Abstract
This article investigates how practices and practicing are also ways of knowing and knowledge and thus epistemologically generative. Drawing on philosophy of religion, practical-theological ideas of practical wisdom, as well as sociological practice theory, it argues that practices are sites of generating and acquiring basic epistemic skills of perception and forming beliefs. But even more, they are shared forms of knowing since they provide socially, materially and bodily distributed interpretations of objects, persons and abstracts and their import, circulating knowledge of how to do and perform practices, and an understanding of the objectives of practices and their emotive significance. This is then exemplified with certain aspects of funerals, analysing how they are cultural and religious sedimentations of knowing death and mortality.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Clearly illustrated in Miller-McLemore, Wiley Blackwell Companion, Part 1.
2 Gherardi, Organizational Knowledge, xii.
3 Holloway et al., “Funerals Aren’t Nice”; Caswell, “Personalisation in Scottish Funerals”; Woodthorpe, “Family and Funerals”; O’Rourke, Spitzberg and Hannawa, “The Good Funeral”; Bailey and Walter, “Funerals Against Death.”
4 Jüngel, Death, 9.
5 Miller-McLemore, “Disciplining,” 175.
6 Scharen, “The Loss and Recovery.”
7 Ibid., 219.
8 Ibid., 221.
9 Ibid., 222.
10 Bennett et al., Invitation to Research, 58.
11 Ibid., 64, 72.
12 Ibid., 31. This also echoes ways of understanding lived religion as well as cultural religion as practical theology’s main objects of interest. See Weyel, “Practical Theology”; Heimbrock, “Leben”; Ganzevoort and Roeland, “Lived Religion” and Gräb, “Practical Theology”; Gräb, Vom Menschsein.
13 See Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, for explication of the critique against modern, representational epistemology.
14 Wolterstorff, “Entitlement to Believe.”
15 Ibid., 86–7, 91.
16 Ibid., 96–7.
17 McGuigan and Kallenberg, “Ecclesial Practices,” 4–5.
18 Ibid., 6.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 13.
21 Ibid., 11–13.
22 Schilbrack, Philosophy, 38. See also Henriksen, Christianity as Distinct Practices.
23 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 37.
24 Sanders, Theology in the Flesh, 47.
25 Ibid., 22.
26 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 45.
27 Ibid., 65; Sanders, Theology in the Flesh, 52–3.
28 Ibid.
29 Schilbrack, Philosophy, 41.
30 Ibid., 42.
31 Ibid.
32 Schäfer, “Einleitung,” 12–13.
33 Schatzki, “Introduction: Practice Theory,” 3.
34 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 5.
35 Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory,” 246.
36 Hui, Schatzki and Shove, “Introduction,” 1. Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory,” 249.
37 Schatzki, “Practice Minded Orders,” 50.
38 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 219–20.
39 Ibid., 231–2.
40 Schatzki, “Introduction: Practice Theory,” 2.
41 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 5.
42 Gherardi Organizational Knowledge, xvi. See also Nicolini, Gherardi and Yanow, “Introduction,” 3.
43 Collins, “What is Tacit Knowledge,” 115–16.
44 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 5.
45 Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory,” 253–4.
46 Reckwitz, “Grundelemente einer Theorie,” 292–3.
47 Nicolini, Practice Theory, 224–5.
48 Ibid., 226.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 225.