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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Volume 96, 2018 - Issue 3
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Articles

Inferential Transitions

Jake Quilty-DunnUniversity of OxfordView further author information
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Eric MandelbaumThe Graduate Center and Baruch College, CUNYView further author information
Pages 532-547 | Received 21 Aug 2016, Published online: 27 Aug 2017

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Brendan Balcerak Jackson. (2023) Inferential practical knowledge of meaning. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-29.
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Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen. (2022) Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism. Philosophical Psychology 35:8, pages 1212-1233.
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Xintong Wei. (2022) Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-27.
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Steven Gross. (2022) Is there an empirical case for semantic perception?. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-26.
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Jared Warren. (2022) Functionalism about inference. Inquiry 0:0, pages 1-25.
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Benjamin Winokur. Inferential self-knowledge reimagined. Philosophical Psychology 0:0, pages 1-21.
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Wade Munroe. (2024) What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:0.
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Joshua Shepherd. (2024) Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness. AI & SOCIETY.
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Michael Murez. (2023) The transparency of mental vehicles. Noûs.
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Dorit Bar‐On & Crispin Wright. 2023. Expression and Self‐Knowledge. Expression and Self‐Knowledge 334 343 .
Dorit Bar‐On & Crispin Wright. 2023. Expression and Self‐Knowledge. Expression and Self‐Knowledge 334 343 .
Wade Munroe. (2023) Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe. Episteme, pages 1-27.
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Zoe Jenkin. (2022) Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness. Noûs 57:2, pages 481-508.
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Nick Wiltsher. (2022) Imagination as a process. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106:2, pages 434-454.
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Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum. (2022) The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46.
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Zoe Jenkin. (2022) Crossmodal Basing. Mind 131:524, pages 1163-1194.
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J. Brendan Ritchie. (2022) Recognizing why vision is inferential. Synthese 200:1.
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Carlotta Pavese. (2021) Practical concepts and productive reasoning. Synthese 199:3-4, pages 7659-7688.
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Mason Westfall. (2020) Other minds are neither seen nor inferred. Synthese 198:12, pages 11977-11997.
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Jared Warren. (2020) Infinite Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103:2, pages 385-407.
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Katherine Ritchie. (2021) Essentializing inferences. Mind & Language 36:4, pages 570-591.
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Benedek Kurdi & Yarrow Dunham. (2021) Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences. Cognition 214, pages 104792.
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Wade Munroe. (2020) Reasoning, rationality, and representation. Synthese 198:9, pages 8323-8345.
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Luca Gasparri & Michael Murez. (2019) Hearing meanings: the revenge of context. Synthese 198:6, pages 5229-5252.
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Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum. (2020) The science of belief: A progress report. WIREs Cognitive Science 12:2.
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Jake Quilty‐Dunn. (2020) Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts. Mind & Language 36:1, pages 158-185.
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Jake Quilty‐Dunn. (2019) Perceptual Pluralism. Noûs 54:4, pages 807-838.
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Jake Quilty‐Dunn. (2020) Concepts and predication from perception to cognition. Philosophical Issues 30:1, pages 273-292.
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Gabbrielle M Johnson. (2020) The Structure of Bias. Mind 129:516, pages 1193-1236.
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Peter J. Graham. 2020. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology 93 123 .
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Jake Quilty‐Dunn. (2019) Attention and encapsulation. Mind & Language 35:3, pages 335-349.
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Zoe Jenkin. (2020) The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition. The Philosophical Review 129:2, pages 251-298.
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Eric Mandelbaum. (2019) Assimilation and control: belief at the lowest levels. Philosophical Studies 177:2, pages 441-447.
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Ulf Hlobil. (2018) We cannot infer by accepting testimony. Philosophical Studies 176:10, pages 2589-2598.
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Anna‐Sara Malmgren. (2018) VARIETIES OF INFERENCE?. Philosophical Issues 28:1, pages 221-254.
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Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum. (2017) Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science. Philosophical Studies 175:9, pages 2353-2372.
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