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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Volume 95, 2017 - Issue 3
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Articles

In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

Stephanie LearyRutgers University
Pages 529-542 | Received 17 Aug 2015, Published online: 09 Oct 2016

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Artūrs Logins. (2024) How to argue with a pragmatist. Inquiry 67:1, pages 384-399.
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Cameron Boult. (2021) Pragmatism, truth, and cognitive agency. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-14.
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Stephanie Leary. (2020) Grounding the Domains of Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98:1, pages 137-152.
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Articles from other publishers (42)

Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof. (2024) Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again. Neuroethics 17:1.
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Michael Vollmer. (2024) In defence of object-given reasons. Philosophical Studies 181:2-3, pages 485-511.
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William Conner. (2024) Radical epistemology, theory choice, and the priority of the epistemic. Synthese 203:2.
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Sophie Keeling. (2022) Controlling our reasons. Noûs 57:4, pages 832-849.
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David Thorstad. (2023) Against the newer evidentialists. Philosophical Studies 180:12, pages 3511-3532.
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William Ratoff. (2023) How should predictive processors conceive of practical reason?. Synthese 202:5.
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Elizabeth Grace Jackson. (2021) A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager. Erkenntnis 88:6, pages 2315-2340.
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Darren Bradley. (2023) Reasons for Belief in Context. Episteme, pages 1-16.
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Miriam Schleifer McCormick. (2023) Engaging with “Fringe” Beliefs: Why, When, and How. Episteme, pages 1-16.
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Sophie Keeling. (2023) Accounting for doxastic agency: Mental action and self-awareness. Synthese 201:6.
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Marilie Coetsee. (2022) The Moral Duty Against Dogmatism. The Journal of Ethics 26:4, pages 563-589.
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Stephanie Leary. (2021) Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105:3, pages 657-676.
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Benjamin Kiesewetter. (2021) Are epistemic reasons normative?. Noûs 56:3, pages 670-695.
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Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini. (2020) No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed. Episteme 19:3, pages 337-352.
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Will Fleisher. (2022) Pursuit and inquisitive reasons. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 94, pages 17-30.
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David Horst. (2022) In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103:2, pages 232-258.
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Stephanie Leary. (2022) Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists. Synthese 200:3.
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Sebastian Schmidt. (2021) On believing indirectly for practical reasons. Philosophical Studies 179:6, pages 1795-1819.
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John Brunero. (2022) Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing. Synthese 200:2.
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Hamid Vahid. (2022) No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations. Synthese 200:2.
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Shawn Hernandez & N. G. Laskowski. (2021) Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆. Analytic Philosophy 63:1, pages 16-27.
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Heather Spradley. (2020) The ethics of believing out loud. Analytic Philosophy 63:1, pages 1-15.
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Anne Jeffrey. (2019) Hoping for Metanormative Realism. Erkenntnis 87:1, pages 1-15.
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Anthony Robert Booth. (2022) Ought to believe, simpliciter . Episteme, pages 1-13.
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Wolfgang Ertl. (2021) Preparing the Ground for Kant’s Highest Good in the World. Philosophia 49:5, pages 1837-1852.
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Alex Worsnip. (2021) From Impossibility to Evidentialism?. Episteme 18:3, pages 384-406.
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Léna Mudry. (2021) Two Shapes of Pragmatism. KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 35:2, pages 151-165.
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Anne Meylan. (2020) Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103:1, pages 199-216.
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Keshav Singh. (2019) Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief. Synthese 198:6, pages 5477-5494.
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Joona Auvinen. (2020) ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AIMS OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. Zygon® 56:1, pages 118-138.
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Patrick Bondy. (2019) The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief. Synthese 198:2, pages 1761-1781.
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A. K. Flowerree. (2019) Evidentialism in action. Philosophical Studies 177:11, pages 3409-3426.
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Christopher Howard. (2019) Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief. Philosophical Studies 177:8, pages 2227-2243.
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Barry Maguire & Jack Woods. (2020) The Game of Belief. The Philosophical Review 129:2, pages 211-249.
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Adam Shmidt. (2019) Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief. Philosophia 48:2, pages 763-776.
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Gregory Antill. (2018) Epistemic freedom revisited. Synthese 197:2, pages 793-815.
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Susanna Rinard. (2018) Believing for Practical Reasons. Noûs 53:4, pages 763-784.
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Selim Berker. (2019) A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief. Analytic Philosophy 59:4, pages 427-470.
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Miriam Schleifer McCormick. (2017) Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency. Erkenntnis 83:4, pages 627-645.
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Miriam Schleifer McCormick. 2018. Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Believing in Accordance with the Evidence 261 276 .
Teemu Toppinen. 2018. Metaepistemology. Metaepistemology 241 264 .
Angélique Thébert. (2017) A Permissivist Ethics of Belief. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy IX:2.
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