Weapon of Resistance or Tool of Control? Chinese Labour Law in a Post-Strike Era

ABSTRACT

Some previous studies have depicted the law in China as a weapon of resistance for the weak and recent apparently pro-labour national statutes are seen as empowering workers. The law governing the practices of labour relations has, however, become a tool for employers to counter rising labour activism. In this article, a detailed case study illustrates how factory managers used the law to control labour since the strike wave of 2010. The legal framework for labour relations and China’s strong state made this new management strategy possible. The law is a combination of labour-related laws, including criminal regulations beyond the labour acts, redolent with inconsistent interpretations and applications. This mixture allows some employers to flexibly deploy the law to discipline workers and constrain collective labour. Consequently, when applied in workplaces, the law is not as labour-friendly as it may appear, but it is so malleable that it may be both the worker’s weapon of resistance and the employer’s tool of control. This study enriches the understanding of labour relations in China by including employers’ strategies and behaviours, which are often neglected in labour studies, and also explores how the macro-level political-legal context shapes workplace dynamics.

KEY WORDS:

• Chinese labour law
• management strategy
• weapon of resistance
• tool of control

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Gaochao He for his inspiring advice and constant encouragement especially during the fieldwork.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. This is not to simply dichotomise the actor and institutional perspectives, as the two perspectives are necessarily intertwined. The division only shows different foci in the literature where some studies highlight the interest and subjectivity of actors while others emphasise the feature and impact of broader institutions.

2. It is highly profitable for Factory A to manufacture its specialised components. The internal purchasing of auto parts within Japanese corporate groups makes the information about revenue and profit non-transparent and employers have become particularly cautious in providing any concrete data regarding their sales and revenues. However, according to an estimate based on open data released by carmakers and interviews with managers and senior workers, this factory has steadily expanded production and increased its revenues.

3. While the interviewees were asked about the strikes during the authors’ investigations, they usually avoided the term, referring to “the incidents.”

Additional information

Funding

Siqi Luo acknowledges the support of a research grant by the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of the Ministry of Education in China (No.18YJC840026).