![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
Abstract
In the late 1990s, China established “strategic cooperative relations” with North Korea, which mixed elements of alliance and practical cooperative relations, in the process of dismantling the Cold War. However, in the summer of 2009, that is, in the wake of the second nuclear test and the serious illness of Kim Jong Il, this relations changed into “new strategic cooperative relations” with “increased elements of alliance.” This new relations between the two countries were characterized by the strengthened bond in politics and security and by the establishment of systematic economic connections. Due to this new relation, the future of North Korea is less likely to follow the scenario envisaged by some in the Western countries who have anticipated the “collapse of the North Korean regime.” This new relations will render the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea rather useless, thus having a great influence on the effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. And the West will find it more difficult to resort to economic sanctions. The expansion of the economic cooperation between China and North Korea created an ironic situation where South Korea’s sanctions against North Korea make it lose its share of North Korean market. To conclude, the new relations between China and North Korea have made it unavoidable for the West and South Korea to modify their respective North Korea policy to adjust to the changing policy environment.
Notes
1 Jong-Seok Lee, Bukhan-jungguk gwangye: 1945–2000 (China–North Korea Relations: 1945–2000) (Seoul: Jungsim Publishing Co., 2000), 263.
2 Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), June 13, 2009.
3 Rodong sinmun (Labor Daily), June 14, 2009.
4 Joseon jungang tongsin (The Korean Central News Agency) (DPRK), October 4, 2010.
5 Jong-Seok Lee, “Bukjung gyeongje hyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui” (Deepening Economic Cooperation between China and North Korea: Characteristics and Implications), Jeongse wa jeongchaek (Current Issues and Policies), no. 183 (July 2011), 8.
6 Jong-Seok Lee, Bukhan-jungguk gwangye: 1945–2000, 17–43.
7 Ibid., 191.
8 Qian Qichen, Waijiao shiji (Remembrances of Ten Diplomatic Events) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), 139–61; Jong-Seok Lee, Bukhan-jungguk gwangye: 1945–2000, 271–72.
9 Jong-Seok Lee, “Change of China–North Korea Relations and its Implications from the Historical- Structural Perspective,” Sejong jeongchaek yeongu (Sejong Policy Studies), 6, no. 1 (2010): 476.
10 Jong-Seok Lee, Bukhan-jungguk gwangye: 1945–2000, 266–75.
11 Jong-Seok Lee, Bukhan-jungguk gwangye: 1945–2000, 282. This shows that the strategic cooperative relations between China and North Korea were formed under the influence of the change in China’s policy toward North Korea. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea was faced with a system crisis caused by economic crisis and diplomatic isolation. Thus it was in the best North Korean interest to maintain the existing alliance with China. This led North Korea to be passive in changing its relations with China. Lee, “Change of China-North Korea Relations,” 479.
12 At least until 2009, there was no news indicating that China clearly demanded the United States resolve hostile relations with North Korea while China acted as a mediator between the United States and North Korea to solve the North Korea’s nuclear problem. Though the September 19 Joint Statement agreed in the Six-Party Talks in 2005 was reached based on the “action to action principle” on the ground of North Korea’s nuclear renouncement, it was the only single case where establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula including the normalization of the relations between the United States and North Korea and the nuclear issues were considered simultaneously. This was not the result of the strong demand by China of the United States, but rather it was the outcome of the change in the US perception and joint efforts of South Korea and China.
13 As to this debate, International Crisis Group, “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” Asia Report, no. 179 (November 2, 2009), 5–11.
14 In item 4 of the October 4 Declaration released in inter-Korean summit talks in October 2007, the heads of state of the two Koreas agreed to pursue a declaration of an end of war that was participated by “the three or four parties directly concerned.” At that time, President Roh Moo Hyun was naturally thinking two Koreas, the United States, and China. But Chairman Kim Jong Il unexpectedly proposed “three” or four parties, implying two Koreas and the United States. This indicates that North Korea was dubious of China’s attitude toward North Korea, considering China’s response toward North Korea’s nuclear test.
15 International Crisis Group, “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” Asia Report, 9.
16 Men Honghua and Xiao Xi, “DPRK integrity important for peace,” China Daily, March 1, 2011.
17 Li Xiaodong ed., Chaoxian bandao weiji guanli yanjiu (Studies on the Management of Crisis of Korean Peninsula) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2010), 3.
18 In contrast to controversies swirled until the summer of 2009, since the Fall of 2009, Chinese pundits said that the reason for North Korea’s nuclear development was the threat from the United States, and without the resolution of the US threat it would be impossible to make North Korea renounce its nuclear development. This theory of the US responsibility became generally accepted.
19 “DPRK allows China domestic trade cargo to ship via its port,” China Daily, July 4, 2011.
20 A state-media said that “The reason that China is helping North Korea is to help North Korea overcome economic and financial sanctions imposed on itself by the West.” Men Honghua and Xiao Xi, “DPRK integrity important for peace,” China Daily, March 1, 2011.
21 Xiaodong ed., Chaoxian bandao weiji guanli yanjiu, 109.
22 Since the summer of 2009, the United States continued to say that China had been using more rigid policy toward North Korea, but China’s policy toward North Korea has changed considerably from the line of the cooperation with the United States.
23 “Xiwang pingrang bugao xinde mangzhuang zhi ju” (Hoping that Pyongyang doesn’t make harsh play anymore), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), April 17, 2012.
24 It is demonstrated in the editorial of a state media: “China needs to frankly express its attitude to young North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, saying that what’s good is good and what’s bad is bad,” and “China hopes that Kim Jong Un should consider not only the interests of North Korea in its nuclear issue but the difficulties of China as well,” “Xiwang pingrang bugao xinde mangzhuang zhi ju,” Huanqiu shibao, April 17, 2012.
25 We have heard many US officials saying that “China is very angry and is set to use more strong policy toward North Korea for the past two years when the UN Security Council Resolution 1874 have been losing its effect because of the expanded economic cooperation between China and North Korea.” This paradox is partly because of the lack of understanding of US officials on China but also because of US officials’ exaggerated interpretation toward Chinese criticism of North Korea as they were anxiously trying to induce China to participate in the sanctions against North Korea.
26 In response to the UN statement condemning the launch of a rocket, North Korea changed its attitude, saying that “We never predicted any military measures like a nuclear test from the beginning.” By doing so, North Korea gave a present to China which had wished to establish a bilateral practice of “give and take.” Nokeot nyuseu (Nocut News), Seoul, May 11, 2012; Nocut News is an Internet news run by CBS (Christian Broadcasting System) since April 2005.
27 Jong-Seok Lee, “Jungguk ui seongjang i nambukhan e michineun yeonghyang” (China’s Growth’s Impact on the Two Koreas), Jeongse wa jeongchaek (Current Issues and Policies), December 2010, 6.
28 Men Honghua and Xiao Xi, “DPRK integrity important for peace,” China Daily, March 1, 2011.
29 National state English media of the PRC, Global Times, expressed its vigilance in an editorial, saying that “Revolutions have erupted in Tunisia and Egypt and some countries in the West are hoping that China will be next” (Yeonhap nyuseu (Yonhap News), Seoul, February 21, 2011). Huanqiu shibao (Global Times) argued in its editorial that “The West media are scrutinizing through a magnifying glass any sign of revolution in China” (Nokeot nyuseu, 25 February 2011); Yonhap News is ROK national news agency.
30 Gyeonghyang Sinmun (Kyunghyang Daily), October 7, 2009.
31 Byuseu aen nyuseu (Views and News), Seoul, May 30, 2008. This remark was made as an answer by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a question by a reporter. But in this regard, the Chinese government did not change its position in the face of the South Korean government’s complaint but rather made its position clearer.
32 “Restrained needed,” China Daily, December 3, 2010.
33 Lee, “Bukjung gyeongje hyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui”, 9–10.
34 Institute for International Trade of the Korea International Trade Association (Korea), “2011 nyeon nambuk gyoyeok bukjung muyeok donghyang bigyo” (Comparison of Trend of Trade between Two Koreas and between China and North Korea in 2011), Trade Focus, 11, no. 17 (April 2012).
35 The Korea International Trade Association, Bukhan ui ‘oegugin . tujabeop’,’raseon,hwanggeumpyeong,wihwado gyeongje jidaebeop’gaejeong mit jejeong naeyong haeseol (Explanations on Revisions and Legislations on North Korea’s “Foreigners” Investment Act, and Rason, Hwanggyumpyong, Whiwha Island Economic Zone Act) (April 2012).
36 “Top leaders of China, hold talks in Beijing,” China Daily, May 7, 2010.
37 Ibid.
38 “Premier Wen meets Kim Jong-Il,” China Daily, May 7, 2010.
39 Immediately after the May summit talks, working-level officials from both countries might have conducted consultations to reach a complete agreement, certain of implementation by both countries. The August summit talks might have been a meeting to confirm the results.
40 “President Hu talks with DPRK top leader Kim,” China Daily, August 30, 2010.
41 “China, DPRK to develop two economic zones,” China Daily, June 9, 2011.
42 Joseon jungang tongsin (The Korean Central News Agency (DPRK)), June 10, 2011; June 14, 2011.
43 Hu Mingyuan, “Kim’s visit promotes economic relations,” China Daily, May 30, 2011.
44 China Daily, October 1, 2010; October 4, 2010; October 8, 2010.
45 “President Hu invites DPRK new leaders to visit,” China Daily, October 12, 2010.
46 Joseonjungangtongsin (The Korean Central News Agency (DPRK)), October 6, 2009; Nokeotnyuseu (Nocut News), 8 May 2010; Tongillyuseu (Tongil News), Seoul, August 30, 2010; Joseonjungangtongsin (The Korean Central News Agency (DPRK)), May 27, 2011; “China, DPRK premiers vow to bolster economic ties,” China Daily, Beijing, September 26, 2011.
47 Joseonjungangtongsin (The Korean Central News Agency (DPRK)), June 10, 2011; June 14, 2011.
48 Yeonhap nyuseu (Yonhap News), May 22, 2011.
49 People’s Daily, Beijing, December 20, 2012.
50 Nyusiseu (Newsis), Seoul, 20 December 2011; Newsis is the largest private news agency in South Korea.
51 “China, DPRK to develop two economic zones,” China Daily, June 9, 2011.
52 Joseon sinbo (The Choson Sinbo Daily)(Tokyo), May 8, 2010.
53 “China, DPRK to develop two economic zones,” China Daily, June 9, 2011.
54 Lee, “Buk-jung gyeongjehyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui”, 9.
55 The Korea International Trade Association, Bukhan ui ‘oegugin tujabeop’,’raseon, hwanggeumpyeong, wihwado gyeongjejidaebeop’gaejeong mit jejeong naeyong haeseol (April 2012). In addition to the two legislations, North Korea established thirteen legislations related to foreigners’ investment or revised to make it easier to invest by foreigners in November and December 2011. Refer to the aforementioned Explanations.
56 Lee, “Buk-jung gyeongje hyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui”, 10.
57 Lee, “Buk-jung gyeongje hyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui”, 11.
58 Lee, “Buk-jung gyeongje hyeomnyeok ui simhwa: teukjing gwa hamui,” 11.
This article has developed and revised several ideas and arguments that appeared in my earlier work (in Korean). See Yicha haeksilheom yihoo bukhan-jungguk gwangyeui byunwhawa hamui (The Change and Implications in DPRK-China Relations Following the Second Nuclear Test), Sejong Jeongchaek Yeongu (Sejong Policy Studies), 2012-21(2012).