Abstract
The nature of the international trade in secondhand clothes is such that the Igbo importer in West Africa cannot know what specific items of clothing are packed in the bales supplied to him from Britain. Since he is not there to pick and select at the sorting factory of his supplier, how is he assured of the quality of the clothes he is importing? The question of information asymmetry is at the heart of this article. An empirical description is provided here of what goes on within an international network of traders in secondhand clothes in relation to quality assurance on items of clothing that cannot be viewed by the importer until the bales are opened up in West Africa. Such assurance is shown to depend on certain practices in the trade, especially the seconding of an apprentice from the shop of the Igbo importer to the sorting factory of the British supplier. The article also explores how the commercial problem of quality assurance is resolved through relationships of trust and cooperation. Importers jostle to establish such relationships with suppliers that understand the subjective as well as pragmatic factors determining the quality of secondhand clothing imported into the West African market from Britain.