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Philosophical Explorations
An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action
Volume 20, 2017 - Issue sup1: False but Useful Beliefs
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Original Articles

Biological function and epistemic normativity

Ema Sullivan-BissettPhilosophy Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UKCorrespondence[email protected]
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Pages 94-110 | Received 22 Nov 2016, Accepted 05 Dec 2016, Published online: 11 Apr 2017

Citations (14)

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Read on this site (1)

Ema Sullivan-Bissett. (2023) Virtually imagining our biases. Philosophical Psychology 36:4, pages 860-893.
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Articles from other publishers (13)

Michał Piekarski. (2022) Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms. Synthese 200:5.
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett. (2022) Debunking Doxastic TransparencyOsporavanje doksastičke transparentnosti. European journal of analytic philosophy 18:1.
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Mona Simion. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese 199:3-4, pages 10371-10388.
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Davide Fassio & Jie Gao. (2021) Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?. Synthese 199:3-4, pages 7031-7059.
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Jason Winning. (2020) Internal perspectivalism: the solution to generality problems about proper function and natural norms. Biology & Philosophy 35:3.
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof. (2019) The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief. Philosophical Studies 177:5, pages 1213-1227.
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Sophie Stammers. (2018) Confabulation, Explanation, and the Pursuit of Resonant Meaning. Topoi 39:1, pages 177-187.
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Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. (2018) Biased by our imaginings. Mind & Language 34:5, pages 627-647.
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Peter J. Graham. (2019) Why is warrant normative?. Philosophical Issues 29:1, pages 110-128.
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Benoit Gaultier. (2019) On the alleged normative significance of a platitude. Ratio 32:1, pages 42-52.
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett. (2017) Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?. Synthese 195:8, pages 3453-3476.
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Peter Clutton & Stephen Gadsby. (2017) Delusions, Harmful Dysfunctions, and Treatable Conditions. Neuroethics 11:2, pages 167-181.
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Wouter Floris KalfWouter Floris Kalf. 2018. Moral Error Theory. Moral Error Theory 119 156 .

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