Editor's Introduction

Abstract

Rebelling against the overused phrase, "we are in a decade of transition," a wag once defined a decade of transition as any ten-year period occurring in the middle of two other decades of transition. To borrow another phrase, what we have in this issue of Russian Politics and Law is a failure to transition. The economic crisis of 17 August 1998, involving Russia's de facto default on international debts and attendant ruble devaluation, appeared at the time to mark finis to the first stage of the postcommunist transition, just as the August 1991 coup attempt seemed to usher in an entirely new era in Russian history. But all in all, the persistence of Russian institutions and habits seems nearly as impressive as their radical uprooting seemed in 1991. In our first article, Vladimir Petukhov and Leontii Byzov ("A Year After the Crisis") cite survey research showing that the August 1998 economic crisis was not quite the political-economic disaster that it seemed to be. At least, the authors estimate that one-third of the workforce (not population) in mid-1999 was still in the middle class. Moreover, half the population still favors a transition to the market economy. Neither extreme right-wing nor extreme left-wing movements have surged in popularity. Considering the provocation, this alone is a notable achievement. Petukhov and Byzov's other findings include the fact that among Russian institutions only the Russian Orthodox Church and the army enjoy positive levels of trust, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn remains the fourth most trusted figure in public life.