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Articles

From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment

Pages 8-26 | Received 09 Dec 2012, Accepted 05 Jan 2013, Published online: 01 Jun 2015

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Matthew A. Leisinger. (2019) The Inner Work of Liberty: Cudworth on Desire and Attention. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27:5, pages 649-667.
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Sarah Hutton. (2017) Salving the phenomena of mind: energy, hegemonikon, and sympathy in Cudworth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25:3, pages 465-486.
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Articles from other publishers (5)

R.J.W. MillsR. J. W. Mills. 2021. The Religious Innatism Debate in Early Modern Britain. The Religious Innatism Debate in Early Modern Britain 97 116 .
HANNAH DAWSON. (2019) THE NORMATIVITY OF NATURE IN PUFENDORF AND LOCKE. The Historical Journal 63:3, pages 528-558.
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Samuel M. Kaldas. (2019) REASON, SENTIMENT, AND AUTONOMY IN THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF RALPH CUDWORTH. History of Philosophy Quarterly 36:2, pages 161-180.
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Sarah Hutton. 2017. The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy. The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy 245 256 .
Giovanni Gellera. (2017) English Philosophers and Scottish Academic Philosophy (1660–1700). Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15:2, pages 213-231.
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