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ABSTRACT
In this article, I discuss the criticisms raised against Thomas Kuhn’s Black-Body Theory. These criticisms concern two issues: how to understand Planck’s position with regards to the quantization of energy in 1901, and how to understand the book’s relation to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both criticisms, I argue, concern the notion of a paradigm: the first concerns how Boltzmann acted as an exemplar for Planck, and the second whether the book provides a paradigm change. I will then argue that both criticisms presume a conceptualization of paradigms that does not align well with Kuhn’s conceptualization of it in both Structure and later work: they assume, more specifically, that sharing a paradigm presupposes sharing an interpretation of it, and that paradigm changes are essentially identical to gestalt switches. On the basis of this, I will then argue that the criticisms are misguided, that Kuhn’s position regarding Planck’s work is in fact quite close to the indetermination-view developed by some of his critics, and that the book fits Structure quite well. In conclusion, I will then reflect on how the narrative provided in Black-Body Theory connects with Kuhn’s views on the relation between history and philosophy of science.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the organizers of the &HPS8 conference for the invitation to submit an earlier draft of this paper for feedback. The author would also like to thank the audiences of the 7th Young Researcher Day in Logic, Philosophy and History of Science, the History of Historical Sciences Workshop, and the students of the History of Science and Society Course (UAntwerpen) for their comments, questions, and feedback. The author would also like to thank two referees for comments and questions regarding an earlier version of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Third Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).
3 Thomas S. Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
4 Thomas S. Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912 Second Edition with a new Afterword (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).
5 Kuhn 1987, p. 350.
6 Kuhn 1987, p. 126.
7 Martin J. Klein and others, ‘Paradigm Lost? A Review Symposium’, Isis, 70.3 (1979), 429–440.
8 Olivier Darrigol, ‘Continuities and Discontinuities in Planck’s Akt der Verzweiflung’, Annalen der Physik, 9.11–12 (2000), 951–960; ‘The Historian’s Disagreement Over the Meaning of Planck’s Quantum’, Centaurus, 43.3–4 (2001), 219–239.
9 Massimiliano Badino, ‘The Odd Couple: Boltzmann, Planck and the Application of Statistics to Physics (1900–1913)’, Annalen der Physik, 18.2–3 (2009), 81–101; The Bumpy Road: Max Planck from Radiation Theory to the Quantum (1896–1906) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015).
10 Klein and others, 1979.
11 Jochen Büttner, Jürgen Renn and Matthias Schemmel, ‘Exploring the Limits of Classical Physics: Planck, Einstein, and the Structure of a Scientific Revolution’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 75.2 (2003), 37–59.
12 Adam Timmins, ‘Between History and Philosophy of Science: The Relationship between Kuhn’s Black-Body Theory and Structure’, HOPOS, 9 (2019), 371–387.
13 For other, mostly critical, reviews of Black-Body Theory along these lines, see John Nicholas, ‘T.S. Kuhn Black Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912’, Philosophy of Science, 49.2 (1978), 295–297; Peter Galison, ‘Kuhn and the Quantum Controversy’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 32.1 (1981), 71–85; and Joseph Agassi, ‘The Structure of the Quantum Revolution’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13.3 (1983), 367–381. More positive reminiscences can be found in Richard Staley, ‘On reading Kuhn’s Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912’, Shifting Paradigms: Thomas S. Kuhn and the History of Science, ed. by Alexander Blum, Kostas Gavroglu, Christian Joas and Jürgen Renn (Berlin: Edition Open Access, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, 2016), 203–210 and Norton M. Wise, ‘A Smoker’s Paradigm’, in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions at Fifty: Reflections on a Science Classic, ed. by Lorraine Daston and Robert J. Richards (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), pp. 31–41. For a discussion of the book’s reception, see Stephen G. Brush, ‘Thomas Kuhn as a Historian of Science’, Science and Education, 9 (2000), 39–58. For a discussion of how Black-Body Theory is to be situated within Kuhn’s career, see chapter 7 of K. Brad Wray, Kuhn’s Intellectual Path: Charting The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
14 At the time, thermal radiation claims were expressed in terms of either wavelength or frequency, with wavelength inversely proportional to frequency. Planck was the first to express such claims in terms of the frequency ν instead of the wavelength λ, Clayton A. Gearhart, ‘Planck, the Quantum, and the Historians’, Physics in Perspective, 4 (2002), 170–215, p. 176.
15 Kuhn 1987, p. 3. For a discussion of the experimental study of black bodies, see Dieter Hoffmann, ‘On the Experimental Context of Planck’s Foundation of Quantum Theory’, Centaurus, 43.3–4 (2001), 240–259.
16 For discussions of the theoretical and experimental context in which Wien’s distribution law and earlier attempts were formulated, see Hans Kangro, Vorgeschichte des Planckschen Strahlungsgesetzes: Messungen und Theorien der spektralen Energieverteilung bis zur Begründung der Quantenhypothese (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970) and Badino 2015, pp. 33–38.
17 Kuhn 1987, p. 25.
18 Kuhn 1987, p. 28.
19 For discussions of Planck’s use of such resonators, see Kuhn 1987, pp. 29–37, Badino 2015, pp. 41–45 and Suman Seth, Crafting the Quantum: Arnold Sommerfeld and the Practice of Theory, 1890–1926 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010), pp. 41–45.
20 Gearhart 2002, p. 175.
21 Kuhn 1987, p. 77.
22 Kuhn 1987, p. 67.
23 Kuhn 1987, p. 352. For discussion of Boltzmann’s approach, see Kuhn 1987, pp. 38–71 and Badino 2015, pp. 48–51 and pp. 65–71.
24 Kuhn 1987, p. 78.
25 Kuhn 1987, p. 84.
26 Kuhn 1987, p. 87.
27 Kuhn 1987, p. 352.
28 Kuhn 1987, p. 99.
29 Gearhart 2002, p. 180.
30 Kuhn 1987, p. 97.
31 Kuhn 1987, pp. 99–100.
32 While their size had to be fixed for calculations to be possible, the specific size was, for Boltzmann, of no importance, Kuhn 1987, p. 127.
33 Boltzmann took this case, where energy elements of fixed size are divided over individual molecules, to be a fictional one. He immediately showed that it could be made more realistic ‘by allowing the molecules to take on continuous values of energy’, Kuhn 1987, p. 49.
34 Badino 2015, p. 93.
35 Kuhn 1987, pp. 104–110.
36 Kuhn 1987, p. 105.
37 Kuhn 1987, p. 105.
38 Kuhn 1987, p. 104, 357–360.
39 Kuhn 1987, p. 128.
40 Kuhn 1987, p. 351.
41 Kuhn 1987, p. 126.
42 Max Planck, ‘Über das Gesetz der Energieverteilung im Normalspectrum’, Annalen der Physik, 4 (1901a), 553–563; ‘Über die Elementarquanta der Materie und der Elektrizität’, Annalen der Physik, 4 (1901b), 564–566; ‘Über irreversible Strahlungsvorgänge (Nachtrag)’, Annalen der Physik, 6 (1901c), 808–831.
43 Kuhn 1987, p. 116.
44 Kuhn 1987, p. 353.
45 Kuhn 1987, p. 117.
46 Kuhn 1987, p. 118.
47 Kuhn 1987, pp. 118–125.
48 Max Planck, Vorlesungen über die Theorie der Wärmestrahlung (Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1906).
49 Kuhn 1987, p. 117.
50 Kuhn 1987, p. 129.
51 Kuhn 1987, pp. 134–140. For an extensive discussion of the reception of Planck’s law, on which Kuhn based his discussion, see Elizabeth Garber, ‘Some Reactions to Planck’s Law, 1900–1914’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 7.2 (1976), 89–126.
52 Kuhn 1987, p. 144.
53 Kuhn 1987, pp. 144–147.
54 Kuhn 1987, p. 146.
55 Kuhn 1987, p. 150.
56 Kuhn 1987, p. 149. Many were critical of Jeans’s claims, such as Rayleigh himself, who criticized its reliance on the equipartition theorem, Kuhn 1987, pp. 148–149.
57 Kuhn 1987, p. 155.
58 Kuhn 1987, p. 159.
59 Kuhn 1987, pp. 166–169.
60 Kuhn 1987, p. 170.
61 Kuhn 197, pp. 183–184.
62 Kuhn 1987, pp. 188–189. The only other physicist to follow them was Max von Laue, equally young and unknown according to Kuhn.
63 Kuhn 1987, p. 191. Like Rayleigh, Lorentz had reservations about the application of the equipartition theorem in this case.
64 Kuhn 1987, p. 193.
65 Kuhn 1987, pp. 193–194.
66 Kuhn 1987, p. 195.
67 Kuhn 1987, p. 198.
68 Kuhn 1987, pp. 202–205.
69 Kuhn 1987, pp. 207–228.
70 Kuhn 1987, pp. 230–232. The Naturforscherversammlung was the yearly meeting of German natural scientists and doctors. See Querner, Hans and Schipperges, Heinrich, Wege der naturforschung 1822–1972 (Berlin: Springer, 1972) for an older historical discussion. For discussions of the Solvay Congress, see Diana Kormos Barkan, ‘The Witches’ Sabbath: The First International Solvay Congress in Physics’, Science in Context, 6.1 (1993), 59–82, Richard Staley, Einstein’s Generation: The Origins of the Relativity Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 397–422 and Seth 2010, pp. 139–173 (footnote 26).
71 Kuhn, 1987, pp. 102–103.
72 Kuhn 1987, pp. 235–244.
73 Kuhn 1987, p. 144.
74 Darrigol 2001 (footnote 8) offers an overview of the different positions.
75 Badino 2009 (footnote 9).
76 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel 2003 (footnote 11).
77 Darrigol 2001, p. 232.
78 Darrigol 2000, p. 957; 2001, p. 227, 233.
79 Badino 2009, pp. 85–86.
80 Badino 2009, p. 89.
81 Darrigol 2001, p. 233.
82 Badino 2009, p. 82.
83 Badino 2009, p. 86.
84 Kuhn 1987, p. 363.
85 Kuhn 1987, p. 363.
86 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel 2003, p. 40.
87 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel 2003, pp. 38–39.
88 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel, 2003, p. 39.
89 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel, 2003, p. 49.
90 Timmins 2019, p. 386.
91 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel 2003, p. 56.
92 Kuhn 1996, p. 174.
93 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 293.
94 Kuhn 1977, pp. xix–xx.
95 Kuhn 1996, pp. 176–182; 1977, p. 297.
96 Kuhn 1996, p. 10.
97 Kuhn 1996, p. 47.
98 Kuhn 1977, p. xix, 285.
99 Kuhn 1996, p. 44.
100 Kuhn 1996, p. 46.
101 Kuhn 1996, p. 185; 1997, p. 324; The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 134.
102 Kuhn 1996, p. 109.
103 Kuhn 1996, p. 94.
104 Kuhn 1996, p. 176; 1977, p. 294.
105 Kuhn 1987, p. 122.
106 Kuhn 1987, p. 78, 88, 121.
107 Kuhn 1987, pp. 117–118.
108 Kuhn 1987, pp. 104–105, 108–109, 117–118, 359.
109 Darrigol 2001, p. 234.
110 Kuhn 1987, p. 131.
111 Kuhn 1987, p. 131.
112 Kuhn 1987, p. 151.
113 Kuhn 1987, p. 150.
114 Kuhn 1987, p. 150.
115 Kuhn 1987, p. 151.
116 Timmins 2019, p. 379.
117 Büttner, Renn and Schemmel 2003, p. 49.
118 Kuhn 1996, p. 85.
119 Kuhn 1996, p. 85. As Kuhn pointed out, it was N.R. Hanson who introduced the notion of gestalt in his Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). Later on, he again stresses the differences between paradigm switches and gestalt switches, e.g. Kuhn 1996, pp. 111–114.
120 Kuhn 1996, p. 84.
121 Kuhn 1996, pp. 10–11, 43, 46, 94, 111, 163–173.
122 Kuhn 1996, p. 176; 1977, p. 278, 296, 308–309; 2003, p. 103, 131, 147.
123 Kuhn 1977, p. 294.
124 Kuhn 1996, p. 111.
125 Kuhn 1987, pp. 102–103, 155, 170, 235–244.
126 Kuhn 1987, pp. 206–232.
127 Kuhn 1996, p. 181.
128 Kuhn 1996, p. 7.
129 Kuhn 1977, pp. 3–20, 105–126, 127–161.
130 Kuhn 1977, p. 5.
131 Kuhn 1977, p. 5.
132 Kuhn 1977, pp. 5–6.
133 Brush 2000; Brad Wray 2021, p. 126 (see footnote 13 for the full references).
134 One interpretation that is quite in line with the one presented here was offered by Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 26–40. For other similar interpretations, see Lydia Patton, ‘Kuhn, Pedagogy, and Practice: A Local Reading of Structure’, in The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?, ed. by Moti Mizrahi (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p. 125, note 4.