THE UNITED STATES AND THE GUOMINDANG (KMT) FORCES IN BURMA, 1949–1954: A DIPLOMATIC DISASTER

Abstract

As Mao Zedong’s armies swept to victory in 1949, thousands of Guomindang (KMT) troops fled into northern Burma. The newly independent country they entered was near collapse. Burma had not recovered from the devastation of World War II and also faced two communist rebellions and several insurgencies in ethnic minority areas. The KMT troops complicated Burma?s relations with the new People?s Republic of China (PRC), fed traditional suspicions of the Siamese, and poisoned relations between the United States and Burma for years to come. This article explores the dynamics of the KMT issue, how it bitterly divided American diplomatic opinion, and how it was temporarily resolved in 1953 and 1954.

Keywords:

• KMT troops
• Burma
• CIA
• Korean War
• Taiwan

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Notes

1 U Nu, Saturday’s Son (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 163.

2 Matthew Foley, The Cold War and National Assertion in Southeast Asia: Britain, the United States and Burma, 1948–62 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 98.

3 The standard account of the United States and the KMT in Burma is Robert H. Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1973). An essential, well-written work, it appeared before the documentary record was available. The documentary record on the American side is by no means complete, but much is now available. Two newer, essential sources are Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2nd rev. ed (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 2003) and Victor S. Kaufman, “Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division,” The China Quarterly, vol. 166 (June 2001): 440–56. Foley, The Cold War and National Assertion in Southeast Asia, examines the US-UK dimension of the KMT issue in a useful chapter. The most comprehensive recent account is Richard M. Gibson with Wenhua Chen, The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-shek and the Drug Warlords of the Golden Triangle (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2011). So far as I am aware, it is the first book on the subject to use Taiwanese archival sources, as well as interviews with some of the actors.

4 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 165; Kaufman, “Trouble in the Gold Triangle,” 441.

5 David McKendree Key to Secretary of State (hereafter SS), June 29, 1950, Tel. 369, 790B.00/6-2950, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4135, US National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter NAII).

6 Key to SS, June 29, 1950, Tel. 369, 790B.00/6-2950, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4135, NAII.

7 Notes of Conversation, Wellington Koo and Dean Rusk, July 7, 1950, Box 180, Wellington Koo Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. See also Memorandum, Raymond A. Hare to Rusk, July 1, 1950, 790B.00/7-150, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), vol. 6 (1950): 244-45 and 245n. Dean Acheson to American Embassy Rangoon, July 7, 1950, Tel. 16, Folder 360·01 Chi Nats–Surrender, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 10, NAII. Key to SS, July 25, 1950, Tel. 41, Folder 360·01 Chi Nats - Kengtung, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 10, NAII.

8 Acheson to US Embassy Taipei, July 28, 1950, US Department of State, FRUS, vol. 6 (1950): 246.

9 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 165–66.

10 Kaufman, “Trouble in the Gold Triangle,” 441; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 167; Gibson, The Secret Army, 60.

11 Gibson, The Secret Army, 60. According to Robert Beisner, Truman did not inform Acheson about his decision to approve KMT forays in Yunnan. Robert Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 496.

12 Gibson, The Secret Army, 59.

13 Ibid., 38.

14 Kaufman, “Trouble in the Gold Triangle,” 441–42.

15 Gibson, The Secret Army, 62.

16 Minute by C.E. King, March 2, 1951, FO 371/92962, British National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, UK (hereafter BNA).

17 Minutes by J. Dalton Murray, March 27, 1951, FO 371/92962, BNA. Foreign Office (hereafter FO) to British Embassy Bangkok, March 30, 1951, FO 371/92962, BNA.

18 Richard Whittington to FO, April 17, 1951, Tel. 212, FO 371/92962, BNA.

19 FO to British Embassy Washington, n.d. [May 7 (?), 1951], Saving Tel. 2316, FO 371/92140, BNA.

20 Walter M. Gifford to SS, May 3, 1951, Tel. 5725, 790B.00/5-351, Henry B. Day to SS, May 2, 1951, Tel. 763, 790B.00/2-551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII.

21 Key to SS, May 5, 1951, Tel. 779, 790B.00/5-551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII; Key to SS, May 5, 1951, Tel. 774, 790B.00 (W)/5-551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4139, NAII; Henry B. Day to SS, May 2, 1951, Tel. 763, 790B.00/2-551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII.

22 Don and Jean Crider to “Dear Friends,” June 6, 1951, American Baptist Historical Society Records, FM 429, Mercer University, Atlanta, GA. This section of the letter was not included in the letter sent out to the friends.

23 Key to R. Austin Acly, May 2, 1951, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 7, NAII.

24 Key to SS, May 5, 1951, Tel. 779, 790B.00/5-551, Henry B. Day to SS, May 2, 1951, Tel. 763, 790B.00/2-551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII.

25 William T. Turner to SS, May 7, 1951, Tel. 85, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 10, NAII.

26 Acheson to US Embassy Rangoon, May 6, 1951, Tel. 714,790B.00/5-651, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII. Acheson to US Embassy Taiwan, May 6, 1951, Tel. 1202, 790B.00/5-651, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII.

27 Karl Rankin to SS, May 7, 1951, Tel. 1547, 790B.00/5-751, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII. When Key read Rankin’s telegram, an official in the American embassy in Rangoon wrote on it, “Taipei has not been receiving enough reports from this area on supplies received by KMT troops.” “Important,” scribbled Key. See handwritten comments on the copy of the above telegram in file 360·01 KMT, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 10, NAII.

28 Rankin to SS, May 9, 1951, Tel. 1558, 790B.00/5-951, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4136, NAII.

29 Ernest Bevin to British Embassy Washington, DC [May 7, 1951], Saving Tel. 2316, FO 371/92140, BNA.

30 Oliver Franks to FO, May 10, 1951, Tel. 1461, FO 371/92140, BNA.

31 FO to British Embassy Washington, May 11, 1951, Tel. 1974, FO 371/92140, BNA.

32 Franks to FO, May 14, 1951, Tel. 1491, FO 371/92140, BNA.

33 Acheson to Key, May 12, 1951, Tel. 738, 690B.93/5-1251, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

34 Minute by R.F. Stretton, May 19, 1951, FO 371/92140, BNA.

35 Key to SS, May 14, 1951, Tel. 815, 690B.93/5-1451, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

36 G.L. Clutton to FO, September 2, 1951, Tel. 1200, FO 371/92142, BNA.

37 Gibson, The Secret Army, 62–63.

38 Acheson to Key, May 25, 1951, Tel. 785, 690B.93/5-2551, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

39 Key to SS, May 31, 1951, Tel. 863, 690B.93/5-3151, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

40 Acly to Key, July 17, 1951, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 7, NAII.

41 Key to SS, June 21, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1950): 273–74. Later a Nationalist Chinese official told a British diplomat that the KMT forces expected an anticommunist movement to snowball once they moved into Yunnan. But “there had been no snowball,” and they were forced to retreat. G.A. Wallinger to Anthony Eden, March 19, 1952, No. 74, FO371/101173, BNA.

42 Key to SS, August 15, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1950): 288–89. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Daily Briefing,” August 17, 1951, CREST documents, NAII. Untitled CIA report, August 18, 1951, CREST documents, NAII.

43 For a detailed account of the Yunnan invasion, see Gibson, The Secret Army, 69–86.

44 Karl Rankin to USDS, October 3, 1951, Despatch 134, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII.

45 Key to SS, July 30, 1951, Tel. 124, 790B.001/7-3051, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4140, NAII.

46 FO to British Embassy Bangkok, June 21, 1951, Tel. 236, FO 371/92140, BNA.

47 Minute by S.J.L. Olver, “Kuomintang Troops in Kengtung,” July 13, 1951, FO 371/92141, BNA. FO to British Embassy Washington, July 26, 1951, Saving Tel. 3687, FO 371/92140, BNA. Memorandum of Conversation, William S.B. Lacy, Livingston Merchant, Christopher Steel, F.S. Tomlinson, July 31, 1951, 790B.00/7-3151, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII. Oliver Franks to FO, July 31, 1951, Tel. 2357, FO 371/92141, BNA.

48 Memorandum of Conversation, Lacy, Merchant, Tomlinson, and Steel, FRUS, 31 July 1951; FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 277–79.

49 FO to British Embassy Washington, 4 August 1951, Saving Tel. 3898, FO 371/92141, BNA. Memorandum of Conversation, F. L. Tomlinson and Merchant, 8 August 1951, 790B.00/8-851, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII.

50 Key to SS, August 15, 1951, FRUS, vol. 5 (1951): 288–89. The public was mostly unaware of developments along the Burma-China border. Only at the end of July 1951 did Associated Press correspondent Seymour Topping report that Li Mi had moved about 15,000 troops into China. Clipping, Seymour Topping, “KMT Troops Invade Yunnan Province?” New Times of Burma, July 29, 1951, Series A1838, Control Symbol 3008/2/9 Part 1, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, ACT, Australia (hereafter NAA).

51 Rusk to Key, August 22, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 289–90.

52 Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences, 37. Oral History Interview of Ted M.G. Tanen, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 21, 2000, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/˜ammem_2KBe

53 James E. Webb to Key, August 31, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 292.

54 Memorandum for the Record, Merchant et al., August 23, 1951, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII.

55 Gibson, The Secret Army, 91.

56 D.W. McNicol to External Affairs Office (hereafter EXAF), September 20, 1951, Memorandum 1710/51, Series A1838, Control Symbol 3008/2/9 Part 1, NAA. F.S. Tomlinson to Murray, September 20, 1951, FO 371/92142, BNA. Stuart Hedden (CIA), Memorandum for the Record, January 2, 1952, http://www.foia.cia.gov/AirAmerica/C05261065.pdf. Similarly, in Rangoon Ambassador Key told an Australian diplomat that “some freelance Americans” were involved, but he denied any official American connection. “Notes on Minister’s Visit to Rangoon,” [November 1951?], Series A 1838, Control Symbol 3008/2/9 Part 1, NAA.

57 Rankin to SS, October 3, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 300.

58 Minute, September 26 [1951], FO 371/192143, BNA.

59 Acheson to US Embassy Bangkok, September 28, 1951, Tel. 746, 790B.00/9-2851, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII.

60 William T. Turner to SS, September 28, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 298.

61 Quoted in Memorandum, Merchant to John M. Allison, Lacy, and Kenneth C. Krentz, November 28, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 316–17.

62 G.A. Wallinger to R.H. Scott, September 22, 1951, 1031/115/510, FO 371/92143, BNA.

63 Turner to SS, October 1, 1951, File 360·01 KMT 1951, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 10, NAII.

64 Key to Acly, October 10, 1951, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4137, NAII.

65 Key to Lucius D. Battle, November 13, 1951, FRUS, vol. 6 (1951): 309–10.

66 Memorandum, William J. Donovan to Bedell Smith, January 28, 1951, CREST documents, NAII.

67 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Daily Digest,” November 29, 1951, CREST documents, NAII.

68 Minute by Murray, January 1, 1952, FO 371/92143, BNA.

69 Wallinger to FO, January 7, 1952, 1004/1/52, FO 371/101173, BNA.

70 Gifford to SS, February 1, 1952, Tel. 3357, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 5–6.

71 Chester Bowles to SS, Tel. 3382, March 18, 1952, RG 84, Burma - US Embassy, Top Secret Telegrams Received 1951–1954, Top Secret Telegrams Sent 1951–1953, Box 1, NAII.

72 Donald Heath to SS, February 4, 1952, Tel. 1541, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 7–8.

73 Acheson to US Legation Saigon, February 12, 1952, Tel. 1142, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 9–11.

74 Tomlinson to Murray, March 17, 1952, 10222/1/-/52, FO 371/101011, BNA. In 1964 Ambassador Henry A. Byroade acknowledged to Burma's Prime Minister, Ne Win, that the United States (he did not mention the CIA) supported the KMT troops from January to August 1951 because of the Korean War. He insisted that after August 17, 1951 there ceased to be “any contact whatever with these forces.” This is the first time any American had admitted to the Burmese any US support. But it is probable that US support continued. Byroade to SS, July 31, 1964, enclosed in “Visit of Ne Win of the Union of Burma,” September 3, 1966, NSF-Countries File, Burma. Ne Win Visit Briefing Book, 9/8-10-66, Box 235 Lyndon Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

75 Franks to FO, October 17, 1951, Saving Tel. 1055, FO 371/192143, BNA.

76 Gibson, The Secret Army, 113.

77 No memorandum of the Allison-Chiang conversation has come to light; the response to Allison was referred to in a dispatch dated May 21, 1953. See editorial note, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 35. Allison to David Bruce, November 18, 1952, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 36–39. Allison’s proposal, “Outline of Steps to be Taken to Transport of Formosa Chinese Nationalist Troops in Kengtung,” dated November 18, 1952, is attached to Allison to Sebald, November 24, 1952, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Top Secret General Records, 1951–1955, NAII.

78 Diary of William J. Sebald, entry for August 31, 1952, Box 56, Folder 1,William J. Sebald Papers, Special Collections and Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD (hereafter Sebald Diary USNA).

79 Sebald to Department of State (hereafter USDS), September 3, 1952, Tel. 206, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 29–32.

80 Memorandum, Blancke to Philip Bonsal, November 28, 1952, 690B.9321/11-2852, RG 59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

81 Rankin to Sebald, December 1, 1952, Tel. 8, RG 84 Burma US Embassy, Top Secret Telegrams Received 1951–1954, Top Secret Telegram Sent 1951–1953, Box 1, NAII.

82 Sebald Diary USNA, entry for December 2, 1952, Box 56, Folder 3. Sebald thought that Rankin had gotten in trouble with the State Department for not sharing his telegram to Sebald with the Department. “I cannot understand how a Chief of Mission can expect to operate on his own by keeping the Dept. in ignorance of his thinking,” he wrote. Sebald Diary USNA, entry for December 19, 1952, Box 56, Folder 3.

83 Sebald to Bonsal, December 4, 1952, RG 84 Burma US Embassy, Top Secret General Records, 1951–1955, Box 1, NAII.

84 Sebald to USDS, January 10, 1953, Despatch 533, 790B.5-MSP/1-1053, RG59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 4142, NAII.

85 Edwin F. Stanton to SS, January 13, 1953, Tel. 1303, 690B.9321/1-1353, RG59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

86 Sebald Diary USNA, entry for January 16, 1953, Box 56, Folder 3.

87 Central Intelligence Agency, “Official Diary,” January 21, 1953, CREST documents, NAII.

88 H. Freeman Matthews to US Embassy Taiwan, January 30, 1953, Tel. 524, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 48–49.

89 John Foster Dulles to US Embassy Taipei, February 19, 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 53.

90 Rankin to SS, February 22, 1953, Tel. 878, 690B.00/9321/2-2253, RG59, CDF 1950–1954, Box 2993, NAII.

91 Notes of a Conversation, Bedell Smith and Koo, March 6, 1953, Box 187, Koo Papers. If asked about the conversation, Koo was to say only that he was meeting the newly appointed Smith on a courtesy call, and that they had discussed Madame Chiang’s forthcoming visit and the implications of Stalin’s recent death.

92 Rankin to SS, March 9, 1953, Tel. 941, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 65-67.

93 Rankin to SS, March 12, 1953, Tel. 956, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 70–71. Sebald surmised, correctly, that Rankin was “being led by the nose by the Chinese and that his heart is not in it for finding a speedy solution.” William J. Sebald, “Burma Diary (1952–54): Some Unlearned Lessons in Southeast Asia” (unpublished), entry for March 12, 1953, pp. 141, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.

94 Dulles to Rankin, March 13, 1953, Tel. 700, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 71-72.

95 Dulles to Sebald, March 18, 1953, Tel. 1470, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 5-76; Dulles to Rankin, 18 March 1953, Tel. 713, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 76n2.

96 Memorandum of Conversation, Ku [Koo], Dulles, Allison, March 19, 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 78.

97 Notes of a Conversation, Dulles and Koo, March 19, 1953, Box 197, Koo Papers.

98 Sebald to SS, March 17, 1953, Tel. 1773, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 74n2.

99 Transcribed article from the Eastern World, April 1953, Series 1838, Control Symbol 3008/11/161 Part 1, NAA.

100 Dulles to Sebald, March 18, 1953, Tel. 1470, RG 84 Burma US Embassy, Top Secret Telegrams Received 1951–1954, Top Secret Telegrams Sent 1951–1953, Box 1, NAII.

101 Historian George Kahin has argued that after the Korean War armistice in July 1953, the rationale for assisting the KMT forces in Burma shifted. The new rationale, he speculated, was to provoke the PRC into invading Burma, which would drive Burma into the Western camp. Kahin himself, writing in 1979, said that he was “highly skeptical of this interpretation” until he read about it in a Rand Corporation study. Kahin may have been right. Six years earlier Robert H. Taylor had written that some in the CIA actually hoped that the KMT’s presence in Burma would provoke a Chinese invasion, forcing Burma to turn toward the West for assistance. George Kahin, “Burma” (unpublished manuscript), March 5, 1979, George Kahin Papers, Folder 74-13, Box 74, Rare Book and Manuscript Division, Kroch Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences, 45.

102 Rankin’s actions disgusted Sebald. Recalling that Rankin once proposed that the United States should “give all-out support to Li Mi,” he confided to his diary, “I bristle.” If that were to happen, he stated, he would resign from the Foreign Service “in five minutes.” Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entry for April 6, 1953, 173.

103 Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Intelligence Bulletin,” March 26, 1953, 5, CREST documents, NAII. Dulles to Sebald, March 27, 1953, Tel. 1538, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 86.

104 Sebald to Stanton, March 31, 1953, RG 84 Burma US Embassy, Top Secret General Records 1951–1955, Box 1, NAII.

105 Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entry for April 8, 1953, p. 174.

106 Sebald Diary USNA, entry for April 15, 1953, Box 56, Folder 4. Draft letter, Sebald to Dulles, April 15, 1953, ibid.

107 Sebald to Dulles, April 18, 1953, Tel. 2014, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 97.

108 Gibson, The Secret Army, 139–51. Office of Current Intelligence, “Current Intelligence Bulletin,” June 3, 1953, CREST document CIA-RPD79T00975A001100560001-7, NAII.

109 Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Intelligence Weekly,” August 28, 1953, p. 10, CREST document CIA-RDP7900927A000100120001-8, NAII.

110 U Nu to Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 12, 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 135–38.

111 William J. Donovan to SS, September 16, 1953, Tel. 524, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 139–40. Archibald R.K. Mackenzie to John G. Tahourdin, September 22, 1953, 10245/209/53, FO 371/106690, BNA.

112 Sebald, “Burma Diary,” 267–68. Bedell Smith to Rankin, September 17, 1953, Tel. 227, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 144-45. Roger Makins to FO, September 24, 1953, Tel. 2024, FO 371/106690, BNA.

113 Roger Makins to FO, September 24, 1953, Tel. 2024, FO 371/106690, BNA. Eisenhower’s response soon thereafter to U Nu would not have given Nu much hope. But Ike also wrote to Chiang asking him to use his influence “to the maximum to bring about immediately the evacuation of as many of the irregular forces as possible and to make clear that those who remain will not have your sympathy or support.” Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek, September 28, 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 152–53.

114 Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entry for October 5, 1953, 277–78.

115 Australian Legation Rangoon to Australian UN Mission and the Australian Commissioner’s Office Singapore, October 28, 1953, Savingram 1, Series A816, Control Symbol 19/306/223, NAA. Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entries for November 5, 1953, 310.

116 H.D. White to EXAF, November 23, 1953, Memorandum No. 461/53, Series A1838, Control Symbol 3008/11/87/1, NAA.

117 Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Intelligence Bulletin,” December 8, 1953, p. 5, CREST document CIA-RDP79T00975A00130001-6, NAII.

118 Gibson, The Secret Army, 143.

119 U Nu to Eisenhower, November 26, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers (Ann Whitman File), Box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

120 Department of States, “Vice President Nixon’s Report to department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East,” (unpublished), January 8, 1954, 21, WHO, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, OCB Central Filer Series, Box 69, folder OCB 091,/far east (file #1)(2) [November 1953–April 1954], Eisenhower Papers.

121 Reuter’s dispatch, November 27, 1953, included with Paul Gore-Booth to FO, November 27, 1953, Tel. 476, FO 371/106693, BNA. Nixon told Sebald that he would send a strong telegram to Eisenhower recommending “that some further concrete action ought to be taken by the United States to bring Kuomintang business to an end.” He could not say this in public because the final decision would be the President’s. Paul Gore-Booth to FO, November 30, 1953, Tel. 483, FO 371/106694, BNA.

122 “Situation Report on KMT Troops in Burma,” Series 1513 (29), Accession No. 268, Myanmar National Archives, Yangon, Myanmar (hereafter MNA). Gibson, The Secret Army, 153–54.

123 Gibson, The Secret Army, 156–57.

124 Rufus Z. Smith to USDS, January 4, 1954, Despatch 31, RG 84, Burma US Embassy, Classified General Records 1945–1961, Box 27, NAII. Smith was the American consul at Chiang Mai, Thailand. The consulate was an important listening post for the United States and a contact venue for the “jungle generals.”

125 Berkeley E.F. Gage to FO, May 18, 1954, Saving Tel. 19, FO 371/11967, BNA.

126 “Contingency Plans to Evacuate Possible Chinese Nationalist Stragglers from Burma After Phase III of Regulation Evacuation,” May 13, 1954, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers 1948–1961, OCB Central File Series, Box 25, Folder OCB 091. Burma (file #1) (1), Eisenhower Papers. United National General Assembly, Resolution 206, October 29, 1964, Series 1513 (29), Accession No. 268, MNA.

127 Sebald to SS, June 2, 1954, Tel. 1166, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 224–25.

128 Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entry for June 27, 1954, 460–61.

129 C.T. Moodie to EAXF, June 28, 1954, Despatch 3/54, Series A1838, Control Symbol 3008/7/1, Part 1, NAA.

130 The Reminiscences of Ambassador Wm. J. Sebald, 3 vols. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1979), 2: 893. The work consists of many oral history interviews conducted in 1977.

131 Moodie to EXAF, August 30, 1954, Despatch 11/54, Series A1838, Control Symbol 3008/7/1 Part 1, NAA.

132 This included in 1964 David Wise and Thomas B. Ross’s book, The Invisible Government, and an article by Selig Harrison in the Washington Post in 1966.

133 Sebald, “Burma Diary,” entries for February 13 and 21, 1953, 124, 130. Sebald to SS, February 13, 1953, Tel. 1525, FRUS, vol. 12, no. 2 (1952–54): 52. The Alsops’ column appeared on February 11, 1953.

134 Reminiscences of Sebald, 2: 987. Sebald subsequently understood that the CIA was in fact involved. Ibid., 895.

135 Foley, Cold War and National Assertion, 117.