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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Volume 88, 2010 - Issue 3
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Articles

Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial

Robert Schroer Arkansas State University
Pages 505-522 | Received 01 Feb 2009, Published online: 21 Aug 2009

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Christopher F. Masciari & Peter Carruthers. (2020) What explains the “hard” problem of consciousness?. Cognitive Neuropsychology 37:3-4, pages 209-212.
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Derek Lam. (2019) Metaphysics of quantity and the limit of phenomenal concepts. Inquiry 62:3, pages 247-266.
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Henry Taylor. (2018) Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96:1, pages 53-66.
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E. Diaz-Leon. (2016) Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque. Philosophical Psychology 29:8, pages 1186-1199.
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Alex Moran. Grounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-24.
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Articles from other publishers (19)

Andrew Y. Lee. (2023) Knowing what it's like. Philosophical Perspectives.
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Marcelino Botin. (2023) Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Philosophical Studies 180:7, pages 1829-1848.
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Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski. (2021) Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives. Res Philosophica 98:3, pages 499-508.
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François Kammerer. (2019) The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese 198:1, pages 845-866.
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Antonin Broi. (2020) Revelation and Phenomenal Relations. The Philosophical Quarterly 70:278, pages 22-42.
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François Kammerer. (2018) Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10:4, pages 649-667.
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. 2019. The Knowledge Argument. The Knowledge Argument.
. 2019. Conscience et matière. Conscience et matière 515 528 .
Philip Woodward. (2017) A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties. Acta Analytica 33:1, pages 121-143.
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Marc ChampagneMarc Champagne. 2018. Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs. Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs 51 77 .
Kelly Trogdon. (2016) Revelation and physicalism. Synthese 194:7, pages 2345-2366.
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Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou. (2016) Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind & Language 31:5, pages 580-611.
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Philip Goff. (2016) Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem. Erkenntnis 81:4, pages 881-898.
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Bénédicte Veillet. (2015) The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge. Philosophical Studies 172:11, pages 2955-2974.
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Keith Allen. (2014) Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument from Structure. Minds and Machines 25:2, pages 193-212.
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MARC CHAMPAGNE. (2013) Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity instead of Indexicality. Dialogue 53:1, pages 135-182.
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Philip Goff. 2014. New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. New Waves in Philosophy of Mind 3 20 .
Philip Goff. 2014. Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience 75 91 .
Robert Schroer. (2013) Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?. Dialectica 67:4, pages 561-577.
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