Incorporating Ritual into Greedy Institution Theory: The Case of Devotion in Amateur Chess

Abstract

Based on ethnographic data, this article explains devotion to chess in terms of the structural mechanisms of its social organization. I use Lewis Coser's theory of greedy institutions as a way to analyze how these mechanisms influence player decisions and foster devotion to the game. Inspired largely by Randall Collins, I expand Coser's original framework by analyzing how the ritual of competitive play is structured in ways to heighten the intrinsic rewards of the game and further encourage commitment among the players. As such, devotion in chess is explained as a product of the following organizational elements: (1) isolation from competing social spheres; (2) encapsulation within a symbolic status structure; (3) a collective feeling of elite status; (4) trials of worthiness; and (5) prestructured ritual. After considering how these mechanisms operate in the world of chess, I discuss the potential of this expanded model of greedy institutions for future research across other social contexts.

NOTES

Notes

¹ I would like to thank Neil McLaughlin and William Shaffir for their help and guidance throughout this larger ethnographic project. I would also like to thank Gary Alan Fine, Lorne Dawson, Benjamin Kelly, Peter Kivisto, Dorothy Pawluch, Trevor Pinch, Robert Prus, Kyle Siler, Ted Welser, and several anonymous reviewers at The Sociological Quarterly for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

² This is especially so when one considers the academic antagonisms that exist between these actors. Coser (1975) was often critical of the “dogma” of ethnomethodological and interactionist approaches to sociology, taking exception to what he thought were insulated, sectarian, and atheoretical approaches to studying social behavior. This article is an honest attempt to bridge these largely political disagreements, and illustrate the merits of finally bringing these warring theoretical camps together to strengthen the sociological imagination.

³ The sample consists of all males, which reflects the fact that chess is a highly male dominated activity. Female players are rare at tournament events, and as such, are difficult to find for interviews. The USCF reported a female membership of only 7 percent in 2001, and many members are not regular participants, so an even smaller percentage than this is actually seen (A. Ashton, e-mail message to author February 19, 2002).

⁴ While this definition fails to emphasize the socially constructed nature of institutions (Berger and Luckmann 1966), or to offer a more refined characterization of institutions as a set of organized social responses to emergent problems in an ongoing process of adjustment (Mead 1934; Chang 2004), this definition is chosen as an efficient way for readers to consider the larger subculture of chess in institutional terms. While the author prefers a socially constructed and processual view of institutions, this emphasis is not necessary for the present argument, which considers actor decisions within chess as a highly stable institutional context.

⁵ There is a slight variation between CFC and FIDE ratings, however, they are calculated using the same system, and there is a minor conversion factor between the two. This is a result of players competing in separate pools rather than how the ratings are calculated (much like an A grade is different depending on the High school or University granting it; ratings in chess are geographically relative).

⁶ Some readers may say that if the institution does not affect all players equally, it is not truly greedy in nature. However, the institution of the family places different demands on husbands than wives (Coser 1974:67–100), and religious sects do not attract and sustain different people to the same effect either (Dawson 2006).

⁷ Dawson (2006:78) draws together research from Lofland (1977); Downton (1979); Stark and Bainbridge (1985); and Balch (1995) among others to help establish the trend that people with weak ties are more likely to be recruited into cults and new religious movements.

⁸ While this may seem like circular logic (explaining success by hard work, and hard work by success), Welser (2002) argues that each component reinforces and bolsters the other dynamically through a temporal progression. Thus, a strong player will more readily meet success through investment, and will learn to invest more as a result of this, which leads to a greater level of skill, and thus, more status to be gained in relation to the peer group by investing further. A weak player will gain little reward for investments early on, and thus enter into a pattern of reinforcement that precludes advancement by discouraging strategies of investment. Thus, investment strategies will vary according to the range of skill levels and the player's ranking in the group.