Abstract
This article examines the theory and practice of government formation, with particular reference to the experience of New Zealand since the introduction of the mixed member proportional (MMP) system in the mid-1990s. As predicted by coalition theory, virtually all the coalitions and related multi-party governance arrangements under MMP have been ideologically connected. But contrary to certain theories, they have not all been minimum-winning in nature. Moreover, by international standards, some aspects of government formation under MMP have been highly unusual. These include the negotiation of many different types of formal inter-party agreements and novel multi-party governance arrangements, most notably the adoption of very flexible approaches to the management of inter-party dissent. The unusual bargaining outcomes, it is argued, can be attributed to the flexible nature of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements (including the accommodating institutional rules which govern inter-party bargaining), a pragmatic political culture, a party system characterized by a degree of multi-dimensionality, and the complex parliamentary arithmetic which followed several MMP elections. Whether the recent models of multi-party governance will become enduring features of New Zealand politics remains unclear.