63
Views
9
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Neoclassical and collective rationality in household labour supply

Pages 529-533 | Received 16 Jul 1996, Published online: 03 Sep 2008
 

Abstract

The Neoclassical treatment of household labour supply assumes household members possess identical preferences. Models have emerged which assume separate utility functions for household members where the solution to resource allocation is derived from non-cooperative or bargaining games. It can be argued that bargaining implies Pareto efficient resources allocation and that non-cooperation is inefficient in the same sense that if individuals cooperated at least one member could become better off without making anyone else worse off. In this paper a revealed preference non-parametric test, first envisaged by Chiappori (1988), is explained, generalized and implemented. This test determines whether data support the hypothesis that householders bargain to a Pareto efficient outcome or not.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.