The Social Life of Pure Sociology

Abstract

Marshall's (2008) critique of Black's (1995, 2000a, 2000b) pure sociology paradigm reveals his preference for studying the psychological properties of individuals, rather than developing a genuinely sociological framework for studying “social life.” The current rejoinder concentrates on four main issues, starting with a discussion of the ontological status of social life as a reality sui generis. The second section deals with the scientific status of pure sociology and clarifies the underlying logic of the explanatory approach. The third part considers the scientific adequacy or validity of pure sociology. Where the intellectual stakes are highest—the theoretical validity of “pure sociology”—Marshall's critique falls flattest: the available evidence overwhelmingly supports the theoretical claims of pure sociologists. By the same token, Marshall fails to demonstrate the utility of psychologizing social life, or how the imputation of psychological variables enhances the explanatory power of purely sociological models. The paper then reveals the hypocrisy of particular aspects of Marshall's critique, as the evidence indicates that he has used some similar elements of theory construction for which he has criticized Black and the pure sociology framework. The conclusion reminds readers of the excitement of pure sociology's mission beyond the futility of irresolvable philosophical quibbles.

NOTES

Notes

¹ Black (1995) has responded to such criticisms of being “epistemologically incorrect” previously, well aware that his “work inevitably violates conventional conceptions of reality” (p. 830). Interested readers are encouraged to consult Black's (1995) epistemological defense of pure sociology—which Baumgartner (2002) describes as “arguably the single most important paper ever published in sociology” (p. 648)—to more fully understand the intellectual foundations and logic of his work.

² Mayhew (1980:335) argues the case against individualism as forcefully and as uncompromisingly as Black's (1995) polemic defense of pure sociology, claiming that structuralism and individualism “are so far apart and employ such different terminologies and definitions that they would be more accurately conceived as two entirely separate fields of study…. The critical aspects of [my] essay are intended to clarify for individualist sociologists just why structuralists regard individualism not only as a dead end, but, indeed, not even as sociology” (emphasis added). Pure sociologists clearly would agree with Mayhew's comments, while individualist sociologists just as surely will be offended. Not surprisingly, the current symposium privileges once again the voices of individualists (three articles) over structuralists or pure sociologists (one article). Hence my colleagues for the most part suggested that I simply decline to participate accordingly.

³ For example, Black has been awarded the Theory Prize of the ASA's Theory Division and the Distinguished Book Award of the ASA's Law Division for The Social Structure of Right and Wrong (Black [1993] 1998), as well as the Distinguished Scholarship Prize by the Law Division for “The Epistemology of Pure Sociology” (Black 1995).

⁴ Throughout his critique, Marshall repeatedly describes pure sociology in general and/or Black's reasoning in particular with invectives such as “absurd,” “banal,” “shallow,” “impoverished,” “unsound,” “meager,” “unsatisfying,” “unfounded,” “counterproductive,” “pedestrian,” “doubtful,” “irrelevant,” and “irresponsible” (among others).

⁵ Cooney (2002) summarizes the consequences as follows: “An outsider might reasonably predict that the discipline would welcome the simplification of sociological explanation, the heightened explanatory generality, and the enhanced disciplinary autonomy the banishment of psychology brings. Alas, no: Of all Black's deviations, this is the one that consistently causes upset, elevates blood pressures, and blows minds. We who work with Black's theory have long learned, for instance, to avoid the point if at all possible when submitting papers to journals: Editors and reviewers just cannot get their heads around it” (p. 660).

⁶ Turner (2006b), for example, has written recently of his theoretical work: “[M]y theories are designed to explain, with a few covering laws, events described by historians” (p. 457).

⁷ Black (1979b) long ago demonstrated the logical flaws of Gottfredson and Hindelang's (1979) empirical “test” of his theory, which effectively rendered their testing irrelevant.

⁸ Thus the current analysis excludes all works and evidence produced by Black himself, as well as those books and chapters produced by colleagues working within the pure sociology tradition.

⁹ The studies included in the table are presented without critically analyzing their methodologies, or identifying those that do not appear to understand or operationalize key concepts adequately. If one were to remove those studies from inclusion, the degree to which evidence contradicts the general theory of law would be reduced further.

¹⁰ We should not forget either that The Behavior of Law has not merely inspired empirical research, but that a great many scholars who do not work within the tradition have described Black's work as “brilliant … a major breakthrough … a crashing classic” (Nader 1976), as “the most important contribution ever made to the sociology of law” (Sherman 1978:11), and as having provided a “long awaited synthesis of sociolegal scholarship, presenting a general model of the behavior of law in social life and laying a conceptual foundation for future comparative research on law in history, sociology, and ethnography” (Koch 1977:149). In short, The Behavior of Law has endured as arguably the most elegant, parsimonious, and powerful theory of law ever developed (see Baumgartner 2002).

¹¹ As Cooney (2002:659) explains, “Adequate tests of Black's theory require new kinds of data, a point that perhaps Black and those of us who use his work have not sufficiently emphasized.”

¹² Turner (2002a:667) argues, for example, that “A mature science does not expect its theorists to be researchers, nor does it expect its researchers to be theorists, but it does require that its researchers spend at least some of their efforts testing the plausibility of theories.”

¹³ Note too that the issue is not that pure sociology has nothing to offer with respect to the analysis of rituals, religion, and ideas. On the contrary, to the extent that these are conceptualized as expressions of “social life” that vary in social space, interesting theoretical and empirical work has been advanced in recent years (e.g., Tucker 2002; Richardson 2006).

¹⁴ There are a great many other issues that could be addressed with additional space. For example, Marshall (2008) criticizes what he perceives to be a certain degree of “reification” in Black's work (pp. 215, 216). Yet Marshall (2002) has the luxury to reify concepts in his own work, such as the following self-description of his theory: “Most significantly, the essential thrust of Durkheim's model is maintained, since the external and coercive facticity of society remains the reality behind religion” (p. 369).

¹⁵ As Horwitz (2002:643) explains: “[M]any sociologists, especially those in the fields such as criminology and law that are closest to Black's work, are not accustomed to thinking sociologically. They explain social life through the motives, beliefs, and characteristics of individuals.”

¹⁶ Turner's comments are especially intriguing in that he does not personally use the “pure sociology” approach in his work and has absolutely no professional investments in the theoretical strategy. For example, Turner's (2002b) interests and theoretical approach in his monograph Face to Face focus on the microlevel properties, biological and cultural embeddedness underlying individual encounters with one another that produce varying primary and secondary emotions.