Abstract
On 4 July 1946 a pogrom took place in the Polish town of Kielce. This was not just a random outrage against a group of Jews, but a prolonged and sustained attack against a Jewish centre in which the town community took part and neither the police nor the security services took measures to stop. In addition to the 43 Jews dead in Kielce, further attacks claimed additional victims. This article explains how the Communists reacted to the event. Investigations which followed and interviews conducted by the Military Prosecutor's Office revealed weakness in the administrative and security structures in Kielce. These were related to the general unreliability of personnel in the Communist Party and the security services. The result of enquiries which followed was to signal the need to build a more reliable party structure in the provinces and to close ranks against enemies. If the Communists still thought that they could come to power through cooperation with the community and existing party and social organizations, the results of the Kielce enquiries dispelled these hopes. They confirmed the general need to build a more reliable party in anticipation of power.