ABSTRACT
An argument derived from a recent research publication is presented that states that the most innovative pharmaceutical products are most likely to bear the brunt of any form of legislative price control measures imposed on the industry. It is further argued that the development of these innovative products is more likely to be the result of the adoption of riskier research and development strategies than the strategies that produce less innovative products. The consequence of legislative price controls is then presented as a slowdown in the rate of innovation, or a stalling of the “innovation engine” that is the pharmaceutical industry. Because this reduction in innovation occurs many years after research allocation decisions are made, the cost of price controls is shifted forward to future generations, making the imposition of price controls both politically attractive and politically feasible, despite the inability to withdraw or redress a decision of this nature with future financial support. It is then argued that the academic community of researchers and educators in the social and administrative pharmaceutical sciences (especially pricing and policy) has a responsibility to make the public aware of the complexities of the pharmaceutical market so that any long-term decision reached by society is an informed one.