State Supreme Court Responses to Atkins v. Virginia: Adaptive Functioning Assessment in Light of Purposeful Planning, Premeditation, and the Behavioral Context of the Homicide

ABSTRACT

In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Atkins v. Virginia and held that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally retarded individual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Since then, state supreme courts are entertaining arguments concerning adaptive functioning assessment in the context of the defendant's criminal history and role in the homicide. This article will outline the reasoning in some of these post-Atkins state supreme court cases, and briefly address the antisocial personality disorder/mental retardation distinction pursuant specifically to adaptive functioning abilities in light of the defendant's behavior within the context of the homicide.

Although this debate leaves an argument that may not be able to be answered by forensic mental health professional experts in Atkins type claims, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case (Tennard v. Dretke, 2004) may shed some light and offer direction to attorney arguments in this area. This case will be briefly discussed, which addressed in part the issue of whether a jury should consider if a capital defendant committed a homicide deliberately with a reasonable expectation that death would ensue and whether the U.S. Supreme Court's prohibition of executing the mentally retarded in Atkins applies if the crime cannot be attributed to mental retardation.

KEYWORDS:

• Atkins v. Virginia
• mental retardation
• death penalty
• adaptive functioning