Kinds of well-being: A conceptual framework that provides direction for caring

Abstract

This article offers a conceptual framework by which different kinds and levels of well-being can be named, and as such, provides a foundation for a resource-oriented approach in situations of illness and vulnerability (rather than a deficit-oriented approach). Building on a previous paper that articulated the philosophical foundations of an existential theory of well-being (“Dwelling-mobility”), we show here how the theory can be further developed towards practice-relevant concerns. We introduce 18 kinds of well-being that are intertwined and inter-related, and consider how each emphasis can lead to the formulation of resources that have the potential to give rise to well-being as a felt experience. By focusing on a much wider range of well-being possibilities, practitioners may find new directions for care that are not just literal but also at an existential level.

• Phenomenology
• well-being
• existential
• conceptual framework
• caring science
• care
• philosophy
• Heidegger

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Karin Dahlberg for helpful conversations and comments.

Notes

1. We cannot here pursue the continental philosophical reasoning behind this statement. Suffice to say that we do not just mean simply “subjective well-being”, but rather an understanding that is based on Heidegger's “Befindlichkeit” and further pursued in Merleau-Ponty's ideas. Here, experiential well-being is seen as a bodily informed phenomenon that speaks of our relation to Being. That is, it is an intentional bodily phenomenon that can tell us something authentic about ways of living in the world.

2. There are many different interpretations of Heidegger and the controversies concerning his earlier and later works. However in following Mugerauer, we have been encouraged by finding similar broad interpretations of Heidegger in other scholars such as Safranski (1999), Inwood (1999) and Moran (2000).

3. Previously, we have indicated that in “Being and Time”’ although homelessness is more profound than “at homeness”, in Heidegger's later work (particularly “Building, Dwelling and Thinking”; “Art and Space” and [Gelassenheit] “Discourse on Thinking”), he emphasizes at homeness more and more, even though this never eradicates homelessness, and we end that paper with how Heidegger finally raises the possibility of homecoming within the homeless (Todres & Galvin, 2010).

4. We acknowledge that these philosophers do not necessarily agree about the nature of these experiential domains and the differential roles that they play. In this respect, we mainly follow Heidegger and Boss in naming these domains but, following Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Ashworth (2003), on the notion of “self-hood”, we have found it useful to add the dimension we call “identity” as it provides a helpful nuance to our theory of well-being.

5. We acknowledge that the Heidegger of “Being and Time” emphasizes futurity (as we emphasize in our section on temporal mobility). However, there are indications, following Mugerauer, that in Heidegger's later works on the topics of Dwelling and Gelassenheit, “to stand in the clearing” had a present-centred emphasis, even though none of the three ecstasies of time are ever alone or without one another.