Children's Memory and Metaphorical Interpretation

Abstract

Assumptions of constructivism, information-processing, and fuzzy-trace theory were tested in two experiments on memory and comprehension of metaphors with 6- and 9-year-old children. In the first experiment, verbatim memory for metaphors was compared with misrecognition of the gist of metaphorical meaning. In the second experiment, children judged metaphorical meaning, including alternative perceptual and psychological interpretations. We found that (a) children misrecognized the gist of metaphorical interpretations, especially after a delay, much like they do for literal gist (e.g., true inferences); (b) contrary to both constructivism and information-processing theory, misrecognizing metaphorical gist was independent of memory for the metaphor itself; (c) true psychological interpretations were misrecognized and judged acceptable more often than any other type at all ages; and (d) contrary to the idea that literal or perceptual interpretations are suppressed to achieve psychological interpretations, acceptances of alternative interpretations were positively dependent. Results were consistent with those obtained for literal language and for numerical information and are explained by fuzzy-trace theory.