new format would be required, adapting to the new security environment and the different nature of strategic relationships.

Such questions may be premature; it is not clear whether a detailed arms-control agreement is necessary in the first place. However, as risks and threats are mounting, arms races are intensifying, and uncertainties with emerging technology are expanding, it is increasingly necessary to create a platform for discussing what kind of arms control would enable the establishment of a stable strategic relationship between the United States and China. The United States would have to ensure that any arms-control mechanism does not undermine the security of its allies in the region and promotes efforts to reduce nuclear risks and threats. Those are necessary conditions for the peace and stability of the region. Beijing’s considerations might be considerably different from Washington’s, but at least in order to avoid inadvertent escalation of crises and uncharted arms race escalation, it would be worthwhile for China to seek an arms-control dialogue and mechanism for mutual restraint and coordination of mutual strategic interests, as the United States and the Soviet Union have done in the past.

Before discussing modalities of arms control, an urgent task is the establishment of a crisis management/risk reduction mechanism – namely, the means of communication to ensure crisis stability and avoid accidental or unintended escalation or use of nuclear weapons. In reality, there certainly exist crisis communication systems between the two countries. But they do not function. There are ongoing efforts to re-establish communication channels between the United States and China. However, they do not seem to have borne fruit yet (Kine 2021). Kurt Campbell, who is responsible for coordinating China policy across the Biden administration, said that Beijing had shown no interest in using them, out of a preference for uncertainty (The Guardian 2021).

In a strategic environment under the cross-domain deterrence and escalation structure that encompasses strategic-level nuclear weapons, sub-strategic nuclear weapons, advanced conventional forces with high strategic utility, and new domains such as cyber and space, risks of unintended or accidental escalation are quite high. This is partly due to the lack of a common understanding of how these elements affect strategic calculations, which could result in increased unpredictability or miscalculation of adversary’s reactions. Therefore, it should be in the mutual interest of the United States and China to establish hotlines at the levels of military commanders and heads of state, which would establish a foundation for making strategic dialogue more sustainable. The commitment at the level of heads of state would be particularly useful; if the highest-level political leadership in China is not interested in such confidence building, such mechanisms will not function.

Further, it is also necessary to establish confidence-building measures among regional stakeholders, including non-nuclear-weapon states. At a summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2007, the two leaders agreed to begin talks on establishing a maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of the two countries in order to prevent the occurrence of “unforeseen circumstances at sea” such as a crash between official ships of two governments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007). Although there have been several meetings to make this mechanism work, it has not been able to function due to the intensifying conflict over the Senkaku Islands. Subsequently, the process of establishing a liaison mechanism under this framework stalled, but a new Memorandum of Understanding on the Japan-China Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism was signed between Prime Minister Abe and Chinese State Council Premier Li Keqiang in 2018 (Kyodo 2018).

With regard to efforts to establish a more sustainable strategic relationship, which could lead to a new modality of strategic stability and arms control, dialogue on the impact of emerging technologies on deterrence and the stability of the regional security environment could be the first issue that China and United States tackle. Developments on this front could provide clues about the prospects for an agreement that can build confidence between the two sides by creating a certain degree of common understanding, an arms-control dialogue, and an agreement on a future arms-control system. This kind of dialogue goes beyond the mere exchange of information and contributes to a better understanding of the thought processes on deterrence and arms control of both parties. When both sides better understand the other’s thought process, the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding is reduced in both peacetime and contingency situations. An aspect of this effort could be the opportunity to have commanders of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and other senior Chinese military officers participate as observers in the US-Russian arms-control dialogue and verification process. Traditionally, China has been reluctant to engage in such a strategic dialogue because China, as a weaker nuclear power, has more to lose vis-à-vis the United States (Santoro and Gromoll 2020). However, both sides would come to appreciate the importance of risk management for a high-stakes situation such as accidental escalation.

Further efforts on regional stability should include dialogues to establish a common understanding on how to manage the threats and risks associated with adaptation of emerging technology into weapon systems before they fully materialize and to establish a code of conduct to prevent potential nuclear crises. The major concern here is the impact of emerging technology on the nuclear stability through the entanglement of nuclear and other domains. One possible item that would need to be explored is a code of conduct to refrain from cyberattacks on the NC3 because of the potential scale of risk of misuse or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Although a code of conduct, like a declaratory policy, cannot eliminate doubts about its effectiveness, it can be useful in managing crises to avert the imminent danger of nuclear use. States therefore would have a strong incentive to negotiate such an agreement and then comply with it.

If we succeed in avoiding unfettered strategic competition by imposing a certain degree of constraint through codes of conduct and other measures on issues that are riskier and less foreseeable (which, in turn, can be said to have greater strategic military utility), the result will be a more specific set of understandings and constraints to limit, control, and monitor new technologies. The most important thing to remember at this point is that there is a lot of work to be done.

Another high-priority issue for dialogue would be missile control. But it will be more difficult as it is the very core of confrontation. If the United States, China, and Japan become serious about arms control, they eventually will need to discuss how to regulate missile capabilities, deployment, and posture, as well as missile defense capabilities. If there is regulation, transparency and verification measures will need to be discussed as well. However, it would be difficult to hold these discussions at the government level, and therefore, it would probably be appropriate to start with an exchange of opinions among experts in a Track 1.5 or Track 2 meetings⁶

Conclusion

Declaratory policies such as NFU are often understood as confidence-building measures to advance disarmament. They are expected to create a favorable environment for disarmament by changing the strategic calculus of parties involved. However, declaratory policies do not always bring about an unconditional positive spiral of disarmament. Rather, their effects are dependent on the environment. When the relationship between the parties is hostile and trust is lacking, unilateral threat-reduction actions are likely to be exploited as an opportunity to establish strategic advantage rather than to elicit reciprocally favorable actions from the other party. Even if they do not, they are unlikely to improve the predictability of the other side’s actions and therefore may not lead to threat reduction.

As discussed above, in Northeast Asia, perceptions and definitions of nuclear deterrence as well as approaches to the role of nuclear weapons in security policy vary greatly from state to state. For this reason, a common understanding of the principles and concepts that govern their relationships over nuclear weapons has yet to be fostered.

In the current political and security situation in Northeast Asia, where mutual distrust and strategic confrontation dominate, a declaratory policy by the United States is unlikely to contribute to the reduction of tensions, change China’s strategic preferences, and induce a positive spiral toward nuclear threat reduction and disarmament.

The most important and urgent goal at this point is to develop a common understanding of the factors that destabilize strategic relations among the nuclear powers and allies, and to agree on measures to reduce, if not eliminate, these risks. The establishment of communication mechanisms should be an effective and urgent agenda item that would reduce the risks of unintended escalation. Also, the process of assessing emerging technologies and developing a common understanding of their impact on strategic stability may be necessary and useful. Increasing the level of trust through such measures will enhance the effectiveness of declaratory policies such as NFU in contributing to the reduction of nuclear threats.

Funding

This work was supported by the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Kakenhi) of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and grant ID is [19H00578].

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nobumasa Akiyama

Nobumasa Akiyama is a professor of international security at the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. He is an adjunct research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Notes

¹ The policies of NFU and sole purpose are, in a strict sense, not identical. NFU is an explicit ex ante constraint on the employment of nuclear weapons. The sole purpose of nuclear weapons, under the policy of that name, is often referred to as deterring and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack. It does not exclude the possibility of first use in an event of the extreme circumstance but rather is a statement of the raison d’être of nuclear possession (Panda and Narang 2021). In a longer article with a different focus, it would be appropriate to analyze and argue the implications of these concepts separately. However, given the similar signaling effects of these declaratory policies, this article will consider them together.

² For the definition of “stability-instability paradox,” see Jervis (1984). Roberts (2013) argues East Asian situations of the stability-instability paradox..

³ This concept comes from a sentence in Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (2003, 70). It states, “Deescalation of aggression [means] forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons” (Translation from Ryan [2020]).

⁴ It should be noted that the concept of minimum deterrence itself has important legal and ethical issues that should be considered if it is to be considered as a step toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible deterrent. The question is whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons in compliance with the principles of discrimination and proportionality when trying to build a credible deterrent with a minimum of nuclear forces. Although this is an important issue that cannot be avoided when considering a concrete and realistic path to nuclear disarmament, it will not be addressed in this article. For the international legal issues of nuclear policy, see Lewis and Sagan (2016)..

⁵ Despite an official denial by China, experts believed that China conducted a test of the DF-17 missile with a nuclear-capable HGV warhead in August 2021. See Sevastopulo (2021); BBC (2021)..

⁶ According to Santoro and Gromoll (2020), the Track 1.5 U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics Dialogue, which has been held since 2004, had a mixed record. In their evaluation, this dialogue was useful in deepening mutual understanding, sharing a common definition of terminologies (such as “strategic stability” and “deterrence”), and establishing an epistemic community of two countries, including at very high levels. However, it could not induce the two sides to agree on the contours of a modus vivendi to help reduce strategic instability..