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Notes
1 Roland Barthes, “L’ancienne rhétorique,” 16 Communications 172–229 (1970)
, especially at p. 179.2 See, e.g., Barthes, supra note 1 at 198. The relation between res and verba might be characterised in terms of the relation of signifier to signified, in which the latter is conjured into existence by the former.
3 Jacques Derrida, Psyché. Inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1998)
, esp. p. 46: “elle intéresse aux deux, entre les deux, jusqu’à rendre la décision impossible .…”4 Georges Didi-Hubermann, “Pour une anthropologie des singularités formelles. Remarque sur l’invention warburgienne,” 24 Genèses 145, 154 (1996)
. In his account of how Warburg’s conception of art history as “detective work [Detektivarbeit]” apprehends art-historical objects as infinitely generative “clues,” Georges Didi-Hubermann presents the object as an epistemic symptom: “In theoretical terms, a symptom is nothing other than a generative moment — a singular irruption or a spectacular exception — in a structure which it “opens” in the sense that it reveals and ruptures it in the same movement.” Id, at 157. The structure is “opened” in this particular sense is the cognitive tissue of the discipline or institution itself, its schematic “horizon.” Whereas invention movemetn forwards, this presentation with anxiety, because the suspects that any analysis of the object will be an analysis without end, because what is at stake, and what has to be continually re-negotiated, is the relation of knowledge to itself and to its own origins.5 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p 16
.6 See generally Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (London: Harvester, 1997)
.7 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, “Beyond Nature and Culture: A Note on Medicine in the Age of Molecular Biology,” 8 Science in Context 249, 252 (1995)
.8 See, e.g., Louis Gernet, “Le temps dans les formes archaïques du droit” (1956), reprinted in Droit et Institutions en Grèce Antique (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), p. 121
; Yan Thomas, “Le droit entre les mots et les choses. Rhétorique et jurisprudence à Rome,” Archives de Philosophie du Droit 24 (1980), pp. 93–114 ; Bernard Jackson, Law, Fact, and Narrative Coherence (Liverpool: Deborah Charles, 1988) .9 See generally Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes (Paris: La Decouverte, 1993)
; idem, Pandora’s Hope (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) ; idem, Politiques de la Nature (Paris: La Découverte, 1999), esp. chapter 2 .10 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, at p. 5, esp. editorial note 3: “Heidegger here anticipates with his identification of technology as an instrumentum and an Einrichtung his later ’true characterisation of technology in terms of a setting-in-place, ordering, Enframing, and standing-reserve.”
11 Pierre Legendre, De la Société comme texte. Linéaments d’une anthropologie dogmatique (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 81–82
.12 See, e.g., Yan Thomas, “Le sujet de droit, la personne et la nature” Le Débat 100 (1998), pp. 85–107
; Pierre Legendre, Leçons II L’empire de la vérité (Paris: Gallimard, 1982) .13 See generally Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998)
.14 See especially Niklas Luhmann, “Operational Closure and Structural Coupling. The Differentiation of the Legal System,” 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419 (2000)
.15 The best illustration is Bruno Latour, Aramis, ou l’amour de la technique (Paris: La Découverte, 1997)
.16 See my “Persons and things. An ethnographic analogy,” 30 Economy & Society 112–138 (2001)
.17 See Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997)
; Michael Hutter and Gunther Teubner, “The Fat Plunder of Society” (ms.).18 Gunther Teubner, “Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law,” 9 Social & Legal Studies 399, 408 (2000)
.19 See Gilles Deleuze, Le pli (Paris: Minuit, 1988)
.20 Jacques Derrida, Psyche, inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilee, 1987).
21 Michel Foucault, “La vie: l’expérience et la science,” Dits et Ecrits, vol 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 763–776
.22 Compare Bert Theunissen, “Closing the Door on Hugo de Vries’ Mendelism,” 51 Annals of Science 225–48 (1994)
, with Robert Olby, “Rediscovery as a Historical Concept,” in Rob Visser et al, eds., New Trends in the History of Science (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 197–208 .23 Alternative accounts are given by Michel Morange, Histoire de la biologie moleculaire (Paris: La Decouverte, 1994)
, and Andre Pichot, Histoire de la notion de gene (Paris: Flammarion, 1999) . For the concept of the blueprint as the plan (re-)written by its implementations, see Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), at pp. 1–2 .24 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger “Gene Concepts: Fragments from the Perspective of Molecular Biology,” in Buerton et al, The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution. Historical and Epistemological Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 219–239
. The observations in this paragraph are also indebted to Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things. Synthesising Proteins in the Test Tube (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) , especially as regards the notion of the experimental concept as opus operatum and modus operandi.25 Crick, Of Molecules and Men (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), p. 10
.26 Ernst Mayr, “Cause and Effect in Biology,” 134 Science 1501, 1501 (1961)
.27 Id, at 1504.
28 C.S. Pittendrigh, “Adaptation, Natural Selection and Behaviour,” in A Roc and G.G. Simpson, eds., Behaviour and Evolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 390–416
.29 Mayr, supra note 26 at 1504.
30 For this phrase, see the following section.
31 This technique was one of the factors which facilitated the rapid sequencing of the human genome. Cf the statement made by a senior representative of the biotechnology firm Genentech to the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives: “the utility of a particular gene or polypeptide rarely can be demonstrated until there has been sufficient characterisation of the function of a gene or its expression product, including through relevant biological assays. In most instances, the ability of a person skilled in this art to make predictions of utility for a polypetide based on homology alone will be extremely limited.” The statement, made on July 13, 2000, is available at <www.house.gov/judiciary/henn0713.htm>).
32 On this theme, see Luhmann, Ecological Communication (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988)
.33 If this “therefore” seems peremptory or unjustified, it might seem less so in the light of e.g., Karin Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
.34 For the full citation, see the following section.
35 Loi No 94–654 du 29 juillet 1994, art 23.
36 More precisely: “opinions on the ethical problems raised by scientific advances in the domains biology, medicine, and health.”
37 This is one way of interpreting Yan Thomas, “Le sujet de droit, la personne et la nature,” Le Débatx 100 (1998) 85–107
.38 See Paul Rabinow, French DNA. Trouble in Purgatory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 125
.39 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx. L’Etat de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale (Paris: Galilée, 1993), pp. 147–148
; tr. 183–184.40 CCNE, Avis sur la non-commercialisation du génome humain, No 27, 2 December 1991. English translations are available on the CCNE’s website: www.ccne.fr.
41 For this kind of gloss, see generally Bernard Edelman, La personne en danger (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999)
.42 Henri Atlan, “Biological Medicine and the Survival of the Person” 8 Science in Context 265, 277 (1998)
.43 The observation of Daniel Cohen, the head of the French genetics corporation, CEPH, cited in Rabinow, supra note 38 at 65.
44 CCNE, Avis sur l’avant-projet de loi portant transposition, dans le code de la propriété intellectuelle de la directive 98/44/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, en date du 6 juillet 1998, relative à la protection juridique des inventions biotechnologiques, No 64, 8 June 2000.
45 CCNE, Avis sur la non-commercialisation du génome humain, No 27, 2 December 1991.
46 See the argument of Yan Thomas in “Le sujet de droit, la personne et la nature” (1998) 100 Le Débat 85–107
.47 Bernard Edelman, La personne en danger (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), at p. 481
.48 CCNE, Avis sur la non-commercialisation du genome humain, No 27, 2 décembre 1991.
49 I borrow this formula from the chapter with the same heading in Giorgio Agamben, L’ouvert. De l’homme et de l’animal (Paris: Rivages, 2002)
; the same chapter informs the discussion in this section.50 To borrow Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s term again.
51 In the sense that this term is used throughout e.g., Gilles Deleuze, Le pli (Paris: Minuit, 1988)
.52 On complexities of Kant and the question of persons/things, see Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), esp. chapter 2
.53 Note the early modern European practice of consuming “mummy,” which suggests rather different attitudes to the body, see Gordon-Grube, “Anthropophagy in Post-Renaissance Europe: The Tradition of Medicinal Cannibalism,” 90 American Anthropologist 405 (1988)
.54 “To acquire and retain possession of property it was necessary to establish both animus —intention, knowledge and will — and corpus — the real or corporeal element of mastery. A master’s possessory animus could radiate far into the distance, grasping any available object in the world. However, his ability to implement this possessory intention being restricted to the things which he was capable of occupying through his own body, and therefore to areas over which he exercised factual control, it was necessary to find some way of getting beyond the limits which the reality of the body imposed upon the free run of possessory intent. The latter was supplemented by servile dependants whose animus was not autonomous and whose bodies were therefore treated as limbs at the disposal of someone else’s juridical intention. Thus the scope of a single subject’s possessory action was increased to the extent that these dependants extended his coverage of the ground. The animus of the master animated not only his own body but, beyond that, those of his slaves, as though they were limbs controlled by a single will. Traditionally, of course, slaves were thought of as instruments, and this subordination fitted them to a ministerial or subordinate function. More precisely, the juridical theory of possession through both will and body, because it severed each of the latter elements from the other, made of the slave a being who increased the intentional capacity of the master,” Yan Thomas, “L’Institution civile de la cité,” Le Débat 23 (1993), p. 41
.55 The remainder of this paragraph is closely informed by Olivier Cayla & Yan Thomas, Du droit de ne pas naître (Paris: Seuil, 2002)
.56 Again, see Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988)
on this question.57 See Marilyn Strathern, “Losing out on intellectual resources” (forthcoming): “In a wonderfully illogical but perfectly sensible way, at the very juncture when through detachment it could be regarded as having ceased to be a part of the body, the tissue or organ is reconstituted neither as a whole entity in itself nor as an intrinsic part of a previous whole. Colloquially, it is, somehow, a free-standing part.” So what is kept alive in this nomenclature is the process of detachment itself: it would seem that for so long as its detachability from the person remains evident it can be thought of as a ‘thing’ — but not to the lengths of a ‘whole thing.’”
58 This latter strategy is what is suggested in Jean-Christophe Galloux, “L’utilisation des matériels biologiques humains: vers un droit de destination?” Receuil Dalloz (Chronique) (1998), pp. 13–18. A droit de destination is the right attributed to authors (under the regime of droit d’auteur) to determine the conditions on which a work can be published or exploited.
59 CCNE, Avis sur fin de vie, arrêt de vie, euthanasie, No 63, 27 January 2000.
60 Ibid, section 2.3 — “Le refus de l’acharnement thérapeutique.”
61 On this notion of survival, see Michel Foucault, Il faut défendre la société (Paris: Gallimard/ EHESS, 1997), pp. 213–235
; Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999), esp chapter 2 .62 Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy (Cambridge: Polity, 1992)
. See also Jean-Claude Kauffman, Ego. Pour une sociologie de l’individu (Paris: Nathan, 2001) .63 Niklas Luhmann, Love as Passion (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), pp. 25–26
.64 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 150–153
: “While the greatest achievement of Heidegger’s philosophical genius was to have elaborated the conceptual categories that kept facticity from presenting itself as a fact, Nazism ended with the incarceration of factical life in an objective racial determination and, therefore, with the abandonment of its original inspiration.”65 Marilyn Strathern, “Enabling Identity? Biology, Choice, and the New Reproductive Technologies,” in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, eds., Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996), p. 48
.66 Georges Canguilhem, “Thérapeutique, experimentation, résponsabilité,” [1959], reprinted in Etudes d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences (Paris: Vrin, 1979), pp. 383–391
, at p. 383.67 See id. at p. 384: “Modern therapies seem to have lost sight of all the natural norms of organic life. Often, and without any express reference to the particular norms of well-being of a given patient, the social and legal circumstances of medicine’s role in society lead it to treat the human being [le vivant humain] as a substance upon which anonymous norms, which are considered to be superior to spontaneous individual norms, can be imposed.”
68 See Richard C Strohman, “The complexity of bioethics,” 19 Nature Biotechnology 1007 (2001)
.69 Bernard Edelman, “Expérimentation sur l’homme: une loi sacrificielle,” La Recherche 235 (1991) 1056–1065, p. 1058
.70 The most cited example is the original Microsoft operating system.
71 See, e.g., D. Perry, “Patients’ voices. The powerful sound in the stem cell debate,” 287 Science 1423 (2000)
.72 See Maurice Cassier and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Contre l’appropriation des genes,” Libération, 28 June 2000
.73 The Guardian, 17 January 2000.
74 See generally Kaja Finkler, Experiencing the New Genetics (Pennsylvania University Press, 2000)
.75 Ted Peters, “Embryonic Stem Cells and the Theology of Dignity,” in Suzanne Holland et al, eds., The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 128
.76 Pierre Legendre, supra note 11 at 82.
77 Yan Thomas, “Le sujet de droit, la personne et la nature,” supra note 12 at 95.
78 See especially Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge (Boston: Shambala, 1988)
.79 CCNE, Consentement éclairé et information des personnes qui se prêtent à des actes de soin ou de recherche, Avis No 58, 12 June 1998.
80 Id.
81 Id.