The Forces of Imperialism: Internalist and Global Explanations of the Anglo-European Empires, 1750–1960

ABSTRACT

The authors explain the imperial expansion of the Anglo-European states from the 18th century to the 20th century using an original pooled time series database on rates of colonization by the Western powers. They employ a negative binomial regression that tests different theories, from classical internalist theories that emphasize domestic or national-level factors, to more global theories that explain formal imperialism by reference to the wider international context in which states operate. Testing these different theories, the authors find that states are most likely to engage in formal imperialism when (a) the world-system is at its most economically competitive, (b) when those societies are more militarized, and (c) when they have more power capabilities relative to other states.

KEYWORDS:

• Imperialism
• colonization
• world-system
• regression

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments on various versions of this article, the authors thank the Editors of SQ, the anonymous reviewers, and Christopher Chase-Dunn, Ho-Fung Hung, David McCourt, and the other participants at the 2016 Social Science History Association meetings.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The closest comprehensive analysis is from Gartzke and Rohmer (2011). Yet their models do not test the full scope of variables that we test here. They do not, for instance, test the theories of Spencer or the Hobson-Lenin thesis, nor do they test the WS level variables discussed subsequently.

2. Later we distinguish “classical realism” from “relational power realism” in international relations theory, though we recognize that the lines between them are not always stark. By classical realism we refer to an interpretation of realism as positing that state interests and capacities are essential and inherent. Alternatively, most later versions of realism since Waltz (1979) are more relational and do not rely on such essentialist notions.

3. Scholars might debate when exactly this “system” emerged historically, what its most important characteristics are, and what drives its expansion (e.g., Carlson 2001; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1994, 1997, 2012), but for our purposes of studying modern imperialism, this debate does not alter our analysis because most scholars in this tradition would agree that during the time period under study, there was a “capitalist world-system” constituted at base by certain economic hierarchies.

4. We realize that IR theory also includes classical realist theory regarding state capacity noted above, which is an internalist theory rather than a proper international or global theory. But we use this categorization here for simplicity’s sake. By “structural IR theory,” then, we seek to differentiate these approaches from both classical realist theory and WS theories which are also global but which emphasize the world economic “system.” In the discipline of IR there is a large literature on how the international “system” should be theorized which do not rest on economic considerations but on geopolitical divisions. For a recent review statement on the vast literature in IR that sees the international system as a system of state hierarchy, see Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon (2018). For “empire” specifically in IR, see the early statement by Barkawi and Laffey (2002) and recent works such as Nexon and Wright (2007).

5. The U.S. cases include, among others, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, all of which were officially “colonies” (i.e., dependent territories without a status equal to states in the union). For thorough discussions of these territories as “colonies,” see Burnett and Marshall (2001), Go (2011) .

6. If we were to include territories run by private companies, we would have to include more recent Export Processing Zones, which means we would be equating those, the Princely States of India, and the control by the United States of the Philippines, and by England of Zambia. Relatedly, some of these company-controlled territories had a wide amount of autonomy, which also renders them less comparable to our cases of direct colonial control. Finally, these are relatively few in number, so we do not believe adding them to our regression analyses would change or alter the conclusions.

7. An argument can be made that many of these non-Western cases are beyond the scope of our analysis because they were “incorporative” empires, taking territories as equal to other territories in the empire, as opposed to the Western colonial empires that treated territories as inferior relative to other territories in the empire (Barkey 2008; Howe 2002; Lieven 2002). Ravlo et al (2003) are among others who focus on European empires because they were the most active colonial powers. It is the case, though, that some historians suggest that these non-Western empires were in fact more similar to Western empires (e.g., Cooper and Burbank 2010). But as historians still debate the status of these empires and their comparability to Western empires, we find that it makes sense to exclude them, especially given the data limitations noted here.

8. Because WS theory defines “hegemony” in economic terms, it periodizes the mid-20th century as a hegemonic/unicentric period, with the U.S. as the hegemon, despite U.S.-USSR geopolitical rivalry. See, among others, Boswell (1989) and Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979).

9. This begs the question as to how hegemonic competition and relative power capabilities are related, if at all. Because the correlation coefficients (Table 6) are not significant, it is difficult to say conclusively. However, if anything, we would suspect that they are negatively related: when there is a more equal distribution of economic capital among the states (i.e., when there is more hegemonic competition), each state is also less powerful than others in terms of relative power capacity—that is, there is a more equal distribution of power among states.

Pearson correlation coefficients.

10. Even the annexation of Crimea by Russia is not formal colonialism in the proper sense of the concept, because Crimea by this invasion becomes fully incorporated into Russia like any other territory (or “federal subject”) in the Russian federation.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Zophia Edwards

Zophia Edwards is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Providence College. Her research interests include colonialism, race, labor movements, and development. Her work has appeared in Studies in Comparative International Development, Political Power and Social Theory, and Journal of Historical Sociology.

Julian Go

Julian Go is Professor of Sociology at Boston University. His latest books include Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory and Global Historical Sociology (co-ed with George Lawson).