ABSTRACT
Much has been said about recurrent conflicts between the government of Spain and the executives of autonomous communities. Drawing on mixed methods, this research explores some of the deterrents of the centre–periphery quarrels in Spain. This investigation operationalizes intergovernmental tensions through a quantitative data set based on several litigations between regional and central executives in Spain before the Constitutional Court from 1980 to 2014, as well as a series of 30 in-depth interviews. It demonstrates that the organization of sectorial conferences, the signing of cooperation agreements and periods of party congruence help prevent the rise of intergovernmental contestation.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. A third category should be added with the creation in 1995 of two autonomous Spanish cities located in Africa: Ceuta and Melilla.
2. Regional and central governments can file other types of litigation, such as the negative conflicts of power (conflictos negativos de competencias) or the review of constitutionality (control previo de constitucionalidad).
3. According to interviewees, those three peaks of dispute correspond historically to the launching of the state of autonomies in the early 1980s, the transfers of health and education in the 2000s, and the budgetary cuts provoked by the 2008 Great Recession.
4. Such as the Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia of 1981, reformed in 2007.
5. Even if the Constitutional Court interpreted this legal framework in a restrictive way in 2010 through its decision 31/2010.
6. Obviously, this depiction is far too simplistic. In reality, symmetric and asymmetric devolution dynamics have coincided in several cases.
7. As an example, a former regional minister of Treasury stated, ‘[Under Rajoy] sectorial conferences converted into classrooms where central ministers give homework to their regional counterparts’ (Seville).