World Domination and Genocide: The ‘Lochner Version’ of Hitler’s Speech from 22 August 1939, a Key Document of National Socialist Ideology

ABSTRACT

On August 22, 1939, only days before the German invasion of Poland, Adolf Hitler delivered an infamous secret speech before the leading Wehrmacht generals at the Obersalzberg. The American foreign correspondent Louis Lochner, as head of the Berlin bureau of Associated Press, was a key figure in securing, spreading, and publishing this speech during the World War II. Despite Lochner’s presence throughout the Nuremberg trials 1945/1946 as a reporter for AP, he was not called as witness to testify regarding the document which today is usually referred to as ‘Lochner Version’ of the secret Hitler speech. Later, while verifying this source during the 1960s, Lochner’s role was too underappreciated and even distorted by German historians. Therefore, until today, the Lochner Version of Hitler’s speech is either unknown, underestimated or misjudged. To reassess this central source for Hitler’s worldview and the global aspirations of National Socialist ideology, this article reconstructs its historical background and context for the first time. It argues that the Lochner Version is indeed the most authentic and reliable version available of this speech by Hitler. Only the Lochner Version reflects Hitler’s two ultimate goals: World conquest and genocides of all ‘inferior races’. Furthermore, it proves that all leading German generals knew of Hitler’s planned crimes against humanity even before World War II started.

KEYWORDS:

• National Socialism
• Holocaust
• World War II

Acknowledgement

The German version of this article appeared as: Norman Domeier, ‘Weltherrschaft und Völkermorden: Die ‘Lochner-Version’ der Hitler-Rede vom 22. August 1939 als Schlüsseldokument nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung,’ Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 6 (2022): 542-567.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Norman Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur. Die amerikanischen Auslandskorrespondenten im “Dritten Reich” (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2021), Chap. 6.

2 Anneke De Rudder, “Warum das ganze Theater? Der Nürnberger Prozeß in den Augen der Zeitgenossen,” Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, Vol. 6 (1997): 233.

3 Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, 15–26.

4 Winfried Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 16, no. 2 (1968): 120–49. Hermann Boehm and Winfried Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 19, no. 3 (1971): 294–304.

5 See the Lochner Version of the Hitler speech from August 22, 1939, in the appendix of this article. The English version was translated by the British on August 25, 1939 (also in the appendix). In the transcript kept in the Wisconsin Historical Society from Louis Lochner’s personal papers, the last paragraph is missing, which describes the reaction of the listeners and Göring’s behaviour. Since this version contains typographical errors, it would appear to be a later copy of Lochner’s original, made by typewriter. He placed a brief explanatory text at the head of the document with the same typewriter font. Louis Lochner Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison/Wisconsin, Reel 58/Frame 149.

6 Cf. the informative, but subjectively argued essay by Richard Albrecht, “‘Wer redet heute noch von der Vernichtung der Armenier?’ Adolf Hitlers Geheimrede am 22. August 1939: Das historische L-3-Dokument,” Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung, Vol. 9, no. 1 (2008): 93–131.

7 Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939,” 139. Boehm and Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939.”

8 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1969), 412–13

9 Andreas Hillgruber, “Quellen und Quellenkritik zur Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs,” in Gottfried Niedhart, (ed.), Kriegsbeginn 1939. Entfesselung oder Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs? (Darmstadt: WBG, 1976), 384-85.

10 In his writings, Eberhard Jäckel makes no reference to the Lochner Version, even though it would have fully supported his interpretation of Hitler’s worldview. He brooded over the “Armenian Quote” from the Lochner Version in his later years repeatedly, as he informed the author in Stuttgart in May 2013.

11 Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, 1939: Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte. Der lange Anlauf zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Olzog, 2003), 321-22.

12 “Ansprache Hitlers vor den Oberbefehlshabern am 22. August 1939.” https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansprache_Hitlers_vor_den_Oberbefehlshabern_am_22._August_1939 [11 May 2022]

13 Other than in the “Blitzkriege” of 1940, when many Norwegian, Danish, Belgian, and Dutch foreign correspondents were surprised by the war and were interned in Berlin. See Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, 337.

14 In any case, Britain was now “World Foe No. 1”, while a compromise with the Soviet Union was desirable, “England has superseded Russia in Hitler’s hatred.” This radical turn was to be made palatable for the German people with the claim that the Communists had rid their ranks of the Jews. John Dickson (Sigrid Schultz), “Nazi Dictator Brands Britain World Foe No. 1 (Oslo),” Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1939, 1, 8.

15 On Jordan and Schultz, see Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, Chaps. 3.3.2 and 315–319.

16 This can be recreated during the “Kristallnacht,” for instance. Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, Chap. 6.1. For Hitler’s daily “picture presentation” see ibid., 482, 488, 698; and on Hitler‘s press policy by Otto Dietrich and Walter Hewel, 698-99. A study on Hitler’s press uptake and policy remains a desideratum.

17 For the secret deal between AP and the NS regime: Norman Domeier, “Geheime Fotos. Die Kooperation von Associated Press und NS-Regime (1942–1945),” Zeithistorische Forschungen, Vol. 14, no. 2 (2017): 199–230, updated in Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, Chap. 5.

18 Hans Rothfels, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung (Zürich: Manesse, 1994), (1949), 101–2. On Maaß see the biographical sketch by Johannes Tuchel in ed. Sigrid Grabner and Hendrik Röder, (eds.), Im Geiste bleibe ich bei Euch. Texte und Dokumente zu Hermann Maaß (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2003), 66–81; for the passing-on of the Hitler speech to Lochner, ibid. 70. Various references to Maaß also in Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984) 196, 292, 370, 499, 514, 521-22, 54-42, 558; Baldur von Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler (Hamburg: Mosaik Verlag, 1967), 177-78.

19 Louis Paul Lochner, What About Germany? (New York: Dodd, 1943), 11. Lochner feared the worst for Maaß in July 1945, since he had not got back in touch, in contrast to Lochner’s other informants. Testimony of Mr. Louis P. Lochner, taken at Berlin, on 25 July 1945, by Colonel John H. Amen, IGD. National Archives Washington (NARA), 6105243, 3–4; Morrell Heald, ed., Journalist at the Brink: Louis P. Lochner in Berlin, 1922–1942 (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2007), 472. General Ludwig Beck stayed connected with Sigrid Schultz of the Chicago Tribune for many years. See Sigrid Schultz, German Underground. Unpublished manuscript, 51, NL Sigrid Schultz, Wisconsin Historical Society.

20 Lochner, What About Germany?, 11.

21 Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende. I. Band: Vom Reichstagsbrand zur Fritsch-Krise (Zurich: Fretz&Wasmuth, 1946). For the intersections between Wehrmacht leadership and historians after 1945, see Paul Fröhlich, “Der Generaloberst und die Historiker. Franz Halders Kriegstagebuch zwischen Apologie und Wissenschaft,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 68, no. 1 (2020): 25–61.

22 Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende. II. Band: Vom Münchner Abkommen zum 20. Juli 1944 (Zurich: Fretz&Wasmuth, 1946), 119–23.

23 Ibid., 120.

24 Both Baumgart and Boehm deny there was a ban on notetaking, see Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 19, no. 3 (1971): 294–304, here 295. Contrary to Hillgruber, Quellenkritik zur Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 385.

25 Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende II, 119-20. Compare Ian Colvin, Admiral Canaris – Chief of Intelligence (London: Victor Gollancz [1951], 1973), 107.

26 By this time, Lochner was already working on the secret deal between AP and the NS regime, which came into effect at the end of 1941, to keep the trade of press photographs between the enemy sides running even after the USA entered the war.

27 Testimony of Mr. Louis P. Lochner (25 July 1945), 4-5. Cf. Klemens von Klemperer, The German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 133; Michael Marrus, The Holocaust in History (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1987), 20–1. On Kirk as a diplomat living in opulence in wartime Germany: Otto D. Tolischus, They Wanted War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940), 197, 325. Lochner termed Kirk disparagingly as a “plutocrat,” in Heald, Journalist at the Brink, 446-45, letter from September 10, 1940.

28 Lochner, What about Germany?, 13-14.

29 See appendix; cf. Colvin, Canaris, 99–102. Generally, on the knowledge of the German attack plans in Great Britain: Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy. British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 (London: IB Tauris, 1985), 116-7 There is, however, no reference to the Hitler speech of August 22, 1939, and its transfer to the Foreign Office in London. Cf. Klemperer, German Resistance, 32-33.

30 The plans for genocide were not limited to “the East,” which was only the beginning. They were global: “Wir werden weiterhin die Unruhe in Fernost und in Arabien schüren. Denken wir als Herren und sehen wir in diesen Völkern bestenfalls lackierte Halbaffen, die die Knute spüren wollen.” Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik (ADAP), D 7, No. 193, 171-72. (Lochner Version, see appendix). On Hitler’s actual goal, “world-conquest”, which would eventually be directed against his ally Japan as well, see his contemporary: Gunnar Thorstensson Pihl, Germany. The Last Phase (New York: Knopf, 1944), 34, 63. Hitler‘s ultimate aim, “world power or nothing”, was recently emphasized once more by Brendan Simms, Hitler. Only the World Was Enough (London: Allen Lane, 2019), 554.

31 ADAP D 7, Nr. 193, 171-72. (Lochner Version, see appendix).

32 Kordt seconds this: “Canaris hatte die Rede Hitlers persönlich mit angehört und den größten Teil mitstenographiert. Es war ein erschütterndes Dokument, in dem nur von Vernichtung, Mitleidlosigkeit, größter Härte, dem Recht des Stärkeren die Rede war.” Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten. Die Wilhelmstraße in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke 1928–1945 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1950), 325.

33 Cf. William L. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 490, fn. 605.

34 See Helmut Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler,” in Europäische Publikation, (ed.), Vollmacht des Gewissens (Frankfurt: Metzner, 1965), 177–384, here 380.

35 Persönliche Erlebnisse des Gen. d. Inf. a. D. Curt Liebmann i. d. Jahren 1938/39 (written in November 1939), originally page 19, now ED 1-1–294, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archiv, Zeugenschrifttum Nr. 95.

36 Krausnick, Vorgeschichte des Widerstandes, 381.

37 Nikolaus von Vormann, So begann der Zweite Weltkrieg. Zeitzeuge der Entscheidungen. Als Offizier bei Hitler 22. 8. – 1. 10. 1939 (Leoni: Druffel, 1988), 30-31.

38 Hannelore Fuchs, ed., Mittendrin im Berlin der Nazizeit. Bernard Lescrinier, als deutscher Journalist Mitglied im Verein der Auslandspresse, berichtet aus den 12 Jahren (Leipzig: Amazon, 2015), 132 f.

39 On Wilhelminian Neo-Byzantinism: Norman Domeier, The Eulenburg Affair. A Cultural History of Politics in the German Empire (Rochester/New York: Camden House, 2015), 159–68.

40 Karl von Wiegand, “Hitler Foresees His End”, Cosmopolitan, April 1939, 27–29, 152–155, here 152. Wiegand Papers (Hoover Archives, Stanford), Box 1.

41 It is instructive how the blame for the alleged manipulation of the Hitler speech was laid on Hans Oster. Even Oster's future activity is taken as evidence for this, but not Hitler’s aspirations, which the Lochner Version turned into gruesome reality. Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, 412–13.

42 Hitler’s ideology regarding the empty living space remained consistent over many years. Still shortly before his liquidation, Hitler’s most important long-term follower, Ernst Röhm, announced to the Berlin foreign press, one did not harbour a “lust for conquest” in the classical sense: “Denn jede Neugewinnung nicht-deutscher Untertanen würde eine natürliche Schwächung des deutschen Volkskerns bedeuten und darum kein politischer Gewinn sein.” Röhm‘s address to the diplomatic corps and the foreign press, Berlin 18 April 1934, printed in Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Teil I und II: 1933–1945, Hans Adolf Jacobsen and Werner Jochmann, ed., (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft, 1961), 1–4 (C, Dokument 18. IV. 1934). Hitler’s policy of destruction was also expressed in the Daily Watchword for the German press on July 29, 1941, reflected Hitler’s “approach” most markedly, according to Helmut Sündermann: “Es wird erneut darauf hingewiesen, daß der Erfolg des gewaltigen Kampfes im Osten nicht geografisch durch einzelne Ortsangaben erfasst werden kann, sondern daß sein Ziel in der Vernichtung der gegnerischen Streitkräfte liegt, wie es z. B. bei der Einkreisungsschlacht von Smolensk der Fall ist.” Gert Sudholt, ed., Helmut Sündermann. Tagesparolen. Deutsche Presseanweisungen 1939–1945. Hitlers Propaganda und Kriegsführung (Leoni: Druffels, 1973), 176.

43 Konrad Heiden, Adolf Hitler. Ein Mann gegen Europa. Eine Biographie (Zürich: Europa-Verlag, 1937), 239.

44 Overviews of the secondary literature during the most heated phase of the debate on Hitler’s plan for world domination may be found here: Jochen Thies, Hitler’s Plans for Global Domination. Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Wolfang Michalka, “Einleitung,” in Wolfang Michalka, (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik (Darmstadt: WBG, 1978), 1–27; Meir Michaelis, “World Power Status or World Dominion? A Survey of the Literature on Hitler’s ‘Plan of World Dominion’ (1937–1970,” in The Historical Journal, Vol. 15, no. 2, (1972): 331–60; Milan Hauner, “Did Hitler Want World Domination?”, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13 (1978), 15–32. I am grateful to Dirk Rupnow for references. In recent years, the transnational and global reach of National Socialism has been taken into focus: Daniel Hedinger, Die Achse. Berlin, Rom, Tokio 1919–1946 (Munich: Beck, 2021); Stefan Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

45 Eberhard Jäckel‘s brief study remains unsurpassed in its intellectual precision: Hitler’s World View. A Blueprint for Power (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1972).

46 Hitler emphasised the exterminatory character of the war once more on 30 March 1941, when the attack on the Soviet Union moved closer. Max Domarus, ed., Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Leonberg: Pamminger [1973], 1988), 1682. Cf. Kriegstagebuch des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres, Generaloberst Franz Halder, Eintrag v. 30. 3. 1941, Bundesarchiv (BArch), RH 2/109. Already in September 1939, Reinhard Heydrich spoke of an “Endziel,” which, however, still required more time. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Herrschaft. Vollzug einer Weltanschauung (Stuttgart: DVA, 1986), 108. During the “Kristallnacht” in November 1938, numerous public statements were made about the final elimination of the Jews. Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, Chap. 6.1.

47 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Edition no. 851 – 855 (Munich: Eher, 1943), 750–51.

48 Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 120–3.

49 Some foreign correspondents believed for years that Hitler would drop anti-Semitism as “part of his programme” sometime, which could have increased his popularity in Great Britain and the USA. Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, 112, 377, 651.

50 Axel Kuhn, Hitlers außenpolitisches Programm (Stuttgart: Klett, 1970), 270.

51 Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 122.

52 The term “Erdherrschaft” (or “Erd-Herrschaft”) can only be found in Nietzsche‘s and later Heidegger’s writings. This is probably why it has not been placed in connection with the Hitler speech of 22 August 1939 so far.

53 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Zur Genealogie der Moral. Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, paragraph 208 (Munich: dtv, 1999), 140.

54 The supposedly better “official” nature of this transcript lay in its place of discovery, according to Baumgart, and in nothing more. He does not consider that this version from the OKW files may have been an attenuated variant of the Canaris script, which was added to the folder despite Hitler’s ban on notes and lacking the author. Document PS-798 was classified in Nuremberg as a “Copy” without signature and known author. Staff Evidence Analysis on Document “PS-798” from 17 September 1945, IMT-NRMB-HL57AEV-20 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School).

55 Baumgart, Zur Ansprache Hitlers, 121.

56 Ibid., 139.

57 “Und so rasselt er weiter und Admiral Canaris, der unauffällig im Hintergrund stand, machte sich die ganze Zeit über Notizen.” The passages Colvin cites are taken from the Lochner Version. Colvin, Canaris, 104-5.

58 Krausnick, Vorgeschichte des Widerstandes, 381, fn. 557.

59 Baumgart, Zur Ansprache Hitlers, 134.

60 Ibid., 138.

61 Richard Breitman, “Hitler and Genghis Khan,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25 (1990): 337–51. It is likely that Hitler possessed information on the Armenian Genocide from his former companion Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who was vice-consul in Erzerum at the time. Paul A. Leverkuehn, German Officer During the Armenian Genocide: A Biography of Max von Scheubner-Richter (London: Gomidas, 2008). For Himmler’s distribution of the book by Michael Prawdin “Tschingis-Chan und sein Erbe” to the SS and Waffen-SS leaders, see Die Organisation des Terrors. Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1943–1945, ed. Matthias Uhl, (Munich: Piper, 2020), 260, entry on 2 May 1943.

62 Domarus, Hitler. Reden, Vol. 4, 1758–67, here 1763.

63 Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944. Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims (Hamburg: Knaus, 1980), 137, 367, 370. Critical on this source: Mikael Nilsson, “Hitler redivivus. Hitlers Tischgespräche und Monologe im Führerhauptquartier – eine kritische Untersuchung,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 67, no. 1 (2019): 105–45.

64 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, 85–87; Thomas Weber, Becoming Hitler. The Making of a Nazi (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 215–217, 275–277, 333, especially 382 f. The German debate, which lasted from the Armenian genocide until the 1930’s, and in which Hitler participated, is traced in Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Who Still Talked About the Extermination of the Armenians? German Talk and German Silences,” in Ronald Grigor Suny, (ed.), A Question of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 199–220, 372–9; more generally: Stefan Ihrig, Justifying Genocide. Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

65 Wolfram Pyta, Hitler. Der Künstler als Politiker und Feldherr: Eine Herrschaftsanalyse (Munich: Siedler, 2015), 435.

66 Thilo Vogelsang, “Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930–1933,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 2 (1954): 397–436, here 435. Cf. Andreas Wirsching, “‘Man kann nur Boden germanisieren:’ Eine neue Quelle zu Hitlers Rede vor den Spitzen der Reichswehr am 3. Februar 1933,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 49 (2001): 516–50. For the reactions of the generals, see Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, 42-43. Cf. Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 316.

67 Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft, 113–5.

68 Ibid., 112-13.

69 Ibid., 117-16

70 Ibid., 120-21.

71 Thies only mentions the other two IMT versions of this speech, ibid., 120.

72 In Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, the speech is not mentioned at all. Kuhn follows Baumgart and only mentions it in a footnote. Kuhn, Hitlers außenpolitisches Programm, 254–256.

73 Wilfred Byford-Jones, Berlin Twilight (London: Hutchinson, 1946), cit. by Louis Paul Lochner, Stets das Unerwartete. Erinnerungen aus Deutschland 1921–1953 (Darmstadt: Schneekluth, 1955), 353 f.

74 Staff Evidence Analysis on Document “L3” from August 4, 1945, IMT-NRMB-HL5762F-1 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School).

75 IMT Proceedings, 378 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School).

76 Ibid., 380.

77 Jens Brüggemann, Männer von Ehre? Die Wehrmachtgeneralität im Nürnberger Prozeß 1945/46. Zur Entstehung einer Legende (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2018), 102.

78 Already in March 1943, Lochner had explained in his book “What about Germany?”: “The speech on the Obersalzberg, indeed, delivered ten days before the outbreak of World War II, reveals Adolf Hitler as the man who planned this war, who wanted this war, and who finally succeeded in bringing about this war.” Lochner, What About Germany?, 18.

79 IMT Proceedings, 9813 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School).

80 IMT Proceedings, 377 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School). On 16 May 1946, defendant Dr. Siemers called the credibility of the two versions (Exibit 29+30) into question once more, with the argument that they consisted merely of loose pages without date and signature. IMT Proceedings, 9782–9784. Siemers also objected that the excerpt was not based on a stenographic transcript and claimed that Hitler did not speak that way: “The words, ‘destruction of Poland in the foreground’, ‘aim is removal of living forces, not arrival at a certain line’ – these words were not spoken, and such a war aim the German High Commanders would not have agreed to. In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third version of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom, L-3, which is even worse than these and which was published by the world press. Wherever one spoke to anyone this grotesque, brutal speech was brought up. For that reason, it is in the interest of historical truth to ascertain whether Hitler in this horrible way spoke at this time. Actually, I admit he used many expressions which are sharp, but he did not use such words. For the reputation of the commanders who were present, this is of great significance.” Siemers thus concedes that this was no longer about individual NS criminals, but about saving the honor of the Wehrmacht leadership. IMT Proceedings, 9784–9785 (Nuremberg Trials Collection at Harvard Law School).

81 The text of the “special correspondent” is dated November 23, 1945, and states that the American state prosecutors had presented their evidence “this evening.” “Nazi Germany’s Road to War,” Times, November 24, 1945, 4.

82 IMT Proceedings, 9812 (17 May 1946), my emphasis. On the congruence between Hitler’s words and actions see Domeier, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, 119, 575–6.

83 Lochner, What about Germany?, 11–18.

84 Krausnick, Vorgeschichte des Widerstandes, 381, fn. 557.

85 The English translation of the Lochner Version was cited in May 1947 almost completely by William L. Shirer, End of a Berlin Diary (New York: Knopf, 1947). Shirer assumed at this point, mistakenly, that Lochner had been handed the Hitler speech only “during the war,” 252.

86 NN, “Hitler, der Verantwortliche, und seine Trabanten,” in Deutsche Blätter, Vol. 1 (1944): 117–9 (37–39).

87 Cf. Dietrich Aigner, “Hitler und die Weltherrschaft,” in Michalka, Außenpolitik, 49–69, here 54.

88 On Louis Lochner as the originator of the secret deal between AP and NS Germany, which was not discovered until 2017, see Domeier, Geheime Fotos, and ibid., Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur, Chap. 5.

89 British Documents on Foreign Policy, Series 3, Vol. VII, No. 399.

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Norman Domeier

Norman Domeier is DAAD guest professor of German and European History at Charles University, Prague. He studied history, political science, and journalism at the University of Göttingen (2000-2003), completed his MPhil at Cambridge in 2004, and defended his PhD thesis at the European University Institute in 2009. His first book, Der Eulenburg-Skandal: Eine politische Kulturgeschichte des Kaiserreichs (2010), was awarded the Geisteswissenschaften International Prize of the German Booksellers’ Association and was translated into English in 2015. His second book, Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur. Die amerikanischen Auslandskorrespondenten im ‘Dritten Reich’ was published in 2021. An English version will be published in 2023. In 2017, he discovered the secret cooperation between Associated Press (AP) and Nazi Germany 1942-1945 which is now a separate research project.