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Articles

Ideal rationality and hand waving

Pages 147-156 | Received 01 Mar 1988, Published online: 02 Jun 2006

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Earl Conee. (1994) Against an epistemic dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:4, pages 475-481.
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Wade Munroe. (2021) Evidentialism and Occurrent Belief: You Aren’t Justified in Believing Everything Your Evidence Clearly Supports. Erkenntnis 88:7, pages 3059-3078.
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Nick Leonard. (2021) Belief and rational indeterminacy. Synthese 199:5-6, pages 13523-13542.
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Thomas Raleigh. (2021) A new anti-expertise dilemma. Synthese 199:3-4, pages 5551-5569.
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Stefan Reining. (2015) ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISM. Episteme 13:3, pages 305-328.
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DAVID CHRISTENSEN. (2010) Higher‐Order Evidence 1 . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81:1, pages 185-215.
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Frederick Kroon. (1993) Rationality and epistemic paradox. Synthese 94:3, pages 377-408.
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