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The research for this text was supported by the grant Analýza československého vývozu do Čínské lidové republiky [An Analysis of Czechoslovak Export to the People's Republic of China] from the Czech Science Foundation (GA 409/07/P016).
Notes
The research for this text was supported by the grant Analýza československého vývozu do Čínské lidové republiky [An Analysis of Czechoslovak Export to the People's Republic of China] from the Czech Science Foundation (GA 409/07/P016).
1. This did not change even when the validity of the Czechoslovak‐Chinese agreement concluded in 1930 was confirmed, which officially placed Czechoslovakia in the group of countries with a relatively advantageous trade position in China arising from a valid reciprocal agreement. This is evident from a circular from the inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, in which Czechoslovakia is on the list of “privileged” countries, which (at least in theory) facilitated the entry of Czechoslovak ships into Chinese ports–or more specifically to Chinese ports with a customs office (The Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, The Maritime Customs Service Archive [hereafter SHAC‐MCSA], Part One: Inspector General's Circulars [hereafter P1], Reel 39, 679 [1] 26923, Circular no. 7023 [19 March 1947], signed by L.K. Little [Inspector General]).
2. The Archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Prague [hereafter AMFA], Territorial Department–Open [hereafter TD‐O] 1945–59, China, folder [hereafter fol.] 15, a letter from the ministry of national defence to the ministry of foreign affairs concerning arms deliveries to China (25 March 1946); AMFA, TD‐O, 1945–59, China, fol. 5, China—interest in ammunition produced in Czechoslovakia, query by the Chinese legation, dispatch from Berlin (24 July 1946); ibid., a letter from the company Diomedea to the ministry of foreign affairs (to JUDr. Josef Lelek; 12 June 1947) concerning the possibility of compensatory trade—soybeans in exchange for Mauser 7,92 rifles.
3. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 15, a letter from Československá Zbrojovka a.s. Brno (Czechoslovak Arms Factory Brno) to the ministry of national defence (general staff—department 6) concerning deliveries of arms material to China (5 February 1946). See as well information about arms imports to China, or about issuing import permits—Huzhao (Huchao)—by Chinese authorities, such as SHAC‐MCSA, P1, Reel 40, 679 (1) 26925, Circular no. 7469 (11 February 1949), signed by L.K. Little (Inspector General); and SHAC‐MCSA, P1, Reel 39, 679 (1) 26923, Circular no. 7040 (12 April 1947), signed by L.K. Little.
4. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 5, China, interest in ammunition produced in Czechoslovakia, query by the Chinese legation, dispatch from Berlin (24 July 1946).
5. The US undoubtedly had the largest share in overall Chinese import. During 1947–1948 deliveries from the U.S. amounted to up to a half of the total volume of the Chinese import (see AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, 6 5, Report no. 3891/48 [China—foreign trade in August] from the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in China [15 November 1948]. Comments of the ambassador, Dr. Josef Lelek, on the status of the US in Chinese foreign trade (AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 5, Report no. 3833/48 [China—purchasing potential] from the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in China [6 November 1948]). On American loans, see AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 3, Report no. 951/48 (China—loans and credits after the war) from the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in China (17 March 1948).
6. Czechoslovakia recognized the People's Republic of China on 4 October 1949, three days after its official declaration (Příručka o navázání diplomatických styků a diplomatické zastoupení Československa v cizině a cizích zemí v Československu 1918–1985 [“Handbook on Establishing Diplomatic Relations and Diplomatic Representation of Czechoslovakia Abroad and Foreign Countries in Czechoslovakia During 1918–1985”], Prague: Taylor & Francis, 1987, 28. At the same time, it terminated diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai‐shek's (Guomindang) government. František C. Weiskopf assumed the office of the Czechoslovak ambassador to the PRC in mid‐January 1950. For more information on the diplomatic representation of Czechoslovakia in the PRC, see Aleš Skřivan, Jr., Československý vývoz do Číny 1918–1992 [“Czechoslovak Export to China 1918–1992”], Prague: Taylor & Francis, 2009, Appendix I, 423.
7. More frequent meetings of high‐ranking officials of both regimes were a logical side‐effect. For more details, see for example Vladimír Čebiš, Jan Prokeš, and Blanka Přibylová, Současné československo‐čínské styky (“Contemporary Czechoslovak‐Chinese Relations”), Paper no. 7, Prague: Taylor & Francis, 1983, 7–9.
8. It often assumed a markedly ostentatious, propagandist form. Co‐operation between agricultural co‐operatives of Czechoslovakia and the PRC is one of many examples (see AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 3, a letter from the agricultural co‐op Vinařice to the agricultural co‐op of Czechoslovak‐Chinese Comradeship [30 April 1958]; and a letter from the Central Co‐operative Council to the ministry of foreign affairs concerning trade relations between the co‐operatives of the CSR and the PRC [2 August 1956]). After the Sino‐Soviet Split of the early 1960s, the relation radically changed (see for example, AMFA, Territorial Department—Secret [hereafter TD‐S] 1960–64, China, fol. 4, Minutes from a visit to the commune of the Chinese‐Czechoslovak comradeship [11 March 1963]).
9. For more information on the embargo on export to the PRC, see e.g., Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America's Embargo Against China and the Sino‐Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963, Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 2001. Naturally, Stalin viewed the conflict on the Korean Peninsula as a factor which could under certain circumstance accelerate a new war breaking out in Europe. In this context, after the war in Korea broke out, new negotiations and consultations between representatives of the European communist countries (including Czechoslovakia) took place in Moscow (see Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: the Stalin Years, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1996, 113).
10. For instance, in connection with opening a pound account at the Czechoslovak State Bank (see AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 3, Report of the ministry of finance [ref. no. 38/51‐p.taj.] to the ministry of foreign affairs concerning the approval of the Czechoslovak State Bank of opening a pound account for the Chinese People's Bank [3 January 1951]).
11. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 6, a letter from the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Beijing to the ministry of foreign affairs (24 June 1950), enclosure no. 1 (Report on negotiations in Shanghai May 19–28, 1950), sheet no. 2.
12. Ibid., enclosure no. 1/C (The handover of the Bata stores to the Czechoslovak Republic).
13. Ibid., enclosure no. 6 (Liquidation of Bata in China).
14. For more information on the Bata Chinese stores, see for example AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 6, Report no. 1405/50‐D (The Dark Bata Business) from the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Beijing (2 October 1950).
15. The situation in the Czechoslovak sea navigation changed in the 1960s, at the time of the Sino‐Soviet Split and accompanying radical drop in the Czechoslovak‐Chinese trade exchange. In 1966, after the start of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Czechoslovak‐Chinese co‐operation in sea navigation came to an end. For more information on the Czechoslovak‐Chinese co‐operation in sea navigation in the 1950s and in the early 1960s, see the National Archives, Prague, collection no. 1261/0/44, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—Central Committee, office of the first secretary of the CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, Part II—foreign relations (hereafter NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, Part II), fol. 85, “A summary of general development of economic relations of the CSSR with the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Albania up to the present,” pp. 12–17.
16. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 5, “The status of the committee for scientific and technical co‐operation between the Czechoslovak Republic and the People's Republic of China”; ibid., “A report from the State Planning Office on the preparations of the first session of the Czechoslovak‐Chinese committee” (25 November 1952). See for example, too, Oldřich Mesároš, Zhodnocení současného stavu a perspektivy hospodářské spolupráce mezi ČSFR a ČLR [“Evaluation of the Current Situation and Prospects of the Economic Co‐operation Between the CSFR and PRC”], Prague: Taylor & Francis, 1990, 25–26.
17. For more information on the handover of production technologies, see for example AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 5, “Government resolution concerning the scientific and technical aid to the People's Republic of China in the implementation of the production of power machinery,” resolution from the secret part of the 225th meeting of the fifth government (30 December 1952). For more information on Czechoslovak‐Chinese scientific and technical co‐operation in the 1950s, see Zdeněk Trhlík, Československo‐čínské vztahy [“Czechoslovak‐Chinese Relations”], Part I, paper no. 16, Prague: Taylor & Francis, 1985, 117–220.
18. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 3, Škoda Works’ debts in China, notes from a meeting held at the ministry of foreign trade (1 February 1951).
19. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 4, A proposal to the political secretariat of the CC CPC concerning the request of Zbrojovka Brno, nár. podnik concerning the collection of withheld bills of exchange in the PRC (unpaid balance for arms deliveries to Chiang Kai‐shek's government) (30 June 1952).
20. Ibid.
21. An agreement made by a note exchange in Beijing of 22 August and 13 November 1957 (AMFA, International agreements, microfiche no. SC 35–79, An agreement made by an exchange of notes concerning the liquidation of debts between the CSR and the PRC accrued before 9 May 1945).
22. The FOB (Free on Board, or Freight on Board) stipulates that costs and risk are transferred to the purchasing party at the moment of the goods being loaded on ship (at the moment of the goods passing the ship's rail) in an agreed on port‐harbor. AMFA, TD‐O 1945–59, China, fol. 3, Payment system between the Czechoslovak Republic and the People's Republic of China, State Bank of Czechoslovakia's regulation (28 July 1950).
23. AMFA, TD‐S 1955–59, China, fol. 5, Report from the ministry of foreign trade to the Office of the Government Presidium concerning long‐term supplies/deliveries of Czechoslovak complete equipment (5 June 1957).
24. Ibid.
25. AMFA, TD‐S 1960–64, China, folder fol. 2, A brief summary of the development of Czechoslovak‐Chinese relations, appendix no. 2, p. 6 (29 July 1963).
26. Compare with values in rubles in Aleš Skřivan, Jr., Československý vývoz, Appendix II, 435.
27. In the same year, the PRC's share in the total turnover of the Czechoslovak foreign trade reached its peak (6.97 per cent; Historická statistická, 322–323). See as well Trhlík, Československo‐čínské vztahy, part I, 112; Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Implications for US Policy, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1966, 146.
28. See the Czechoslovak trade with the PRC and the COMECON countries, Historická statistická, 322–324.
29. As the development at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, when the PCR found itself facing extreme food shortages as a result of the radical strategy of the Great Leap Forward and the caprices of the weather, similar worries were legitimate. (For more information, see Aleš Skřivan, Jr., Hospodářské reformy v ČLR v letech 1979–1989 [“Economic Reforms in the PRC During 1979–1989”], Prague: Taylor & Francis, 2007, 35–36.)
30. For more information on the volume and value changes in the most important items of the Czechoslovak export to the PRC in the 1950s, see Skřivan Jr., Československý vývoz, Appendix II, Tables-VI and VII, 433–4.
31. Ibid.
32. Some statistics use a different categorization which results in the commodity group of machines and machinery featuring as having the largest share in the total Czechoslovak deliveries to the PRC (for example, approximately 90 per cent of it in 1958); this category then includes all complete plant equipments and means of transport, among other things (see NA, the Office of the Government Presidium (hereafter OGP), common record office, fol. 2348, call no.: 11.31.31/1958, “A proposal for methods and forms of the development of economic, scientific and technical co‐operation with the PRC,” prepared by the State Planning Office, delivered to the Office of the Government Presidium [3 November 1958]).
33. AMFA, TD‐S 1955–59, China, fol. 4, “A proposal for provisions between the Central People's Government of the Chinese Republic and the government of the Czechoslovak Republic concerning aid provided by the Czechoslovak party to the Chinese party for the expansion of the ‘Shanghai’ power plant of 16 MW” (2 September 1954).
34. AMFA, TD‐S 1955–59, China, fol. 4, Shanghai and Chapei I power plants, a report from the ministry of mechanical engineering for the embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Beijing (6 August 1955); ibid., “An agreement with the PRC concerning deliveries of complete plant equipment, ministry of foreign trade's report for the ministry of foreign affairs” (20 August 1954); NA, OGP, common record office, fol. 2348, call no.: 11.31.7/1954, Monthly reports by observer L. Vajner—deliveries to countries of people's democracy in the month of March. For Škoda Works’ deliveries for the Chapei power plant in the inter‐war period, see Skřivan Jr., Československý vývoz, 154 and 159.
35. The names of power plants appear in several variants in the available archived materials, which is in some cases obviously caused by erroneous transcription of Chinese names. Unfortunately, this is the case not only with power‐plant projects, but a general problem in following trade. For more information on the development of deliveries for Chinese power plants, see for example NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, 6 82, “Development and issues of economic relations with the People's Republic of China,” p. 3.
36. NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, fol. 85, “A summary of general development,” appendix no. 3: Export of most important complete plant equipments to the PRC. See, too, Zdeněk Bydžovský, Čínská lidová republika [“People's Republic of China”], trade and economic collections, Prague: Taylor & Francis, 1978, 262. A sugar refinery referred to in the materials of the ministry of foreign trade as “Lung‐Kinag” or “He Lung Kiang,” whose construction was agreed upon in 1954, was put in operation in 1956 with the volume of 1200 tons of sugar beet per 24 hours. Another example was a cane sugar refinery in the Guangzhou (Canton) region mostly called as “Hua Tsiao”; it began to operate in 1958 with a volume of processing 2000 tons of cane sugar per 24 hours. For more information on sugar refineries, see for instance AMFA, TD‐S 1955–59, China, fol. 4, Notes from the 27th working meeting held on 27 August 1957 at the ministry of heavy engineering and concerning cane sugar refinery (Guangzhou—China); AMFA, TD‐S 1955–59, China, fol. 4, “An agreement with the PRC concerning deliveries of complete plant equipments, ministry of foreign trade's report for the ministry of foreign affairs, p. 3. (dated 20 August 1954).
37. NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, fol. 85, “A summary of general development,” p. 10. The PRC enquired about items such as parachute silk, which was produced in Czechoslovakia from special silk yarn imported from Switzerland, for its army (see Central Military Archives, Department III: Historical Military Archives [hereafter CMA‐HMA], collection of the Ministry of National Defence [hereafter MND], year 1952, fol. 536, inv. no. 1997, call no.: 88/7, an approval of the ministry of national defence to export parachute silk to Democratic People's China [2 February 1952]).
38. The licensed production of Soviet‐designed MIG‐15 airplanes started in Czechoslovakia in 1951 in the Letov company, in 1953 it was transferred to Aero Vodochody. MIG‐15 UTI was a two‐seat training version produced in Czechoslovakia as CS‐102. The licensed production of Soviet‐designed IL‐14 was launched in Czechoslovakia in 1951 under the name AVIA (gradually, several versions were produced).
39. See for example CMA‐HMA, MND‐1958, fol. 366, inv. no. 1584, call no.: 30/2/2, a letter from the ministry of precision engineering to the ministry of national defence (2 August 1958).
40. See CMA‐HMA, MND‐1960, fol. 460, inv. no. 1466, call no: 30/2/2, correspondence between the ministry of national defence and the ministry of foreign trade (March 1960).
41. See NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, fol. 85, “A summary of general development,” pp. 10–12.
42. In 1959, the share of foodstuffs in the total Chinese export to Czechoslovakia reached 49.8%, that of raw materials and semi‐finished product 42.4%. NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, fol. 82, Development and issues of economic relations with the People's Republic of China, p. 3.
43. For more information on the commodity structure of Chinese deliveries to Czechoslovakia, see NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, part II, fol. 82, Materials for the visit of Czechoslovak delegation to the PRC, PRC I—no. 027.671/59, pp. 34–35 and 44.
44. Cf. interesting observations on the development of the Sino‐Soviet relations in Vojtech Mastny, From Consensus to Strains in the Sino‐Soviet Alliance, A Palpable Deterioration, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6–7, Washington DC: Taylor & Francis, Winter 1995–1996, 22–23; Odd Arne Westad, Unwrapping the Stalin‐Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6–7, Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Winter 1995–1996, 23–24. See Mao Zedong's criticism of the Soviet Union's interventions in the developments in Poland and Hungary in 1956 in Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, NC: Taylor & Francis., 2007, 116.
45. For more information on the Chinese criticism of the Czechoslovak supplies, see, e.g. NA, CC CPC, Antonín Novotný, Part II, fol. 84, China section (telegrams, ciphers, dispatches, reports), a report from Beijing for the ministry of foreign affairs (14 October 1954).
46. An interesting view of to what extent the Sino‐Soviet split was caused by the conflict of the two different figures (Mao Zedong and Khrushchev) can be found in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev, Cambridge, MA: Taylor & Francis, 1996, 210–235. See as well the impact of the Brezhnev doctrine and the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 on Sino‐Soviet relations (Christian F. Ostermann, East German Documents on the Sino‐Soviet Border Conflict, 1969, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6–7, Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Winter 1995–1996, 187). At the beginning of the 1960s, Antonín Novotný, Czechoslovak president and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, complained about the cancellation of the Chinese orders in Moscow; Khrushchev's memoirs suggest that he was exaggerating the negative effect of the Czechoslovak‐Chinese trade on Czechoslovak economy (Sergei Khrushchev, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman [1953–1964], University Park, PA: Taylor & Francis, 2007, 693). In this context (and as a matter of interest), we could mention Antonín Novotný's reaction to Mao Zedong's views of a potential new global conflict (nuclear war), which Mao presented during a meeting of representatives of communist parties in 1957 (ibid., 436). Mao Zedong ostentatiously indicated that he was not afraid of a nuclear conflict or even a situation in which the PRC might lose 300 million people. Novotný responded that in a way he could understand Mao Zedong, as communist China could afford this loss considering its high population. At the same time he pointed out the fact that Czechoslovakia would be in an entirely different situation and that World War III could lead to a total destruction of Czechoslovakia's population with only the slightest hope of ever resurfacing.
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Aleš Jr. Skřivan
Dr. Aleš Skřivan is associate professor in the Department of Economic History at the Faculty of Economics and Public Administration (University of Economics, Prague). He has been focusing primarily on the 20th‐century history of the Far East, Czechoslovak foreign trade, and arms production in inter‐war Czechoslovakia.