The myth of German hegemony in the euro area revisited

Abstract

This paper contributes to the scholarly debate on hegemony and leadership in international relations and elaborates on an analytical framework to assess the nature, scope, functions and causal mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic leadership in general terms. Based on this framework, it takes issue with the interpretation of Germany’s role during the euro area crisis as being a hegemonic one. Discussing the concepts of hegemony, leadership and dominance, it argues that Germany proved dominant during the euro area crisis on selected issues, mainly using its veto power. On other issues, Berlin provided non-hegemonic leadership, more often than not asymmetric co-leadership shared with France. It did not play the role of a hegemon, however, lacking the resources and being unable to shape decisively the economic constitution of the euro area along the lines of its core preferences.

Keywords:

• Germany
• hegemony
• leadership
• euro area
• European Union

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the conveners and participants of the ECPR Workshop on ‘The Role of Leadership in EU Politics and Policy Making’, held at Nicosia, 10–14 April 2018, for their valuable comments, in particular the discussant of my paper, Marij Swinkels. A special thanks goes to two anonymous reviewers for their very detailed and extremely constructive and helpful feedback. Last but not least, I would like to thank Joanna Ardizzone for her careful proofreading. The usual disclaimer applies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Joachim Schild is Professor of Political Science at Trier University. His research focuses on Franco-German relations in the European Union and the political economy of European integration. His books include Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics, co-authored with Ulrich Krotz (2013, OUP). [[email protected]]

Notes

1 All quotes from German sources are translated by the author.

2 In a similar fashion, Underdal defines leadership ‘as an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others toward a certain goal over a certain period of time’ (Underdal 1994: 178).

3 For a distinction between dominance and leadership, based on a public goods argument, see Kindleberger (1981).

4 Triepel’s thinking on hegemony is succinctly summarised by Anderson (2017: 25–31).

5 Contrary to this understanding, Destradi sees a hegemon mainly as aiming ‘to realise its own self-interested goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states’ whereas ‘the leader guides – “leads” – a group of states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objectives’ (Destradi 2010: 921).

6 From Triepel’s perspective, a concept such as ‘coercive hegemonic leadership’ (in opposition to the ‘benevolent’ kind, see Snidal 1985: 579) would be a contradictio in adjecto as it implies the non-voluntary subordination of followers and the use of threats, arm-twisting or brute force by the leader.

7 For a different view, see Lake 1993. He suggests an explicit distinction between leadership theory, building on public goods theory and assuming shared interests, and hegemony theory, which starts from diverging policy preferences of states and where hegemons use power and coercion to overcome conflicting preferences.

8 In a similar vein, Harnisch sees leadership roles as limited in time and functional scope, hence more acceptable to followers than hegemony (Harnisch 2014: 48).

9 On soft power, see Nye (1990).

10 According to Keohane (1984: 32), ‘[h]egemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods’.

11 See Peterson (1995) for the distinction between history-making, policy-shaping, and policy-setting decisions in the EU. However, not all history-making decisions reflect the decisive influence of a hegemon. I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for making this point.

12 See Bulmer (1997: 72–7) for a discussion of different faces of German power.

13 Data from Eurostat, at market values in power purchasing parities.

14 For a similar argument in the context of the European Monetary System, see Kaelberer (1997: 40).

15 Pedersen (2002) uses the concept of co-hegemony for analysing Franco-German relations in Europe.

16 Degner and Leuffen (2019: 90) refer to this capacity as a mechanism of ‘elimination’.

17 Interviews with senior civil servants from the ministries of finance in creditor states from the ‘New Hanseatic League’, 11 and 14 January 2019.

18 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point to me.

19 Interview with a senior civil servant in the German Chancellery’s European policy department on 14 March 2012.