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Original Article

Group: The More Primitive Psychology?

A Review of Some Paradigms in Group Dynamics

Pages 238-246 | Received 25 May 1971, Published online: 06 Jul 2009
 

SYNOPSIS

Comment is made on the concept of “paradigm” in contrast with the attitude of mind implicit in Husserl's “phenomenological reduction”. Merleau-Ponty's development of Husserl's phenomenology brings into focus our intersubjective enmeshment with a shared world, a view denied by traditional emphasis on individuality and objectivity.

An outline of the origins of group life and individual valency is sketched by consideration of child development and object-relations theory, broadened by the insights of R. D. Laing. W. R. Bion's formulations on the work and basic assumption groups are seen as a description of the group expression of primal patterns of instinctual life.

R. Schindler of Vienna has distinguished pre-group from group and has described the binding power of the group's opponent (G) function. His description of fixated group positions represents a sophistication of the ethological concept of pecking-order. This institutionalization is seen as a step in the formation, maturation and decay of a group's structure. Some interrelation is seen between Bion's and Schindler's ideas.

The relevance of these dynamic models of the natural history of groups to interpretative technique is discussed, leading to a consideration of H. Ezriel's analysis of the common group tension into required, avoided and calamitous relationships.

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