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Original Articles

Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons

Pages 213-248 | Published online: 01 Jul 2013

Keep up to date with the latest research on this topic with citation updates for this article.

Read on this site (4)

Stephanie Leary. (2020) Grounding the Domains of Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98:1, pages 137-152.
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Andrea Guardo. (2019) Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27:4, pages 515-527.
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett. (2017) Biological function and epistemic normativity. Philosophical Explorations 20:sup1, pages 94-110.
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Daniel Greco. (2015) Epistemological Open Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93:3, pages 509-523.
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Articles from other publishers (22)

Justis Koon. (2023) Recalibrating evolutionary debunking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett. (2022) Debunking Doxastic TransparencyOsporavanje doksastičke transparentnosti. European journal of analytic philosophy 18:1.
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Frank Hofmann. (2020) Is Evidence Normative?. Philosophia 49:2, pages 667-684.
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Lisa Warenski. (2019) Epistemic norms: truth conducive enough. Synthese 198:3, pages 2721-2741.
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Christos Kyriacou. (2019) Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic Skepticism. Acta Analytica 35:4, pages 543-561.
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Silvan Wittwer. (2019) Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt. Philosophical Studies 177:10, pages 2969-2983.
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William J. Talbott. (2019) Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?. Philosophical Studies 177:8, pages 2277-2298.
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Arnon Levy & Yair Levy. (2018) Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100:3, pages 491-509.
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Daniel Z. Korman. (2019) Debunking arguments. Philosophy Compass 14:12.
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Christos Kyriacou. (2017) Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized. Synthese 196:7, pages 2695-2713.
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Nathaniel Sharadin. (2016) Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence. Synthese 195:9, pages 3791-3809.
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Jane Friedman. (2018) Teleological epistemology. Philosophical Studies.
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Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna. 2018. Metaepistemology. Metaepistemology 217 239 .
Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna. 2018. Metaepistemology. Metaepistemology 1 14 .
Charles Côte-Bouchard. (2017) Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco. Manuscrito 40:4, pages 97-111.
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Robert C. Koons. (2017) The ontological and epistemological superiority of hylomorphism. Synthese.
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Christos Kyriacou. (2017) Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?. Philosophia 44:4, pages 1351-1366.
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Thomas Raleigh. (2016) Another Argument Against Uniqueness. The Philosophical Quarterly, pages pqw058.
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Daan Evers. (2015) Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons. Synthese 192:11, pages 3663-3676.
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Katia Vavova. (2015) Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass 10:2, pages 104-116.
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Christopher Cowie. (2014) In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191:16, pages 4003-4017.
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Toby Handfield. (2013) Genealogical Explanations of Chance and Morals. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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