Civil–military relations and organisational preferences regarding the use of the military in Chinese foreign policy: insights from the debate on MOOTW

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the positions of the Chinese civilian leaders and military elites on Military Operations Other Than War in order to shed light on their preferences about the use of the armed forces in foreign policy between the late 1990s and the early 2010s. Over time, a significant divergence developed between civilians and soldiers until 2011, when the Libyan crisis happened. The study also prompts important considerations about our understanding of civil–military relations in China and future role of the People’s Liberation Army as a tool of statecraft in foreign policy.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil–military relations
• military operations other than war
• organisational preferences
• foreign policy
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2015).

² For example: You Ji, China’s Military Transformation (Maldem, MA and Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2016), ebook position 840–1194.

³ Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force (New York: Cambridge UP 2003), ebook position 2728–42.

⁴ To some extent, an exception is David Shambaugh and Xiao Ren, ‘China: The Conflicted Power’, in Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally (eds.), Worldviews of Aspiring Power (New York: Oxford UP 2012), ebook position 767–1459.

⁵ For example: Ankit Panda, ‘China’s Military May Have Gone “Rogue” After All’, The Diplomat, 23 Sept. 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-may-have-gone-rogue-after-all/.

⁶ Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Decision-making Regarding Taiwan 1979–2000’, in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2001), 323–6.

⁷ Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP 1984), 55–9.

⁸ Michael D. Swaine, ‘China’s Assertive Behaviour Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises’, China Leadership Monitor 37 (2012), http://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-assertive-behavior-part-four-role-military-foreign-crises.

⁹ The ‘realpolitik’ approach sees the use of force to resolve interstate issues that represent a substantial threat to national security and to the nation’s core interests. The ‘interventionist’ view expands the use of force to address also issues beyond classic interstate competition/conflict. Classic ‘interventionist’ missions are peacekeeping and counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations. I stick to this general definition in this article. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, ‘American Veterans in Government and the Use of Force’, in James M. McCormick (ed.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Plymouth, UK: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers 2012) 6th edition, 105–22.

¹⁰ Stefano Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warrior (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2015).

¹¹ David M. Finkelstein, ‘China’s “New Concept of Security”’, in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition (Washington, DC: National Defence UP 2003), 193–210.

¹² ‘NDU Experts Discuss MOOTW: How to Use the Military Today’, Guangming Daily, 26 May 2010, http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201005/26/t20100526_21447514.shtml.

¹³ For the Chinese military doctrine: AMS Research Department (eds.), The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 2013). The academic journals here examined are AMS’ China Military Science and the NDU’s Journal of the National Defence University. The newspapers taken into consideration are the PLA Daily and the China National Defence Daily, both published under the auspices of the Political Work Department of the CMC (known as the PLA General Political Department until 2016).

¹⁴ As pointed out by Timothy R. Heath, the defence white papers are largely built on how civilians define ‘security’ and ‘defence’, and what role the PLA has to play. The PLA scholars then may expand on the direction provided by the central leadership, but they may not undermine or contradict the national-level decision. Therefore, I take them into consideration in order to complement the information collected from the other civilian sources that usually talk about security only alongside other issues. Timothy R. Heath, ‘An Overview of China’s National Military Strategy’, in Joe McReynolds (ed.), China’s Evolving Military Strategy (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation 2015), 12–46.

¹⁵ Yizhou Wang, ‘Talking about the Transformation of Chinese Diplomacy’, Study & Exploration 5 (2008), 57–67.

¹⁶ Yuejin Liu, ‘Expression of Non-traditional Security Concepts by the Chinese Government’, in Yu Xiaofeng and Wei Zhijiang (eds.), Bluebook of Non-traditional Security (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 2014), 14–7.

¹⁷ ‘Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 14th National Congress of the CCP’, People’s Daily, 12 Oct. 1992, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313.html.

¹⁸ ‘China Offers New Security Concept at ASEAN Meetings’, Xinhua, 2 Aug. 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-08/01/content_507462.htm.

¹⁹ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. China’s National Defence (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, PRC 2000), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/20-2.htm.

²⁰ ‘Report to the 16th National Congress of the CCP’, People’s Daily, 8 Nov. 2002, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429125.html.

²¹ Nongyi Du, Military Diplomacy of New China and International Peacekeeping (Beijing: Guofang daxuechu banshe 2015), 149.

²² Jiaping Fu, ‘On Foreign Affairs in National Defence in the Situation of Peace and Development’, China Military Science 1 (1994), 55–60.

²³ For example: Qinggong Li, ‘Views on the Evolution of the Post Cold War World Military Pattern’, China Military Science 1 (1997), 112–9.

²⁴ Jianmin Wang and Tinggui Fu, ‘Building Up a Powerful Mechanized Force’, China Military Science 3 (1997), 145–49.

²⁵ Yongsheng Tang, ‘China and UN Peacekeeping Operations’, World Economics and Politics 9 (2002), 39–44.

²⁶ Jianqun Teng, ‘Analysis’ of ‘American’ MOOTW’, PLA Daily, 2 Aug. 2000.

²⁷ Guangqiang Peng and Youzhi Yao (eds.), Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 2001), 15–6, 214, 484, 500.

²⁸ Mingwu Wang, et al. (eds.), Military Operations Other Than War (Beijing: PLA NDU Press 2009).

²⁹ Guangkai Xiong, ‘China’s National Defence Policy’, China Military Science 5 (2000), 17–22.

³⁰ Zhengnan Xia (ed.), ‘A Rationalist Understanding of Terrorist War and Anti Terrorism War’, China Military Science 6 (2001), 138–40.

³¹ Yao Youzhi and Zhao Xide, ‘The Generalization, Conservation, and Development of “Strategy”’, China Military Science 4 (2001), 120–7.

³² Bingjin Cao, Decai Li, and Zili Zhu, ‘Views on National Security Strategy’, China Military Science 6 (2000), 111–6.

³³ Liang Feng and Xiaolin Zhang, ‘The Strategic Application of the Navy in Peacetime’, China Military Science 3 (2000), 77–84.

³⁴ ‘Hu Jintao: The Essence of the Three Representatives is Establishing the Party for the Public, Governing for the People’, cnr.cn, 2 Jul. 2003, http://www.cnr.cn/news/200307020213.html.

³⁵ The views expressed in the eighth issue of World Economics and Politics in 2009, the flagship journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of World Economics and Politics, offer a comprehensive overview the debate.

³⁶ National Bureau of Statistics, China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press 2005–2016).

³⁷ ‘The CCP’s Central Committee Decision on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Capabilities’ (Beijing: Central People’s Government, PRC 2004), http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-08/20/content_1075279.htm.

³⁸ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. China’s National Defence in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, PRC 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/I.htm.

³⁹ ‘Hu Jintao’s Report to the 17th National Congress of the CCP’, China Daily, 25 Oct. 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/25/content_6205616_9.htm.

⁴⁰ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, PRC 2011), http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm.

⁴¹ For example: Ping Wang, ‘Principles that the Army Groups Should Observe for Non-war Operations along the Borders’, Journal of the National Defence University 1 (2005),45–6.

⁴² For example: Haiming Zhang, ‘Analyzing the Origin of MOOTW’, China National Defence Daily, 30 Mar. 2006.

⁴³ For example: Xingsheng Wang and Zhizhong Wu, ‘On Building Soft Military Power’, China Military Science 20/1 (2007), 92–8.

⁴⁴ For example: Wei Zhang, ‘Growth and “Termination” of U.S. Theory of Non-war Military Operations’, China Military Science 3 (2008), 31–41.

⁴⁵ They list different missions and do not offer clear and consistent definitions of the concept MOOTW. Mingwu Wang, et al. (eds.), Military Operations Other Than War; Xiao Tianliang (ed.), The Non-War Use of Military Force (Beijing: PLA NDU Press 2009).

⁴⁶ The main takeaways from the disaster relief operations in Sichuan were that it was necessary to improve the political work carried out during and after MOOTW and that the PLA had to provide better equipment and training to its soldiers. For example: Cadre Department of the General Political Department, ‘A Study and Analysis of Improving Cadres’ Work in Non-war military Operations’, China Military Science5 (2008), 71–6.

⁴⁷ Xixin Wang, ‘Creating the Core Military Capabilities up with the Times’, PLA Daily, 2 May 2009.

⁴⁸ James Mulvenon, ‘Party-Military Coordination of the Yushu Earthquake Response’, China Leadership Monitor33 (2010), http://www.hoover.org/research/party-military-coordination-yushu-earthquake-response.

⁴⁹ For example: Jie Li, ‘An Aircraft Carrier Can Do More Than Fighting’, China National Defence Daily, 17 Febr. 2009.

⁵⁰ For example: Jiacheng He, Fang Zou, and Zhijun Lai, ‘Situation of International Military Safety and the Development strategy of China National Defence Economy’, Military Economic Research 1 (2005), 10–14.

⁵¹ Zhou Xie, ‘Discussion on the Legal Issues of Non-war Military Operations’, China Military Science 3 (2008), 19–24.

⁵² Xiaodong Li and Can Ou, ‘The Armed Forces Go Abroad, How Does the Law Protect Them?’, PLA Daily, 4 Apr. 2008.

⁵³ Junhua Peng and Feng Xiao, ‘Accelerating the Regulation of MOOTW’, PLA Daily, 28 Oct. 2008.

⁵⁴ Xuan Song, ‘Building a Platform for Cooperation and Dialogue’, PLA Daily, 11 Jun. 2009.

⁵⁵ Shaio H. Zerba, ‘China’s Libya Evacuation Operation: A New Diplomatic Imperative-Overseas Citizen Protection’, Journal of Contemporary China 23/90 (2014), 1093–1112.

⁵⁶ China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook, 2016.

⁵⁷ Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchậtel, China’s Strong Arm, Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad (New York: Routledge 2015), ebook position 2034–2358.

⁵⁸ Xia Liping, ‘Practice and Development of “Diplomacy for the People” since the 18th Party Congress’, People’s Daily, 6 Febr. 2015, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0206/c187710-26521276.html.

⁵⁹ Jiechi Yang, ‘The Path of Scientific Development for Diplomatic Work’, People’s Daily, 10 Oct. 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1010/c1001-19209677.html.

⁶⁰ ‘Report to the 18th National Congress of the CCP’, Xinhua, 8 Nov. 2012, http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/19/c_113722546.htm.

⁶¹ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, (Beijing: Information Office of the State, PRC 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.

⁶² ‘Xi Jinping: Upholding a Holistic National Security Concept Taking the Path of Security with Chinese Characteristics’, Xinhua, 15 Apr. 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm.

⁶³ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, PRC 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001.htm.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Yuejin Liu, ‘Non-traditional Concept of Overall National Security’, Journal of International Security Studies 6 (2014), 3–25.

⁶⁶ Haipi Li, ‘An Analysis of the Sustainable Development of China’s Consular Protection’, Contemporary International Relations 6 (2016), 9–14.

⁶⁷ Kunlun Huang, ‘The National Interest in the Era of Globalization’, PLA Daily, 15 Mar. 2011.

⁶⁸ For example: Jixian Liu, ‘Deepen the Understanding of the Objectives of Strengthening the Military and Its Practices’, China Military Science 4 (2013), 11–20.

⁶⁹ For example: Quan Li, ‘A study of Hu Jintao’s Important Expositions on Establishing Comprehensive Security Concepts’, China Military Science 5 (2012), 26–35.

⁷⁰ For example: Shoumin Chen, ‘Strategic Thinking on Strengthening Crisis Management in the Information Era’, China Military Science 3 (2013), 43–50.

⁷¹ Jixian Liu, ‘Strategic Guidance to Build the Capabilities for Non-war Operations’, China Military Science 1 (2013), 36–43.

⁷² Zhengqing Lv and Debin Xu, ‘Strengthening the Capabilities to Respond to International Crises’, China Defence Daily, 28 Mar. 2011.

⁷³ Guiyun Yue et al., ‘On All-Domain Manoeuvres’, China Military Science 4 (2015), 118–25.

⁷⁴ Wanquan Chang, ‘Asia-Pacific Security and China’s National Defence Building’, China Military Science 6 (2014), 1–3.

⁷⁵ Keshi Zhao, ‘Strategic Thoughts on Accelerating Modernization of PLA Logistics in the New Situation’, China Military Science 4 (2013) 1–10.

⁷⁶ TianYiwei, ‘The AMS Opens the MOOTW Research Centre”‘, Xinhua, 13 Dec. 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-12/13/c_122413199.htm?anchor=1.

⁷⁷ AMS Research Department (eds.), Science of Military Strategy, 120–21.

⁷⁸ A review made by Fravel shows that between 2004 and 2010 the protection of overseas interests and international antiterrorism operations are not in the list of operations considered MOOTW in Chinese military texts. However, they are in post-2011 manuals. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations in China’, Asian Security 7/3 (2011), 177–200; Shouhua Zheng (ed.), MOOTW Teaching Material (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 2013), 3.

⁷⁹ Daniel M. Hartnett, ‘China’s First Deployment of Combat Troops to a UN Peacekeeping Mission – South Sudan’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Memo, 13 Mar. 2012, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf.

⁸⁰ Simply, while instability in Mali can negatively affect the situation in Algeria, where the number of Chinese workers grew from 14,000 in 2002 to 91,000 in 2015, war in South Sudan and Sudan naturally is a destabilising factor for bordering countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia where Chinese economic presence is significant and growing. China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook, 2016 and previous years.

⁸¹ Yuandan Guo, ‘The PLA “Overseas Operation Unit” to Strengthen Overseas Rapid Reaction Capabilities’, Global Times, 25 Mar. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2016-03/8768818.html.

⁸² Andrea Ghiselli, ‘China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti, An Enabler of Its Middle East Policy’, China Brief 16/2 (2016), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti-an-enabler-of-its-middle-east-policy/.

⁸³ Nan Li, ‘Top leaders and the PLA: The different styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.), PLA influence on China’s national security policymaking, ebook position (2015), 2684–730.

⁸⁴ James Mulvenon, ‘Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions’, China Leadership Monitor 27 (2009), http://www.hoover.org/research/chairman-hu-and-plas-new-historic-missions.

⁸⁵ Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants, Agency, Oversights, and Civil-military Relations (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 2004), 63.

⁸⁶ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 57.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, Six years at sea…and counting (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation June 2015), 45–56.

⁸⁹ Haibin Tong, ‘Values and Morals for Development of Naval Culture’, China Military Science 6 (2012), 17–25.

⁹⁰ Michael S. Chase and Christina L. Garafola, ‘China’s Search for a “Strategic Air Force”’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/1 (2016), 4–28.

⁹¹ China’s National Defence in 2004.

⁹² The number and influence of the service chiefs within the CMC were greatly reduced, as in the aftermath of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017.

⁹³ James Mulvenon, ‘China’s “Goldwater-Nichols”? The Long-awaited PLA Reorganization Has Finally Arrived’, China Leadership Monitor 49 (2016), http://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-goldwater-nichols-long-awaited-pla-reorganization-has-finally-arrived.

⁹⁴ Keira Lu Huang, ‘Xi Jinping’s Reforms Encounter “Unimaginably Fierce Resistance”, Chinese State Media Says in “Furious” Commentary’, South China Morning Post, 21 Aug. 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1851314/xi-jinpings-reforms-encountering-fierce-resistance.

⁹⁵ Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books 2005).

⁹⁶ Xiaolin Ma, ‘Carefully Standing Close to an Imminent Danger: Thinking about China’s Participation in Peacekeeping Missions’, Beijing Youth Daily, 4 Jun. 2016, http://epaper.ynet.com/html/2016-06/04/content_201565.htm?div=-1.

⁹⁷ Andrea Ghiselli, ‘Growing Overlap between Counter-Terrorism and Overseas Interest Protection Acts as New Driver of Chinese Strategy’, China Brief, 16/9 (2016), https://jamestown.org/program/growing-overlap-between-counter-terrorism-and-overseas-interest-protection-acts-as-new-driver-of-chinese-strategy/.