Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures: Toward a cycle of engagement

Abstract

Central to the compliance structure of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are the confidence-building measures—the means by which States Parties disclose information annually. Improving this process is one of the key agenda items garnering a great deal of interest among State Parties and non-governmental organizations leading up to the Seventh BWC Review Conference in December. This article considers the challenges of enforcing the measures and the current efforts to strengthen them. The author presents additional approaches to enhance these measures and to build greater confidence in national compliance with the BWC, arguing particularly that civil society involvement and periodic, collective reviews of submissions have essential roles to play.

• anthrax
• biodefense
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
• biological weapons
• confidence-building measures
• Seventh BWC Review Conference

Notes

1 The information exchange is based on a set of seven measures, A-G, covering research centers and laboratories, biodefense programs, outbreaks of infectious disease, past offensive programs, vaccine production facilities, etc.

2 The confidence-building measures were not touched at the Fourth BWC Review Conference, to avoid interference with the work of the BWC Ad Hoc Group on a strengthening protocol that might conceivably include the measures; nor at the Fifth BWC Review Conference, because no final declaration was issued and the only decision reached was to hold intersessional meetings on specific topics in 2003—2005, which did not include the measures. All that could be agreed at the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006 was to entrust certain confidence-building measures-related functions to the newly established Implementation Support Unit (ISU). Instead there was a commitment at the Seventh BWC Review Conference to accomplish what they could not at the Sixth: to give the measures the “further and comprehensive attention” that “the issue merits.”

3 In broad-brush terms, these suggestions are to: Retain form A (part 1) on research centers and labs, and form A (part 2) on current biodefense programs; but to extend form A (part 1) with a second section for States Parties that do not possess BSL4 facilities where they can declare lower containment facilities, and to reword form A (part 2) to ensure civil biodefense programs are also declared. Delete form B (i) on general disease outbreaks—this information is now readily available from other sources. Retain form B (ii) on unusual outbreaks of disease with very minor amendments. Delete form C on scientific publications outbreaks—this information is readily available from other sources. Extend form D on promotion of contacts beyond research to also include implementation assistance. Extend form E on implementing legislation and regulations to also include biosafety and biosecurity measures, as well as codes of conduct. Retain form F on past programs. Possibly extend form G on vaccine production facilities to also include animal vaccine facilities.

4 This message was also repeated in statements at the last Meeting of States Parties, where, for example, the JACKSNNZ (an informal grouping of Japan, Australia, Canada, (South) Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand formed at the Sixth BWC Review Conference) referred to “standing expert groups” and “standing working groups,” which could be established at the review conferences and which would continue discussions on compliance as well as other topics during the intersessional years.

5 The Action Plan could, for instance, include: regional workshops and other outreach activities on CBMs to remind States Parties of their obligation to submit confidence-building measures and provide tailored assistance with submission preparation; annual reminders from the ISU prompting States Parties to start collecting and collating the necessary data; modernizing the submission process to make it faster and more intuitive for States Parties to file their returns. The Action Plan could also helpfully be used to systematically explore the impediments States Parties face in submitting their returns so that assistance can be more directly targeted.

6 In 2010, 15 States Parties made their confidence-building measures publicly available (Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States), up from 11 in 2009.

7 The knowledge, experience, and expertise of civil society can contribute to the CBM communication process and to enhancing transparency between States Parties in several ways, including through: assisting States Parties to collect and collate information on the confidence-building measures; monitoring States Parties’ biodefense activities; collecting data from open sources; processing the data submitted to generate accessible information; and, ultimately, by bringing this information into the public sphere.

Additional information

Author biography

Filippa Lentzos is a senior research fellow in the BIOS Centre for the study of Bioscience, Biomedicine, Biotechnology and Society at the London School of Economics and Political Science.