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Abstract
Based on a case study, this article argues that the goals of accountability and fiscal prudence can be reconciled in the context of the parliamentary budget process. It captures the institutional setting for the budgetary work of the German parliament, in legal, organisational and procedural terms and with regard to its resources. The article then provides an assessment of the budgetary impact of the legislature against the goals of public expenditure management: aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency. The conclusion indicates that some standard arguments cannot explain why the budgetary work of parliament in this case has tended to result in lower deficits and improved public expenditure management. Rather, it is argued, a system that allows for parliament to buy into the overall budgetary aims and policies of the government through a co-operative process facilitates the reconciliation of accountability and fiscal prudence. At the same time, there is scope to refine the public expenditure management model for its application to the comparative study of the budgetary outcomes of legislative behaviour.