Challenging partial intentionalism

Abstract

Paisley Livingston claims that an artist's intentions are successfully realized and hence determinant of the meaning of a work if and only if they are compatible and “mesh” with the linguistic and conventional meanings of the text or artefact taken in its target or intended context. I argue that this specific standard of success is not without its difficulties. First, I show how an artist's intention can sometimes be constitutive of a work's meaning even if there is no significant meshing between the artist's intention and his work. Secondly, I argue against the claim that the artist's intentions need to be compatible with the linguistic and conventional meanings of a text. Thirdly, I discuss a case that creates a particular puzzle for Livingston since the intentions of the artist concerned are not successfully realized, though they are compatible and mesh with all the relevant data. I conclude my paper by suggesting a solution to this puzzle.

Keywords:

• intention
• interpretation
• intentionalism
• jokes
• cartoon
• Livingston