ABSTRACT
Aid agencies have in recent years recalibrated their interventions to encompass social media technologies within their programmes. This uptake can in part be explained by the unprecedented opportunities for connectivity – and therefore scalability – that social media technologies allow for. This is particularly evident amongst aid organisations within the migration policy sector. Whilst the efficacy of such approaches remains contested, less attention has been devoted to how migrant associations instrumentalise social media for emancipatory purposes. This paper explores how migrant associations attain operational space and scale by combining social media’s connective capabilities with pre-established forms of relationality (reciprocity and patrimonialism). These two forms of connectivity amplify state effects and scalability, evidenced by how migrant assistance groups both emulate yet become antagonistic towards state authorities, which ultimately renders migration assistance unstable. Hence, social media’s scalability goes hand in hand with state emulation and contestation.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 I use pseudonyms throughout for persons, organisations, and places, except if they are on the public record.
2 For example, the ‘Golden Dream’ app, which is meant to function similar to ‘TripAdvisor’ in allowing migrants to rate employers, have only 5000 downloads, which is easily dwarfed by MAM’s 1 million Facebook followers.
3 Interviews with expatriate aid workers revealed limited awareness of how migrants use smartphones and social media. For example, the mere fact that many migrants do not download apps due to the prohibitive cost relating to data usage appears to be poorly understood amongst aid programmes.
4 The research was approved by the Australian National University’s research ethics committee (Protocol reference: 2012/521).
5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to extensively review the vast literature on moral economies, and patron–client relations in the Mekong region. The purpose of this essay is to show how such forms of sociality intersect with social media; not to revisit theoretical debates regarding reciprocity or patrimonialism as such.
6 It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the reasons why Lao migrants decide against taking action. For a comparative analysis of Lao and Burmese migrants in terms of social organisation, see (Molland Citation2021).
7 The reason Ko Thet Oo refers to the lack sub-contracting arrangements has to do with ongoing problems with rent-seeking practices by migrant brokers at these registration centres.
8 The MOU system refers to legal, state-sanctioned channels where migrants can, through licensed recruitment agencies, obtain legal employment in Thailand. It is based on bilateral Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between Mekong countries. It is riddled with rent-seeking problems, which causes considerable embarrassment and tensions for Myanmar and Thai governments and has been subject to considerable discussion amongst aid agencies and the media (Huijsmans & Phouxay Citation2008; Charouensuthipan Citation2017; Campbell Citation2018).
9 A demand letter is an official document that Thai employers must obtain to legally import labour migrants. The case Ko Thet Oo refers to in this post appear to be one of many examples where recruitment agencies or brokers fraudulently import labour migrants well beyond their set quotas resulting in migrants being farmed out to different types of jobs than are stipulated in their contracts (with often much worse working conditions).
10 In addition to Thai employers, Thai recruitment agencies can also import labour, but they must obtain a license which is conditional on a 5 million Baht bond. Khun Chalerm bypassed this requirement by posing as an ‘employer’.