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Original Articles

Scientific Narratives in Law: An Introduction

Pages 253-274 | Published online: 19 Dec 2013
 

Notes

1 See Richard Weisberg, Poethics And Other Strategies of Law and Literature, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 67–73

. Significantly, Weisberg does not limit the law and literature project to reading great books about law, but also includes the study of legal opinions, statutes, and lawyers’ interpretive strategies as significant materials for reflecting on ethics in law. See id. at 5–34, 127–75.

2 See Alan G. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1990), p. 5

.

3 See id.

4 Steven J. Harris, “Thinking Locally, Acting Globally,” 6 Configurations 131, 135–6 (1998).

5 See id., at 136.

6 See generally Werner Callebaut, ed., Taking the Naturalist Turn, or How Real Philosophy of Science is Done (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1993)

.

7 See Harris, supra note 4 at 131 (“Can we free ourselves from the constraints imposed by off-the-shelf narrative formats, and can we compose big-picture or longue durée narratives other than those of origin story,’ ‘story of progress,’ or ‘stories of heroic exploration and conquest’ to give order and meaning to the available historical material?”). See also William Clark, “Narratology and the History of Science,” 26 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 1 (1995)

.

8 See, e.g., Frederick Suppe, “The Structure of a Scientific Paper,” 65 Philosophy of Science 381 (1998)

(the argumentative structure commonplace in science is often ignored by standard philosophical accounts).

9 See Sharon Traweek, “An Introduction to Cultural and Social Studies of Sciences and Technologies,” 17 Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 3, 5 (1993)

. Note that Traweek includes under “literature” the rhetoric of science.

10 Id., at 13.

We interpretive anthropologists usually align ourselves with those literary theorists, art historians, classicists, economists, philosophers, historians, legal studies researchers, and so on who do “cultural studies”: we all attend to patterned interactions, such as oral and written discourse, or any other “social text” such as a poem, an article, a scientist, a detector, a policy, a set of terms, or a conference, in which the form and the content reverberate to evoke significant strategic meaning to those who know the local patterns. Discursive, strategic, evocative practices are key terms in the lexicon.

Id., at 11.

11 See Timothy Lenoir, “Inscription Practices and Materialities of Communication,” in Timothy Lenoir, ed., Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998)

.

12 See “Bibliography: Relations of Science to Literature and the Arts 1998,” 8 Configurations 439 (2000)

.

13 See Lenoir, supra note 11 at 2.

14 See Hans-Jörg Rheinburger, “Experimental Systems, Graphematic Spaces,” in Inscribing Science, supra note 11 at 285. Briefly, Kuhn inspired many to see science as theory-driven, such that observation is theory-laden or biased by theoretical pre-suppositions.

15 See Timothy Lenoir, “Was the Last Turn the Right Turn?: The Semiotic Turn and A.J. Greimas,” in Mario Biagioli, ed., The Science Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 291

.

16 See Joseph Rouse, “Understanding Scientific Practices: Cultural Studies of Science as a Philosophical Program,” in The Science Studies Reader, supra note 15 at 442.

17 See Lenoir, supra note 15 at 291.

18 See Rouse, supra note 16 at 450.

19 See Joseph Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 179–80

, citing Donald Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in Truth and Interpretation: Essays on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 433–46 ; Thomas Wortenburg, The Forms of Power (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1990) . See also Engaging Science, supra at 205-36 (chapter on Davidsonian Semiotics) and 177–204 (chapter on Wortenburg’s discussion of power).

20 Engaging Science, supra note 19 at 160–61.

21 Id., at 177.

22 Id., at 177–78.

23 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans., Catherine Porter. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993), p. 6

.

24 See Rheinberger, supra note 14 at 285–86, citing Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 132–34

.

25 See Bruno Latour, “One More Turn After the Social Turn,” in The Science Studies Reader, supra note 15 at 284, 286, citing Michel Serres, Statues (Paris: François Bourin; 1987)

.

26 Latour, supra note 25 at 284.

27 Latour, supra note 23 at 5.

28 Id.

29 For criticism of Latour, see Lenoir, supra note 15; Sande Cohen, “Reading Science Studies Writing,” in The Science Studies Reader, supra note 15 at 84–90; Steve Fuller, “Why Science Studies Has Never Been Critical of Science: Some Recent Lessons on How to Be a Helpful Nuisance and a Harmless Radical,” 30 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5–32 (2000)

.

30 See David S. Caudill, “Law and Science: An Essay on Links and Socio-Natural Hybrids,” 51 Syracuse Law Review 841, 855–60 (2001)

.

31 See John T. Battalio, “Introduction,” in John T. Battalio, ed., Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse: Methods, Practice, and Pedagogy (Stamford, CT: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1998), p. vii

.

32 Id. at vii–viii, citing Charles Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge: The genre and activity of the experimental article in science (Madison, WI: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1988)

; Lawrence J. Prelli, A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse (Columbia, SC: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1989) ; Alan G. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science, supra note 2; Greg Myers, Writing Biology (Madison, WI: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1990) ; Charles Alan Taylor, Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation (Madison, WI: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1996) .

33 Charles Alan Taylor, “Science as Cultural Practice: A Rhetorical Perspective,” in Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse, supra note 31 at 90.

34 See Herbert W Simons, “The Rhetoric of the Scientific Research Report: ‘Drug-pushing’ in a Medical Journal Article,” in R. H. Roberts & J. M. M. Good, eds., The Recovery of Rhetoric: Persuasive Discourse and Disciplinary in the Human Sciences (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1993), pp. 148–63

. (Simons analyzes an article on the effectiveness of the cholesterol-lowering drug cholestyramine.)

35 See id., 148–49.

36 Id., at 150.

37 See id., at 150, quoting A. G. Gross, “The origin of species: Evolutionary taxonomy as an example of the rhetoric of science,” in H. W. Simons, ed., The Rhetorical Turn (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990)

; and J. Lyne, “Bio-rhetorics: moralizing the life sciences,” in The Rhetorical Turn, supra. See also Simons, supra note 34 at 160, quoting J. Gusfield, “The literary rhetoric of science: comedy and pathos of drinking driver research,” 1976 American Sociological Review 16–33 .

38 Charles Alan Taylor, “Feuding Communities and the Feudalism of Science: Democratizing the Community and/of Science,” in J. Michael Hogan, ed., Rhetoric and Community: Studies in Unity and Fragmentation (Columbia, SC: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1998), p. 287

. “Principles do not close down debates; principals, via selection and application of competing principles, do.” Id.

39 Id., at 289.

40 See id., at 288–89.

41 See id., at 285.

42 See id., at 289.

43 See id.

44 See Ken Hyland, “Boosting, hedging and the negotiation of academic knowledge,” 18 Text 349, 352–53 (1998)

.

45 See id., at 353.

46 See id., at 363.

47 Id., at 364.

48 See id., at 365.

49 See Dan Ding, “Rationality Reborn: Historical Roots of the Passive Voice in Scientific Discourse,” in Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse, supra note 31 at 132.

50 See Richard D. Johnson-Sheehan, “Metaphor in the Rhetoric of Scientific Discourse,” in Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse, supra note 31 at 167.

51 Id

52 See id., at 168.

53 See Michael Bradie, “Models and Metaphors in Science: The Metaphorical Turn,” 12 Proto Sociology 305, 311–12 (1998)

.

54 See Heather Brodie Graves, “Marbles, Dimples, Rubber Sheets, and Quantum Wells: The Role of Analogy in the Rhetoric of Science,” 28 Rhetoric Society Quarterly 25, 25 (1998)

.

55 See id., at 25–26.

56 Id., at 26.

57 See id., at 26, 45.

58 Refer to note 33 supra and accompanying text.

59 See Taylor, supra note 33 at 90, citing Prelli, supra note 32.

60 See Taylor, supra note 33 at 90, citing M. Overington, “The Scientific Community as Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science,” 10 Philosophy and Rhetoric 143 (1977)

.

61 See Suppe, supra note 8 at 384, citing Suppe, “Credentialing Scientific Claims,” 1/2 Perspectives on Science 153 (1993)

.

62 See Taylor, supra note 33 at 90.

63 See id., at 91.

64 See id.

65 See id.

66 Taylor, supra note 38 at 290.

67 See id.

68 See Taylor, supra note 33 at 97–98.

69 See Gay M. Gragson & Ted L. Gragson, “Uncertain Science and the Sponsored-Research Process,” in Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse, supra note 31 at 5.

70 Id., at 19.

71 See Suppe, supra note 8 at 384, citing G. Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973)

.

72 See Michael Mulkay, Jonathan Potter, & Steven Yearley, “Why an Analysis of Scientific Discourse is Needed,” in Karin D. Knorr-Cetina & Michael Mulkay, eds., Science Observed Perspectives on the Social Study of Science (London: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 175, 187

.

73 Id., at 178.

74 See id., at 190–92.

75 See id., at 190.

76 See id., at 192, 195.

77 See Leah Ceccarelli, Shaping Science with Rhetoric: The Cases of Dobzhansky, Schrödinger, and Wilson (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 3

.

78 See id., at 5–6.

79 See id., at 169.

80 See Jeanne Fahnestock, “Accommodating Science: The Rhetorical Life of Scientific Facts,” 15 Written Communication 330 (1998)

, reprinted from 3 Written Communications 275 (1986).

81 See id., at 332–44.

82 See id., at 333–34.

83 See id., at 334.

84 Id

85 See id., at 335–42.

86 See id., at 346–47.

87 See id., at 347.

88 See John S. Nelson, Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action (Madison, WI: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1998), p. 48

.

89 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D. C. Cir. 1923).

90 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

91 See Fed. R. Evid. 702.

92 See Charles Kester, “The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science, and the Troubles of Translation: Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation,” 74 Nebraska L. Rev. 529, 560 (1995)

.

93 See Brian Leiter, “The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence,” 1997 Brigham Young L. Rev. 803, 817

.

94 Id.

95 See David S. Caudill, “Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law,” 39 San Diego L. Rev. 269 (2002)

.

96 See David S. Caudill, “Give me a line in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion or in official commentary to the rules of evidence for admissibility of experts in court, and I will move the [legal] world,” 39 Houston L. Rev. 437 (2002)

.

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