Threats or Opportunities? Chinese “Proto-Elite” Perceptions of their Regional Neighbours

ABSTRACT

Realists perceive China’s rise as a threat to the international order. Liberals see China’s increased participation in international organisations as examples of greater integration in the global order. Both sets of analyses frequently overlook the opinions of the Chinese public or conflate them with those of the state. To better understand how the Chinese people, particularly those among the elite, perceive the international order we conducted a large-scale survey among China’s “proto-elite” youths concerning their views of the international order. Our findings suggest that the current dichotomy between realist and liberal scholars is too simplistic. The respondents to the survey demonstrated aspects of both positions – supporting co-operation with the neighbouring states yet, simultaneously, considering most of the same neighbours as threatening to Chinese interests. Given the increasing presence of Chinese people seeking to have an impact on the country’s foreign affairs and the way the state seems to episodically permit such societal voices to infuse foreign policy issues, it is argued that a deeper analysis of this complex array of views is essential for a more complete understanding of the domestic context to China’s rise.

KEY WORDS:

• Threat perception
• defensive realism
• China
• East Asia
• foreign policy
• survey

Notes

¹ It is useful to observe that others – such as Ikenberry (2016) – propose that the regional order is bifurcated between a security order, led by the USA, and an economic order, led by China. Structurally, we disagree with Ikenberry’s conclusion that such a bifurcation between two competing powers can be the status quo. A competition, by its very nature, implies a winner and a loser, and a subsequently dominant set of norms and values – which leads us back to the realist/liberal debates.

² It is worthwhile noting the comments of a senior Chinese foreign policy official during a talk in Hong Kong on April 4, 2019, attended by one of the authors, stating: “The Chinese Foreign Ministry attaches great importance of the sentiment of the Chinese people.” The official went on to explain that the Foreign Ministry deals on a daily basis with increased communication from Chinese citizens as well as reviewing all social media posts that relate to the foreign affairs. This is in addition to fielding queries from National People’s Congress members, who may also be responding to public concerns. As the official observed: “otherwise the Foreign Ministry would receive criticism for being out of touch.” While these statements do not indicate where the threshold for incorporating such views into foreign policy lies, they suggest that the foreign ministry is responsive to public perceptions and that such perceptions can have an influence on policy matters; although under what conditions and to what extent remain uncharted.

³ The focus on students has been previously used by Han and Zweig (2010) as well as Pang and Thomas (2017). Even though the methodology yields a statistically significant sample, the inferences that can be drawn for the wider population are limited. For a discussion of “proto-elites” in China, see, for example, Cheng (1994).

⁴ Some of the findings raise the possibility of an alternative worldview being held by our respondents: outside the realist/liberal dichotomy. The nature of this orientation cannot be determined by this study. As noted earlier, it is a limitation of the research but, as the data show, most respondents do fall into clearly identified categories drawn upon by the original study.

⁵ The survey structure does not yield an explanation as to why the results contained three components in the Chinese setting. We suspect that this result is due to cultural differences or may be due to methodological or survey techniques. This will be clarified in a future study.

⁶ Each term is carefully explained in Chinese to avoid misunderstanding. Respondents in the Guangzhou pilot study offered suggestions for alternative wordings and respondents in the Beijing pilot study claimed to fully understand the questions.

⁷ Drawing upon the experimental approach used by Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau (2012, 179) the directional relations between power and threat were tested, with identity and worldview types being controlled for the seven countries. The results are in line with the correlation results (see Appendix Table A3).

⁸ This fits with Nathan and Ross’s (1996, 10) observation that in the twentieth century: “China has engaged in military conflicts with the United States, Russia, Japan, India, Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan. All remain potential military rivals. It is also conceivable that China might have to use military arms against North Korea … China’s borders are easier to invade than defend … War today looks unlikely, but defence planners cannot rule out the long-run possibility of war at almost any place along China’s long continental or maritime borders.”

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by The Key Upbringing Research Grant for Young Scholars in Sun Yat-Sen University, #20wkzd04.