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Original Articles

Central bank independence: A political economy approachFootnote1

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Pages 235-264 | Accepted 01 Jul 1994, Published online: 23 Nov 2007

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Alasdair Roberts. (2011) Debate: The end of the guardians?. Public Money & Management 31:4, pages 232-233.
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Denis Saint-Martin & Christine Rothmayr Allison. (2011) Rationalism and public policy: Mode of analysis or symbolic politics?. Policy and Society 30:1, pages 19-27.
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Michael Tager. (2007) Central Bank Independence: A Research Note on the Case of the United Kingdom. The Social Science Journal 44:2, pages 359-366.
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James Forder. (2005) Why Is Central Bank Independence So Widely Approved?. Journal of Economic Issues 39:4, pages 843-865.
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Ole Therkildsen. (2004) Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of the Uganda Revenue Authority. Forum for Development Studies 31:1, pages 59-88.
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Stephen Bell. (2001) Open-economy Central Banking: Explaining Australia's Recommitment to Central Bank Independence. Australian Journal of Political Science 36:3, pages 459-480.
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. (2000) Independence in an Era of Globalisation: Central banking in developing countries. International Review of Applied Economics 14:4, pages 495-500.
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William Tompson. (1998) The politics of central bank independence in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies 50:7, pages 1157-1182.
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Articles from other publishers (16)

Adam Knight. (2021) Your word and your bond: Central Banks and sovereign lending in civil wars, 1815–1914. International Politics 58:6, pages 903-918.
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John Evemy. (2018) The Bank of England, operational independence and the financial crisis. British Politics 14:4, pages 347-371.
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Gregory T. Chin. (2013) Understanding Currency Policy and Central Banking in China. The Journal of Asian Studies 72:3, pages 519-538.
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Christopher Crowe. (2008) Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate. European Journal of Political Economy 24:4, pages 748-762.
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D. Maman & Z. Rosenhek. (2008) The contested institutionalization of policy paradigm shifts: the adoption of inflation targeting in Israel. Socio-Economic Review 7:2, pages 217-243.
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Christopher W. Crowe. (2006) Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. IMF Working Papers 06:256, pages 1.
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Alice Sindzingre. (2003) Liberalisation, Multilateral Institutions and Public Policies : The Issue of Sovereignty In Sub-Saharan Africa. Mondes en développement 123:3, pages 23.
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Stephen Bell. (2016) The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia. Political Studies 50:3, pages 477-496.
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Vishnu Padayachee. (2001) Central Bank transformation in a globalized world: the Reserve Bank in post-apartheid South Africa. Journal of International Development 13:6, pages 741-765.
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José Ripoll. (2003) Rogoff's Central Banker CUM Stability and Growth Pact: Mutually Reinforcing Institutions or a Cursed Overdose?. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Hyoung-kyu Chey & Yu Wai Vic Li. (2016) Bringing the Central Bank into the Study of Currency Internationalization: Monetary Policy, Independence, and Internationalization. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Josh Ryan-Collins. (2015) Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935-75. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Alasdair S. Roberts. (2014) Four Crises of Democracy: Representation, Mastery, Discipline, Anticipation. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Godfrey Uzonwanne. (2011) The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence and the Challenges for Development in African Economies. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Alasdair S. Roberts. (2009) The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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Christopher Crowe. (2008) Goal Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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