ABSTRACT
Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The most notable example is Waltz’s comment that ‘[t]he theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era … . In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of actions for others as well as for themselves’ (1975: 72).
2. Other strategic options have also been identified, including hiding, transcending (Schroeder Citation1994), buck-passing (Posen Citation1984), non-alignment (Labs Citation1992).
3. These seven countries are: Sao Tome and Principle (December 2016), Panama (June 2017), Dominican Republic (May 2018), Burkina Faso (May 2018), El Salvador (August 2018), the Solomon Islands (September 2019) and Kiribati (September 2019).
4. See, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, at <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3566_665531/t23031.shtml>, accessed 24 November 2020.
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Notes on contributors
T.Y. Wang
T. Y. Wang is Chair of the Department of Politics and Government, Illinois State University in Normal, Illinois, USA. He was designated as ISU University Professor in 2020 and currently serves as the co-editor of the Journal of Asian and African Studies. Wang’s current research focuses on Taiwanese national identity, cross-Strait relations, and US policy towards China and Taiwan. He is the co-editor of the Taiwan Voter (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017) (with Christopher Achen).
Alexander C. Tan
Alexander C. Tan is Head of Department and Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury, University Chair Professor of the Department of Political Science and Taiwan Institute of Governance and Communications Research at the National Cheng-chi University (Taiwan), and Honorary Professor of the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College. A graduate of Texas A&M University, University of California at Santa Barbara, and Ateneo de Manila University, he has published extensively in the areas of political parties and elections, political economy, Asian politics and international affairs.