Games and ideal playgrounds

ABSTRACT

Even though many sport philosophers have worked to delineate clear definitions of play and games, typical language usage often conflates the two phenomena and even provides an undue normative bias toward games as play. In this paper, I argue that a better understanding of games and ideal playgrounds is required to alleviate this normative bias. To carry out this argument, I first examine previous definitions of play and games and how the concepts are often conflated. Secondly, I provide a definition of ideal playgrounds using prior philosophy on play and human conventions. Third, I present an analysis that examines how both game and non-game activities can act as ideal playgrounds. Finally, I argue that changes to the way we use language can help to alleviate this problem.

KEYWORDS:

• Play
• games
• conventions

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Chad Carlson, journal editor Paul Gaffney, and the anonymous reviewers from the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. It should be noted that both Huizinga’s Homo Ludens and Caillois’ Man, Play and Games have been translated to English, so some confusion between the terms play and games could be a result of translation. However, my point still stands: both authors often do not present clear, separate delineations of games and play.

2. For a more in-depth discussion of the conflation of play and games, see Carlson (2011).

3. Some sport philosophers have voiced concerns of some aspects of this definition. Morgan (2008), for example, worries that Suits too forcefully separated playing and game-playing, but remedies it by arguing that players must be committed to intrinsic goals. Schmid (2011) disagrees that autotelicity need be a strong criterion for playing, contending that the ‘intrinsic reasons account’ allows for a continuum and mixed motivations to better define play. Royce (2011) concludes that Suits’ definition of play, particularly his emphasis on ‘playing with,’ is not sufficiently defended. Ryall (2013) highlights similar concerns about the redundancy of reallocating time and issues around autotelicity. Although these authors delineate clear and forceful criticisms of Suits’ definition, none advocate for a wholesale elimination of his examination of play. Thus, based on previous analyses of play and with these criticisms in mind, I maintain that play can be defined, as least sufficiently for the purpose of discussing ideal play, by autotelicity, intrinsic value, and a temporary reallocation of goods (including time).

4. For more on the debate on constitutive rules, see Hindriks (2009).

5. Often, reading literature is not a game (along with listening to music, and other non-game playgrounds). Certainly, elements could be added to reading fiction (and other non-game playgrounds), such as stipulating that a certain number of pages must be read within a specific timeframe, that would make it a game.

6. Thank you to journal editor Paul Gaffney for his helpful suggestion to consider the implications of ideal play and how my definition could, without clarification, be incorrectly extended to other activities that are not typically considered play.