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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Volume 39, 2009 - Issue sup1: Supplementary Volume 35: Belief and Agency
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Original Articles

Believing at Will

PAMELA HIERONYMI
Pages 149-187 | Published online: 01 Jul 2013

Citations (31)

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Read on this site (4)

Sebastian Schmidt. (2022) Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 0:0, pages 1-17.
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Sarah K. Paul. (2015) The courage of conviction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45:5-6, pages 647-669.
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Rik Peels. (2015) Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93:3, pages 524-541.
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Julie Tannenbaum. (2015) Mere moral failure. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45:1, pages 58-84.
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Articles from other publishers (27)

Sophie Keeling. (2022) Controlling our reasons. Noûs 57:4, pages 832-849.
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David Domínguez. (2023) Unzipping the zetetic turn. Synthese 202:6.
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Nomy Arpaly. (2023) Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. Philosophical Issues 33:1, pages 22-32.
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Elizabeth Grace Jackson. (2021) A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager. Erkenntnis 88:6, pages 2315-2340.
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Sophie Keeling. (2023) Accounting for doxastic agency: Mental action and self-awareness. Synthese 201:6.
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Phillip Hintikka Kieval. (2022) Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will. Synthese 200:5.
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Sebastian Schmidt. (2021) On believing indirectly for practical reasons. Philosophical Studies 179:6, pages 1795-1819.
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Jennifer M. Morton. (2021) Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104:3, pages 728-746.
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A. K. Flowerree. (2019) Evidentialism in action. Philosophical Studies 177:11, pages 3409-3426.
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Blake Roeber. (2019) Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101:2, pages 415-431.
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Gregory Antill. (2018) Epistemic freedom revisited. Synthese 197:2, pages 793-815.
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Susanna Rinard. (2018) Believing for Practical Reasons. Noûs 53:4, pages 763-784.
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Elizabeth Grace Jackson. (2018) Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters. Philosophical Studies 176:9, pages 2477-2496.
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Anne Meylan. (2018) The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation. Erkenntnis 84:4, pages 877-893.
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Blake Roeber. (2019) Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will. Mind 128:511, pages 837-859.
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David Hunter. (2019) Belief: A Pragmatic Picture By Aaron Z. Zimmerman . Analysis 79:1, pages 180-183.
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Benjamin Wald. (2018) A New Defense of the Motive of Duty Thesis. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21:5, pages 1163-1179.
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John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter. (2017) Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 175:10, pages 2507-2537.
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. (2018) Références bibliographiques du fascicule. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger Tome 143:3, pages 407-416.
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Lindsay Rettler. (2017) In defense of doxastic blame. Synthese 195:5, pages 2205-2226.
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Conor McHugh. (2015) Attitudinal control. Synthese 194:8, pages 2745-2762.
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Benjamin McMyler. (2017) Requesting Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98:1, pages 70-88.
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Hagit Benbaji. (2015) What can we not do at will and why. Philosophical Studies 173:7, pages 1941-1961.
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A. K. Flowerree. (2016) Agency of belief and intention. Synthese.
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Karl Schafer. (2014) Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism. Synthese 191:12, pages 2571-2591.
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Aude Bandini. 2014. La reconstruction de la raison. La reconstruction de la raison.
Nishi Shah. (2013) WHY WE REASON THE WAY WE DO. Philosophical Issues 23:1, pages 311-325.
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