Abstract
It has been argued that there are obligations, or virtues and vices, that pertain uniquely to architectural practice. Thus Jack Sammons has argued that the moral failings of the Nazi architect Albert Speer were failings specific to him as an architect (qua architect). I argue that Sammons’ account misappropriates ideas about the virtues from Alasdair MacIntyre and for that and other reasons does not succeed. Nonetheless it may be possible to support the idea that there can be a specifically architectural ethics. I comment briefly on Heidegger's notion of ‘dwelling’ in trying to indicate what might be involved in such an ethics.
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Norman Lillegard
NORMAN LILLEGARD
Professor emeritus of philosophy, University of Tennessee, Martin, 38238 Tennessee, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
Visiting Professor of philosophy, Minzu University, Beijing, PRC. Visiting Professor of philosophy, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, PRC.
Author of works on ethics, including The Moral Domain (Oxford, 2010), aesthetics, the history of philosophy, including A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford, 2002, co-author James Fieser) and On Epicurus (Wadsworth, 2003), Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind.