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ABSTRACT
Malaysia’s 14th General Election in 2018 toppled the Barisan Nasional government after six decades in power. Barisan Nasional’s longevity was due to its performance legitimacy and a capacity to manipulate electoral mechanisms. However, it was the use of money in eliciting consent that led to a political change. This article traces how sustaining the dominance of the Barisan Nasional under Najib Razak used a strategy which we term the monetisation of consent. However, when monetising consent loses its efficacy, political dominance is challenged. We discuss why and how manufacturing consent through the use of money has its limits when regime legitimacy is challenged. Intense political competition on the electoral terrain from 2008 and the multiplication of Malay-Muslim political parties induced Najib’s greater personal grip on state funds to gain political support. This resulted in the Najib regime’s kleptocratic turn. Beyond the disbursement of largesse to political power brokers and business elites, his government monetised consent as a populist strategy. The reduced efficacy of electoral manipulation made the monetisation of consent imperative for regime survival but the use of money and unpopular fiscal policies, which deprived citizens of disposable income, led to a legitimacy crisis and the Barisan Nasional’s defeat.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. As acknowledged by Herman and Chomsky, the original use of the phrase was by the highly regarded American journalist and liberal thinker Walter Lippmann (Citation1922).
2. See Caperchi (Citation2012) for why neo-liberal market practices are today easily accepted as common sense because of the denial of alternative worldviews.
3. The significance of FELDA as a crucial UMNO vote bank has been studied by Khor (Citation2015) and Mohamad (Citation2015). See also Pakiam (Citation2018) for an analysis of BN’s loss of FELDA seats in the 2018 general election.
4. Najib’s notion of “personalised” rule is to be distinguished from Mahathir’s rule (Hwang Citation2003). In Hwang’s study Mahathir’s authoritarianism is emphasised, with far less attention to his direct control of party finances. In Najib’s case the personalisation is developed in his control over political and state finances, as well as in using funds from his personal bank account to finance elections.
5. As deputy leader, Najib executed what was termed the “Perak Coup” in which the defection of two politicians (allegedly through huge cash payments) saw the collapse of the opposition in that state government in 2009. As defence minister he was also implicated in bribery allegations in the purchase of submarines from French companies. The French court for corruption indicted two heads of these companies. Later, Najib’s associate Abdul Razak Baginda was indicted for his role in the submarine deal (see Malaysiakini, August 3, 2017; Le Parisein, July 18, 2017).
6. A comprehensive review of the complex 1MDB scandal is beyond the scope of this article, not least because investigations are continuing. The DOJ made its filing of its forfeiture litigation on June 15, 2017 (See DOJ Citation2017). The DOJ had earlier mentioned a Malaysian Official 1(MOI) – presumed to be Prime Minister Najib – and alleged that 1MDB funds were transferred to MO1’s personal bank account. The scandal saw comprehensive coverage by The Wall Street Journal and The Edge, a business and financial weekly, which was suspended by Malaysian authorities for three months from July 2015. The Sarawak Report which also relentlessly reported on the affair was also banned by the Najib government. Following the 2018 defeat of BN, three books were published in quick succession on the 1MBD scandal (Wright and Hope Citation2018; Brown Citation2018; and Gunasegaram and Kinibiz Citation2018).
7. The convictions included banker Yeo Jiawei, an associate of Jho Low (Low Taek Jho), the alleged mastermind of the 1MDB fund, sentenced to 54 months in prison (The Business Times, July 13, 2017).
8. For a succinct but detailed exposition of the internationalisation of the scandal, its various phases and the money laundering aspects, see Lee (Citation2018).
9. Space does not allow for a full rendering of the complex web of FGV controversies. For an analysis of FGV’s woes and its relevance to the shifting political dynamics, see Saravanamuttu (Citation2017) and Khor (Citation2017).
10. Penang state’s website detailing such programmes is: http://penangparadigm.com. Accessed November 18, 2017.
11. There were indications that the growth rate would drop below 5% under Najib. Such talk could have affected Najib’s performance legitimacy (see The Star Online, August 18, 2018).
12. The PH parties won the states of Selangor, Penang, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Kedah, Johor, Melaka while PAS took Kelantan and Terengannu and Warisan captured Sabah. Parti Warisan also opted to join the PH government at the federal level.
13. A total of 21 money laundering charges pertained to the so-called Arab donation. Najib is alleged to have personally received RM2.08 billion in nine tranches from Tanore Financial Corporation through the Falcon Bank in Singapore. He was also charged with abusing his power in receiving gratification of RM2.28 billion from 1MDB, which included the RM2.08 billion (KiniGuide Citation2018).
14. A similar approach or stratagem was arguably used in Thailand by several governments and most spectacularly by former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in subsidising rice farmers, a major vote bank, by effectively giving the farmers purchase prices for their crops well above the market value (see Ricks Citation2018).