Public Accountability in Malaysia: Challenges and Critical Concerns

Abstract

Despite its laudable roles in steering the process of socioeconomic development, government bureaucracy in Malaysia has not escaped public criticisms for its inefficiency, corruption, and failure to guard public interests. The media, civil society groups, intelligentsia, and the political opposition have successfully utilized the major scandals to highlight the growing public concern over the poor performance of the bureaucracy and its lack of accountability and responsiveness. This has provided impetus for the “clean and efficient government” movement initiated in the early 1980s and a series of subsequent efforts aimed at promoting appropriate values and ethics among public officials. Numerous rules and regulations have been framed, major reforms have been introduced in various spheres of administration, and an extensive program of training and bureaucratic reorientation has been undertaken. Despite all this, recent evidence suggests that the public service continues to suffer from problems of corruption and other irregularities. Obviously, the performance of numerous reforms in public service and the institutional mechanisms put in place for tackling ethical problems, though positive in general, has fallen short of expectations. This paper seeks to examine and analyze the present approach to combating corruption and promoting accountability in the Malaysian public service. In particular, it focuses on institutional mechanisms currently available and identifies and analyzes their constraints and limitations in keeping the public bureaucracy under surveillance and control.

Notes

3. Based on who is accountable to whom, how, and for what, Carino identifies four different types of accountability: traditional, managerial, program, and process accountability. For her, the traditional accountability focuses on the compliance with rules and regulations while discharging administrative, fiscal, and managerial responsibilities; the managerial accountability is concerned with the efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources. Program accountability pays attention to results of government operations, and, finally, process accountability emphasizes the procedures and methods of operation (see Carino, L.V. Administrative Accountability: A Review of the Evolution, Meaning and Operationalization of a Key Term in Public Administration. Philippines Journal of Public Administration, 1983, XXVII (2), 118–148). Likewise, Romzek and Dubnick separate four major types of accountability: bureaucratic, legal, political, and professional. Bureaucratic accountability stresses the need to follow the rules and procedures and close supervision. Legal accountability emphasizes on a fiduciary or principal-agent relationship and advocates auditing, monitoring, and other oversights. Political accountability focuses on the extent of the responsiveness to the constituency. Finally, professional accountability emphasizes the placement of experts in organizational positions whose actions are guided by integrity and professionalism (Romzeck, B.S.; Dubnick, M.J. Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy. In Introduction to Public Administration: A Book of Readings, J.S. Ott and E.W. Russel, Eds. Longman, 2001

4. See New Straits Times, April 29 and May 24, 2002

5. The Prime Minister’s Department could be seen as another manifestation of the powerful executive in Malaysia. It is by far the most powerful unit within the government not only because it is headed by the Prime Minister but more so because it includes important agencies like the Economic Planning Unit, the Public Service Commission, the Elections Commission, the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), MAMPU, the Attorney General’s Office, and the National Oil Corporation

6. In fact, the growth and expansion of bureaucracy in terms of personnel employed and public expenditure incurred until 1990 was remarkable. An estimate shows that between 1960 and 1990 the Malaysian public service witnessed a four-fold increase in the number of staff employed. On the other hand, public expenditure increased almost 20 times during the same period

7. Though the Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations (1993) and civil and penal codes are among the rules that allow disciplinary actions against errant public servants, the most significant legal instrument to counter corruption in Malaysia, is the Anti-Corruption Act (1997) (Act 575) that provides detailed framework for dealing with bribery and other forms of corruption in the public service

8. Noor, Z.M. Anti-Corruption Mechanism and Strategies: The Malaysian Experience, 2001, Mimeo

13. Mansor, N.; Nordin, A. Op. Cit.

14. Ho, K.L. Op. Cit.

20. See New Straits Times, May 23, 2002

21. New Straits Times, April 15, 2002

22. The 1999 annual report of the ACA reveals that 245 posts remained vacant in 1999 out of 1227 sanctioned positions

23. Even though it is justified as a means to insulate the agency from the pressures of the ruling party and to accord the ACA a very high status within administrative hierarchy, it is fraught with danger of politicization. The experience shows that elsewhere such an arrangement has facilitated the abuse of the anticorruption agency by the executive to hide its misdeeds and those of its close allies and at the same time to harass the political opponents. Thus, instead of helping curb malfeasance and abuse of power, it may serve as a political tool in the hands of the government

24. Mansor, N.; Nordin, A. Op. Cit.

25. Ibid

26. Chee, S. Op. Cit.

28. Chee, S. Op. Cit.

29. Funston, J. Op. Cit.

35. Hai, L.H. Op. Cit.

36. For more on this, see Ibid, p. 190

37. New Straits Times, May 24, 2002

38. Ho, K.L. Op. Cit.

39. New Straits Times, August 16, 2002

41. Laporan Ketua Audit Negara (Auditor General’s Report), 1998, 1999