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Abstract
The paper discusses the identity-building power and motivational force of patriotism. The basic idea underlying the discussion is that far from being a mere irrational and destructive force, patriotism is an expression of ‘existing human social identity.’ Thus, it argues that rather than dismissing patriotism altogether as an undesirable and/or irrational phenomenon, we need to understand how to discriminate between alternative forms of patriotism while investigating what constitutional reforms might be required to support those forms of patriotic identification that are morally desirable. I argue that to flourish, desirable forms of patriotism (what I call Ethical Patriotism) require a political milieu where forms of subsidiarity, functional representation and local participation combine to produce a more democratic and decentralized system of governance. Applied to a post-national polity like the EU, this conclusion invites to rethink the European constitutional project so as to make it less elitist and more open to influence and participation from below.
Acknowledgements
This article originates as a conference paper delivered at the GARNET-JERP 5.2.1 final conference ‘The Europeans. The European Union in Search of Political Identity and Legitimacy,’ Florence, 25 and 26 May 2007. I would like to thank the discussant, Klaus Eder and the conference organizer, Furio Cerutti, for their critical observations. I am also grateful to three anonymous reviewers and the journal's editorial team for helping me identify several conceptual obscurities. A special thank goes to Alan Scott for his continuous encouragement and support throughout. Any error rests of course with the author.
Notes
1. Jean Jacques Rousseau's remarks on patriotism are mostly confined to the Discourse on Political Economy (1755), the dedicatory letter of A Discourse on Inequality (1754) and the Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772). French originals now in, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, ed. C.E. Vaughaned (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915).
2. Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, in The Social Contract and the Discourses, by J.H. Brumfitt and J.C. Hall, ed. and trans. G.D.H. Cole (London: Everyman's Library, 1993), 198.
3. Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, in The Social Contract, 142.
4. Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’, 301.
5. For a restatement of Hobbes’ compliance problem in game theoretical terms, see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
6. As Anthony Smith explains, for the counter-revolutionaries,
The key to society was authority and the root of social authority was religion. Take away religion, and you remove the one sure foundation of social order and individual happiness. Only religion could ensure community between heterogeneous men and women; only full assent to its supernaturally-backed values and norms could give everyone the sense of belonging, of solidarity, which was man's basic need. Anthony Smith, ‘Nationalism and Classical Social Theory’, British Journal of Sociology 34, no. 1 (1983): 28.
7. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 46–7.
8. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 499–500. For the game theoretical reading of Hume's account of conventions, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) and David Lewis, Convention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
9. Emile Durkheim's reflections on patriotism are to be found in his war time writings, Germany above All: German Mentality and the War (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1915) and the posthumous Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (London: Brookfield, 1957).
10. David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1985), 127. For Max Weber's remarks on patriotism, see From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, ed. H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (London: Routledge, 1948), 77–128, 171–79 and Weber: Political Writings, ed. P. Lassman and R. Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–28, 309–69.
11. Ernest Gellner, ‘Nationalism and Modernization’, in Nationalism, ed. J. Hutchinson and A.W. Smith (Oxford: OUP, 1994), 61, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). See also, the complementary work of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).
12. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985), ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’ in Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. D. Matravers and J. Pike (London: Routledge, 2003), 286–300; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, Political Theory 12, no. 1 (1984): 81–96, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), ‘America's Search for a New Public Philosophy’, Atlantic Monthly 277, no. 3 (1996): 57–74; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995—in particular: ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, 181–203 and ‘The Politics of Recognition’, 225–56), ‘Atomism’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 187–210; Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (New York: Clarion Book, 1970), Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), ‘Nation and Universe’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Brasenose College, Oxford University, May 1 and 8 1989), ‘Citizenship’, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. T. Ball, J. Farr and R.L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 211–19, ‘Response to Veit Bader’, Political Theory 23, no. 2 (1995): 247–49.
13. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 220, 221.
14. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 221; Whose Justice, 68.
15. Michael Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic’, 86.
16. Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic, 90.
17. Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 187.
18. Michael Sandel clearly acknowledges the diverse political implications derivable from the communitarian critique of liberalism:
On some issues the two theories [liberalism and communitarianism] may produce different argument for similar policies. […] On other issues, the two ethics might lead to different policies. Communitarians would be more likely to ban pornographic bookstores, on the grounds that pornography offends its way of life and the values that sustain it. But a politics of civic virtue does not always part company with liberalism in favor of conservative policies. Michael Sandel, ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, The New Republic May 7(1984): 17.
The indeterminacy of Michael Sandel's republicanism is discussed by Pettit, ‘Reworking Sandel's Republicanism’, Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 73–96. I argue that to avoid supporting conservative values and policies, communitarians like Michael Sandel needs to spell out what type of patriotic identification is compatible with the progressive public philosophy he advocates. The taxonomy I propose here represents a contribution to this clarification.As for the communitarians’ support for the nation-state, quoting approvingly Nisbet, Friedman stresses ‘the communitarians’ surprising indifference to ‘the groups, associations, and localities in which we actually spend our lives’. Generally speaking, the communities with which communitarians are concerned are not families, friendships, neighborhoods, or even other arenas of close human association, but nation-states, Friedman, ‘The Politics of Communitarianism’, Critical Review 8, no. 2 (1994): 298. Admittedly, on this point the textual evidence is more ambiguous. In the conclusion to Democracy's and ‘America's Search’, where he explicitly refers to the nation-state, Sandel recognizes the drawbacks the nationalization of American politics occurred in the early decades of the 20th century had on self-government. However, he seems to view positively the fact that ‘the primary form of political community had to be recast on a national scale’, for ‘Only a strong sense of national community could morally and politically underwrite the extended involvements of a modern industrial order’ Democracy's, 340. See also note 33.
19. One of the main exponents of this historiography is A.D. Smith, whose conception of national identity is strikingly communitarian: ‘Nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its members to its collective “self,” so that it, and they, obey only the “inner voice” of the purified community. Authentic experience and authentic community are therefore, preconditions of full autonomy, just as only autonomy can allow the nation and its members to realize themselves in an authentic manner’, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 77.
20. Viroli, For Love of Country (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), Repubblicanesimo (Roma: Laterza, 1999 exp. Ch. VI), ‘Nazionalismo e patriottismo’, Il Mulino 3, maggio-giugno (1993). The distinction has a longer and problematic history behind. Since its reintroduction in literature by Hans Khon (it was originally proposed by Ernst Troeltsch), it has often been used to distinguish between Western and Eastern forms of nationalism. Hans Khon, The Idea of Nationalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1944). Viroli employs it to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism and stress the role of political ties and values against ethno-cultural ties and values. However, I find even Viroli's redefinition both analytically unclear and heuristically unhelpful. First, his account lacks consistency and is often contradictory. Second, he's unable to spell out the dynamics of identification that characterizes and distinguishes patriotism from nationalism. The taxonomy I propose below shows that some ideal-types of patriotism cut across the alleged divide. My account also differs from Viroli in that I do not attempt to connect my defense of Ethical Patriotism to a republican conception of liberty as non-domination. The value I attribute to participation rests on its educational and identity-building force. This point cannot unfortunately be dealt properly here.
21. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, ‘What I am […] is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not one of the bearers of a tradition,’ After Virtue, 221. Similar claims are stated by Michael Sandel, ‘As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself’ ‘The Procedural Republic’, 91.
22. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 33–4.
23. Michael Sandel, Liberalism, 179.
24. Michael Sandel, America's Search, 74.
25. Charles Taylor in discussing the politics of equal recognition for different culture seems to arrive to just such an attribution of rights, and noticing the paradox refuses to move further stating, ‘I am not sure about the validity of demanding this presumption as a right. But we can leave this issue aside, because the demand made seems to be much stronger’, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, 68.
26. The only reference I was able to find on this point is two brief passages in Michael Sandel, Liberalism, 63.
27. Michael Sandel, Liberalism, 150. To ‘discover’ the constitutive attachments of the self is, according to A.D. Smith, a process akin to founding out who we really are, and is epitomized by Oedipus’ tragic discovery of his identity: ‘Oedipus has a series of such role-identities—father, husband, king, even hero. His individual identity is, in large part, made up of these social roles and cultural categories—or so it would appear until the moment of truth. Then his world is turned upside down, and his former identities are shown to be hollow,’ National Identity, 3.
28. This seems to be the view subscribed by Ernest Renan for whom, ‘More valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to strategic ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of having, in the future, [a shared] program to put into effect.’ ‘What Is a Nation?,’ in Becoming National, ed. G. Eley and R.G. Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 52. The civic approach rests on what Bhirkhu Parekh calls a constructivist view of identity—‘a view which opposes both volitionalist and substantialist conceptions.’ ‘Discourses on National Identity’, Political Studies 42, no. 3 (1994): 504. Such a constructivism is epitomized by G.H. Mead. Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1934), and more recently by Alberto Melucci, ‘The Process of Collective Identity’, in Social Movements and Culture, ed. H. Johnston and B. Klandermans (London: UCL Press, 1995), 41–63.
29. See Georg Simmel, ‘The Intersection of Social Spheres’, in Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European, ed. P.A. Lawrence (Sunbury-on-Thames: Nelson, 1976), 95–110.
30. Nenad Miščević claims that the communitarians’ epistemology of the self supports a move from identification to identity. ‘Is National Identity Essential for Personal Identity?’, in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. Nenad Miščević (Chicago, IL: Open Court), 239–57. In my opinion civic patriotism suggest the need to operate a shift in reverse from identity to identification.
31. Here I follow the non-essentialist reading of Rousseau suggested by Viroli, For Love of Country.
32. Michael Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic’, 91.
33. As Friedman notes, Michael Sandel's and Charles Taylor's positions are more ambiguous. On the one hand, they base their critique of liberal deontology on a strong notion of community as constitutive of the self. When developing the positive aspects of their public philosophy, this conception of community is, on the other hand, revised to support multicultural political arrangements. ‘The Politics of Communitarianism’. Although, there is no room here to argue it properly, the same basic charge could apply to Michael Walzer as well. Cf. Veit Bader, ‘Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What is Wrong with Communitarianism?’, Political Theory 23, no. 2 (1995): 211–46. On the similarity and differences between communitarians and liberal nationalists, see also Vincent, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Communitarianism: An Ambiguous Association’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 43, no. 1 (1997): 14–27.
34. Alasdair MacIntyre implicitly assumes that the moral psychology employed to explain group loyalty and allegiance at group-level can also be employed to explain the national patriotism. Such an assumption is deeply problematic, though. As Stephen Nathanson explains,
if his communitarian conception of morality were correct […] the group to which our primary loyalty would be owed would […] be one's family, one's town, one's religion. The nation need not be the source of morality or the primary beneficial of our loyalty. […] the forging of nations has involved a huge effort to overcome the pull of diverse local attachments. Patriotism has had to compete with familial, tribal, racial, religious, and regional identity. Stephen Nathanson, ‘In Defense of “Moderate Patriotism”’, Ethics 99 (1989): 549.
Similar problems affect ethno-symbolists like A.D. Smith, who believe that modern national identities rest on pre-modern ‘ethnic cores.’ The collective identity of people who interact anonymously across community boundaries and that of those who interact non-anonymously in face-to-face contests must necessarily rest on diverse epistemologies of the self. Alasdair MacIntyre has acknowledged the validity of this criticism. Thus, he now maintains that,
the shared public goods of the modern nation-state are not the common goods of a genuine nation-wide community and, when the nation-state masquerades as the guardian of such a common good, the outcome is bound to be either ludicrous or disastrous or both. For the counterpart to the nation-state thus misconceived as itself as community is a misconception of its citizens as constituting a Volk, a type of collectivity whose bonds are simultaneously to extend to the entire body of citizenship and yet to be binding as the ties of kinship and locality. In a modern, large scale nation-state no such collectivity is possible and the pretence that it is always an ideological disguise for sinister realities. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (London: Duckworth, 1999), 132.
This acknowledgment raises, however, two further questions: first, how can we account for modern nationalism? and second, how can we promote patriotic identification within modern nation-states?
35. This change is well presented by Amin Maalouf in his discussion of the hypothetical case of an inhabitant of Sarajevo,
In 1980 or thereabout he might have said proudly and without hesitation, ‘I'm a Yugoslavian!’ Questioned more closely, he could have said that he was a citizen of the Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, incidentally, that he came from a traditionally Muslim family. […] twelve years later […] he might have answered automatically and emphatically, ‘I'm a Muslim!’ He might have grown the statutory beard. He would quickly have added that he was Bosnian, and would not have been pleased to be reminded of how proudly he once called himself a Yugoslavian. If he was stopped and questioned now, he would say first of all that he was a Bosnian, then that he was a Muslim. He'd tell you he was just on his way to the mosque, but he'd also want you to know that his country is part of Europe and that he hopes it will one day be a member of the Union. Amin Maalouf, On Identity (London: Harvill Press, 2000), 11.
36. Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’, 196–7.
37. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’, 299.
38. See http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/his/CoreArt/art/neocl_dav_oath.html
39. Anthony Smith, National Identity, 78. Smith also, notes that the contrast between family ties and patriotic sentiments also entails a conflict between gender-based worldviews, that between an ethics of duty and an ethics of care.
40. Sometimes, these two distinctions support opposite claims. For instance, according to Viroli: ‘Patriotism as the “love of political institutions,” the “common liberty of a people,” or “the republic” is exclusively civic or political and completely opposed to nationalism, which was forged in late 18th century Europe, assuming the existence of or striving for linguistic, cultural, religious, ethnic, or even racial unity, homogeneity, and purity,’ Veit Bader, ‘For Love of Country’, Political Theory 27, no. 3 (1999): 380. Reversing Viroli's reading, Bar-Tal contends that, ‘Nationalism relates to a specific content, focusing entirely on the fundamental goal to have a separate, distinct and independent nation-state […] in contrast, patriotism does not dictate the nature of political organization to a group. It is a more general and basic sentiment,’ Bar-Tal ‘Patriotism as Fundamental Beliefs of Group Members’, Politics and the Individual 3, no. 2 (1993): 51.
41. Leonard Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 128. As with Kohn's even this psychological distinction has a longer history behind. Similar claims were in fact put forward by J.S. Mill in his A System of Logic (London: Routledge, 1843), VI, §5, 561.
42. R. Kosterman and S. Feshbach, ‘Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes’, Political Psychology 10, no. 2 (1989): 271.
43. To limit myself to Viroli's, he first claims that ‘The theorists of republican patriotism attribute to the republic, viewed as a set of political institutions and ways of life based on these institutions, the highest political value’; two paragraphs later he points out that ‘this does not mean, however, that the republic is purely or essentially political, as distinct from the nation as a cultural entity’; and then clarifies that ‘This does not also mean that the idea of nation or the principle of nationality are opposed to republican patriotism,’ Viroli, Repubblicanesimo, 77, 78 (translation by the author, emphasis in original).
44. As Bader puts it discussing Viroli, ‘cultural diversity is good, unity is bad; patriots are the good guys and nationalists the bad ones,’ ‘Love of country,’ 383. Similar criticisms can be moved against attempts to distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘pseudo’ patriotism—T.W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson, and R.N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950)—or blind and enlightened patriotism—R.T. Schatz, E. Staub and H. Lavine, ‘On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind versus Constructive Patriotism’, Political Psychology 20, no. 1 (1999): 151–74. The taxonomy proposed not only aims at defending a preferred ideal-type of patriotism, Ethical patriotism, but also at separating and re-evaluating Protective and Hegemonic forms from their association with Jingoistic modes of identification.
45. Especially so when we use, as we currently do, the word ‘nation’ to refer to a nation-state. On the evolution of the term nation from its Latin origins indicating a non-political ‘native community of foreigners’—something larger than a family but smaller than a clan (stirps) or a people (gens)—to its actual meaning referring to extended territorial states ruling over allegedly homogeneous ethnic groups, see Zernatto, ‘Nation: the History of a Word’, Review of Politics 6, no. 3 (1944): 351–66.
46. Polities like Athens and Sparta, civitas like Rome and Alba and the Italian Renaissance republics are notable historical examples. As Viroli himself notes, Florentine 15th century patriotism was also a celebration of the city's military and civic superiority. The Florentine expression ‘better a dead corpse inside than a Pisan outside your door’ still in use today is a graphic indication of inter-communal hatred between Italian principalities and republics. Alasdair MacIntyre also notes that:
A variety of such peoples—Scottish Gaels, Iroquois Indians, Bedouin—have regarded raiding the territory of their traditional enemies […] as an essential constituent of the good life; whereas the settled urban or agricultural communities which provide a target for their depredation have regarded the subjugation of such peoples and their reduction to peaceful pursuits as one of their central responsibilities. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?,’ 289.
The essays collected in Ethnicity. Theory and Experience, ed. N. Glazer and D. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), supply plentiful other examples—see in particular Horowitz's contribution to the volume.
47. This is eminently the case of Chantal Mouffe, who superimposes the Schmittian account to a polycentric model of identity very much like the one I advocate here. Cf. Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993).
48. For non-Western examples, see in particular the Makario Sakay's Republic of Katagalugan, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 154.
49. As Benedict Anderson notes, ‘official nationalism was typically a response on the part of threatened dynastic and aristocratic groups—upper classes—to popular vernacular nationalism. Colonial racism was a major element in that conception of “Empire” which attempted to weld dynastic legitimacy and national community,’ Imagined Communities, 150. On nationalism as a strategy of internal and external colonization, see T.K. Oomen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge: Polity, 1997) and Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Reconstituting the Modern State’, in Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings, ed. J. Anderson (London: Routledge, 2002), 39–55. The social Darwinian attempts to establish cultural hierarchies among peoples, races and social classes in the second half of the 19th century are the ironic target of Matthew Kneale's novel English Passengers.
50. Cf. A.W. Marx, Faith in Nation. Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
51. On these movements, see D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell ed., Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy, (London: Palgrave, 2007). For their 19th predecessors, see Eric Hobsbawm, Nation and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), who attributes the rising of this form of patriotism to three main causes:
the resistance of traditional groups threatened by the onrush of modernity, the novel and quite non-traditional classes and strata now rapidly growing in the urbanizing societies of developed countries, and the unprecedented migrations which distributed a multiple diaspora of peoples across the globe, each strangers to both natives and other migrant groups, none, as yet, with the habits and conventions of coexistence. (109)
Protective Patriotism also emerge within communities who are drained by migration flows. For migration affects their ability to reproduce their way of life as much as immigration does at the receiving end.
52. The term derives from the refrain of a 1887 song supporting Lord Beaconsfield's anti-Russian policy. The refrain conveys both a sense of superiority and a militaristic readiness to act upon it: ‘We don't want to fight/But, by Jingo, if we do, /We've got the ships, /We've got the men, /We've got the money, too.’
53. Cf. Michael Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, 540ff.
54. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 124.
55. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 37.
56. Max Weber, From Max Weber, 176.
57. Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 75. Emile Durkheim's claims find support in current experimental social psychology. A. Mummendey, A. Klink and R. Brown. ‘Nationalism and Patriotism: National Identification and Out-group Rejection’, British Journal of Social Psychology 40 (2001): 171, for instance, argue that ‘it is at least possible to disconnect in-group favoritism and/or in-group identification from out-group devaluation. This might be the way to achieve a positive regard for and identification with, one's own country that is not dependent upon the disregard of other countries.’ Similar conclusions are reached by J.P de Figueiredo Jr. and Z. Elkins, ‘Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride,’ American Journal of Political Science 47 (2003): 171–88.
58. Historically, this form of patriotism has been at the core of European mutualist thought. Emile Durkheim in France and D.G.H. Cole in Britain are the main intellectual exponents. Interest in this tradition of thought has been renewed by the late Paul Hirst in Britain: The Pluralist Theory of the State (London: Routledge, 1989), From Statism to Pluralism (London: UCL Press, 1997), Associative Democracy. The Real Third Way (London: Frank Cass, 2001); and by Dominique Schnapper in France: Community of Citizens: on the Modern Idea of Nationality (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).
59. Cf. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism.
60. Cf. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Paul Lawrence, Nationalism. History and Theory (Harlow: Pearson, 2005); Josep Llobera, The God of Modernity (Oxford: Berg, 1994); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
61. Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’, 196–7.
62. Emile Durkheim, ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’, in Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society, ed. R.N. Bellah (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 54. Cosmopolitan like Habermas reverse this relation and justify only those patriotisms that have at their core liberal values. For him patriotism ought to be grounded in constitutions that ‘contextualize the same universal principles, popular sovereignty and human rights, from the perspectives of its own particular history.’ Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, in Id. The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 118.
63. Cf. Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).
64. Cf. Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’.
65. Michael Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic’, 91.
66. Sylvia Walby, ‘Woman and Nation’, in Nationalism. Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 1509.
67. Concerning the ‘citizens of a state who declare that they personally have no enemies,’ Carl Schmitt remarks that, ‘Such declaration can at most say that he would like to place himself outside the political community to which he belongs and continue to live as a private individual only.’ In the footnote attached to this passage, Schmitt then explains that ‘in this case it is a matter for the political community somehow to regulate this kind of non-public, politically disinterested existence (by privileges for aliens, internment, extraterritoriality, permits of residence, concessions, laws for metics, or in some other way),’ The Concept of the Political, 51.
68. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1957).
69. See Note 51.
70. David Marquand, Decline of the Public (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 118. See John Gray, False Dawn. The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta, 1998), a book whose thesis (and self-delusion) is uncannily closed to Polanyi's.
71. Cf. R.N. Bellah R. Madsen, W.M. Sullivan, A. Swindler and S.M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996) and Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) for a contemporary restatement of these arguments.
72. This is evident in the unexpected convergence on the French ‘non’ of left-wing NGOs like ATTAC (Action pour une Tax Tobin d'Aide aux Citoyens) on an explicit anti-neoliberal platform. See Bernard Cassen, ‘Attac against the Treaty’, New Left Review 33 (2005): 27–33.
73. Cf. Richard Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union Citizenship: Belonging, Rights and Participation within the EU’, Citizenship Studies 12, no. 6 (2008): 597–611.
74. Benjamin Constant, ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns’, in Political Writings, ed. B. Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 321.
75. Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge: CUP, 2007).
76. Cf. Yasemin Soysal, ‘Postnational Citizenship: Reconfiguring the Familiar Terrain’, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, ed. K. Nash and Alan Scott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 333–41, ‘Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational Membership and the National State’, in Rethinking European Welfare, ed. J. Fink, G. Lewis, J. Clarke (London: Sage, 2001), 65–75.
77. Cf. Roger King, The Regulatory State in an Age of Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); A. La Spina and G. Majone, Lo stato regolatore (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000); Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003).
78. Cf. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: CUP, 1950).
79. Milestones of the neoliberal counter-revolution are: Isaiah Berlin ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Id. Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); F.A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (London: Routledge, 1976); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); and Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
80. Philosophically, the success of the neoliberal counter-revolution is marked by John Rawls’ discarding of his second principle of justice for being incompatible with the overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For a similar shift in relation to workfare, see Stuart White, ‘Social Rights and the Social Contract—Political Theory and the New Welfare Politics’, British Journal of Political Science 30 (2000): 507–32.
81. Richard Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union Citizenship’, 605.
82. John Rawls, Political Liberalism.
83. This Durkheimian theme is at the center of Paul Hirst, ‘Associative Democracy’, Dissent, Spring 1994: 241–7, and ‘Renewing Democracy through Associations’, Political Quarterly (2002): 409–21. See also Reiner Eichenberger and Bruno Frey, ‘Democratic Governance for a Globalized World’, Kyklos 55, no. 2 (2002): 265–88.
84. Cf. J.S. Dryzek, ‘Transnational Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 30–51.